

A QUESTION OF STRATEGY—STEPHEN W. SEARS

NORTH & SOUTH

THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE OF THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY

VOLUME 5 • NUMBER 4

TERROR 1860s Style

FIGHTING FOR TIME:
CAVALRY ACTIONS IN THE
RED RIVER CAMPAIGN

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

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
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
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The 2nd Kansas State Militia crossing into Missouri in late 1864. ("Better Off In Hell," page 20.)



The Federals had been nibbling away at the Mississippi citadel since winter. ("We Should Assume the Aggressive," page 58.)



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Editorial

GENTLEMEN?

THIS ISSUE'S ARTICLE, "TERROR—1860s STYLE," catalogs the ruthless logic of the Lincoln administration in targeting the enemy capital and members of the Confederate government, and the Confederate leadership's descent into darkness as it plotted, and attempted to execute, a campaign of indiscriminate terror against the civilian population of the North—and indeed in some instances of the occupied South. Arson, assassination, sabotage, and biological and chemical warfare all found a place in this desperate Confederate attempt to undermine civilian morale and thus undercut support for the war to preserve the Union.

There is a widespread tendency to view the American Civil War as—in the words of Winston S. Churchill—"the last war fought between gentlemen." And a concomitant reluctance to believe that Victorian gentlemen such as Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis could target one another for death. I, however, find the evidence that they did so rather compelling.

The emphasis of the "Terror" article, of course, is on the Confederate government's systematic resort to "black flag" warfare in the latter part of the war. Lest any reader conclude, however, that only Confederates dirtied their hands, they should read on. The following article, "Better Off In Hell," recounts the evolution of the Kansas "Red Legs"—nominally Unionist in sympathy—whose widespread depredations in Missouri are a tale of unrelenting horror.

* * * *

Some readers I suspect will question my statement above that the Lincoln administration targeted the members of the Confederate government. I will therefore spell out my understanding of the situation. In February 1864 Union cavalry under Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick attempted to capture Richmond and release Federal prisoners held there. The raid's second-in-command, Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, was killed, and papers found on his body proved to be operational plans calling for the burning of the city and the killing of members of the Confederate government. Denounced at the time by Union leaders as forgeries, their authenticity has since become widely accepted.

Who was behind the instructions? Members of the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Intelligence accompanied the raid, supplied with combustibles and propaganda leaflets. Neither Dahlgren nor Kilpatrick could have co-opted these men—their orders had to have come from higher up. Cavalry commander Alfred Pleasonton did not approve of the raid, and apparently played no part in its inception. Nor did Army of the Potomac commander George Meade or General-in-Chief Henry Halleck; indeed, the former explicitly denied any knowledge of the instructions found on Dahlgren's body.

That leaves only Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and Abraham Lincoln, or both. It seems unlikely that Stanton would have ordered the deaths of Confederate leaders without consulting the president, and we know that Kilpatrick presented his plan personally to Lincoln on February 12. Furthermore, we should not overlook Lincoln's telegram to Joe Hooker, nine months earlier, implying regret that the cavalry had failed to burn Richmond and capture Jeff Davis during the Chancellorsville Campaign. Does this prove that Lincoln was behind the instructions? No. But it strongly suggests that he was.

As always we welcome readers' letters on these and other topics.





Crossfire

HAPPY CAMPER

I have been a subscriber to *N&S* since the initial issue and subscribe to the other three main Civil War magazines as well. However, there is no doubt that *N&S* is far and away the most thought-provoking and well researched of all. I am an avid Civil War buff and want my thought process to be challenged each issue—not spoon fed with the same rehash of important battles and figures. You splendidly accomplish this goal and there isn't a close second. In short, it's the magazine I truly wait for every other month.

Regarding your editorial of volume 5 #2, I most enjoy those articles where battlefield tactics are secondary to the personalities, places and events that shaped them. Reading about how a relatively obscure general or city impacted the bigger picture brings these people and places to life. Your magazine has excelled in this endeavor. Please continue to mesh lesser people, events and places into your 85% military. Do NOT change too much.

—Ron Block, via email

CAVALRY IN THE INFANTRY?—NOT.


A co-worker passed along this issue to me [*N&S*, vol. 4, #6, special infantry tactics issue]. I couldn't help but notice in the cover painting that Colonel Ryan seems to have lost his sword. Do you know if there is a story behind this?

Also, in the same issue, the painting of Chickamauga on pages 58-59 is accompanied by the commentary, "It is unlikely the cavalry would have been sitting around quite so casually!"

In fact, no cavalry units took part in the defense of Snodgrass Hill (more properly called Horseshoe Ridge). Stanley's cavalry corps fought much farther south near Lee and Gordon's Mill defending supply trains against Wheeler's cavalry. And Wilder's brigade had been ordered to withdraw early Sunday afternoon to Chattanooga by that idiot Dana. The "cavalry" depicted in the painting in question are actually orderlies holding horses for dismounted officers.

Your obedient servant,
J.B. Turchin, Late Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers (a.k.a. Mike Strelka, Arlington Heights, Illinois)

ED.: General, mighty glad to hear from you—last time I heard you were incarcerated in the Southern Asylum for the Insane, in Ana, Illinois, and not expected to live. Your cavalry observation makes it obvious that time has not dimmed your eyes. As for the missing sword, artist Don Troiani tells me that it had been left behind on the colonel's horse.



HONOR OR SLAVERY?

W. Keith Beason, in his letter in the August issue of *North & South* ["Crossfire," vol. 4, #6], argues that "Southern honor, not slavery, was the cause of secession." He further asserts that this sense of honor was pervasive throughout Southern society. According to Mr. Beason, Lee described the Army of Northern Virginia as an "Army of Gentlemen!" right down to the barefoot privates and cooks.

If Virginia had such a strong sense of honor, and honor was the motive for secession, why did Virginia wait until after the firing on Fort Sumter to secede? Wouldn't Virginia have been among the first to secede? Clement Eaton, in *The Growth of Southern Civilization 1790-1860*, refers to the plantation gentry as cherishing the "idea of personal dignity, of honor." Eaton goes on to write "The masses of the Southern people, however, were too strongly molded by rural isolation to exhibit much of the countrygentlemen ideal." What, then, did unify Southern society?

Eaton explains that the institution of slavery was an interest that "tended to unify the heterogeneous elements of Southern Society.... The defense of slavery involved two powerful and constant human interests, the retention of profitable property...and the preservation of public safety. Southerners differed on many political measures, but when the institution of slavery was threatened they closed their ranks." (*The Growth of Southern Civilization*.)

Thus, the slave owner would support slavery because his livelihood and way of life depended on it. The non-slave owner would fear for his safety if large numbers of freed slaves existed in his community.

Beason quotes Eaton, "If slavery expansion into the Federal territories in 1860 was largely an abstract question, why then did Southern leaders insist on it? The answer, at least partly, was Southern pride.... Such a program also struck a blow to Southern prestige and power." Although Beason emphasizes "pride" it is important to note that Eaton also recognizes the "blow to Southern power."

I agree that the honor of slave holders was insulted by abolitionist attacks on the institution of slavery. Senator Charles Sumner's vitriolic and personal attacks come readily to mind. But I would suggest that there was more than honor at stake.

I'm not so sure the people of the 1850s saw the expansion of slavery in the territories as an "abstraction." Robert Toombs, who represented Georgia in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, stated in a speech November 13, 1861, during the secession crisis in Georgia, "before the end of this century, at precisely the same rate of increase, the Africans among us in a subordinate condition will amount to eleven millions of persons. What shall be done with them? We must expand or perish. We are constrained by an inexorable necessity to accept expansion or extermination." Toombs goes on that the North had as its object "to pen up slavery within its present limits—surround it a border of free States, and like the scorpion surrounded with fire, they will make it sting itself to death." (For Toombs' speech see *Secession Debated, Georgia's Show-down in 1860*.) A ban on slavery in the existing territories and territory acquired by the United States in the future would seem like a very real threat to the South.

In an 1858 speech at Edwardsville, Illinois, Lincoln said the Republican Party considered slavery to be a moral, social and political wrong. The party would use "every Constitutional method to prevent the evil from becoming larger.... They will, if possible, place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate peaceable extinction, in God's good time." When Lincoln was elected president at the head of a party that saw slavery as immoral and dedicated to the extinction of slavery, Southerners, very realistically, saw this as a threat to their whole way of life. This was more than an affront to Southern honor.

Joseph E. Brown, who served Georgia both before the war and after as governor, wrote a public letter on December 7, 1860, as

governor. Brown wrote: "What will be the result to the institution of slavery, which will follow submission to the inauguration and administration of Mr. Lincoln as the president of one section of the Union? My candid opinion is, that it will be the total abolition of slavery, and the utter ruin of the South, in less than twenty-five years." He went on to conjure up images of mass poverty, racial intermarriage, robbing and killing, etc., which he warned would inevitably follow emancipation. Brown is not talking about "honor" here; he is concerned with the inevitable emancipation of the slaves if Georgia remains in the Union. (Brown's letter can be found in *Secession Debated*.)

Was it a coincidence that the first states to secede were those with the largest slave populations? Virginia, as noted above, did not secede until after Fort Sumter was fired upon. As late as April 4, 1861, the Virginia Convention rejected secession. James M. McPherson (*Battle Cry of Freedom*) maintains: "The main reason for this outcome was the lesser salience of slavery in the upper South." This would explain why Virginia, with its highly developed sense of honor, was not a leader in secession. Why then, did Virginia secede?

After Fort Sumter was fired upon it was clear there would be war. Many Virginians felt they should join their sister slave states, especially after Lincoln's call for troops to coerce the states into remaining in the Union. (Union sentiment in the western parts of Virginia led to the creation of West Virginia. There were very few slaves in that part of Virginia.)

Beason is correct, I think, that Southern honor was a factor in bringing on the war. But Southerners were fighting for more than honor. Leaders in the slave states with the largest slave populations were perceptive enough to realize that to remain in the Union meant the eventual end of slavery and thus their way of life. The realization that slavery was doomed in the Union caused the slave states to want to secede from the Union. Because Lincoln and the North would rather fight than see the Union dissolved, the war came.

Dr. J. Scott Somerset, in his letter which appeared with Mr. Beason's letter, makes the point that "slavery was not a burning issue with the vast majority of the American people or the men who fought the war." It may be that Federal soldiers, at least at the beginning of the war, fought to preserve the Union rather than to free the slaves, but that is beside the point I wish to make—that slavery was the main cause of the coming of the war. The point is that a Union victory meant the end of slavery and the South knew it. Somerset also states that Abraham Lincoln believed slavery wasn't the paramount issue. I would challenge that assertion.

In 1858, in his "House Divided" speech, Lincoln stated, "I believe this government can-

not endure, permanently half slave and half free.... Either the opponents of slavery, will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new—North as well as South." Less than three years later, in his first inaugural address, Lincoln stated his belief that, "One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute."

I will let Lincoln have the last word. In his second inaugural address, March 4, 1865, Lincoln looked back four years to his first inaugural. At that time, "One eighth of the whole population was colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war."

—Dennis B. Tenk,
President, South Suburban CWRT
Orland Park, Illinois

BRANDY STATION (PART I)


I disagree with something Pat Brennan wrote in his article on Brandy Station, which appears in the current issue of *North & South* [volume 5, #3]. Pat claims that Pleasanton was a coward who avoided danger while in battle.

General Alfred Pleasanton was a lot of things, but he was not a physical coward and this is evidenced by personal accounts written by men who fought with him.

In the cavalry battle at Brandy Station in October 1863, Pleasanton fought with one of the cavalry divisions in the front ranks. On October 23, 1864, at Westport, Missouri, he was again at the front and relieved two officers for not attacking the enemy when ordered. A little later, he personally led a battery of artillery to within close range of the enemy and ordered it to open fire. Its shells broke the Confederate lines. At Mine Creek on October 25 he led his men in a decisive cavalry charge that ended with the capture of a number of cannon and prisoners.

I just wanted to set the record straight.

—Bryce A. Suderow, via email



PAT BRENNAN RESPONDS:

First, I'd like to record my tremendous respect for Bryce Suderow's excellent work, both as a researcher and writer. Having said that, I'm afraid trying to set the record straight concerning Alfred Pleasanton would be tricky business. In my article, I footnoted a number of primary sources wherein a genuine lack of respect bordering on disdain was

evinced for the Knight of Romance, a nickname he earned—as one of his colleagues argued—by his systematic lying. There certainly were more sources I could have used. At the June Battle of Brandy Station, he did little to sway my judgement based on these primary sources and, in fact, exhibited many of the shortcomings for which he was accused. I happily accept Bryce's accounts of Pleasanton's later bravery, but it is impossible to discount the perception in the Army of the Potomac's cavalry that Pleasanton was indeed a "news-paper humbug" with a less than stellar battle reputation, a perception based no doubt on the man's actions.

MILITARY HISTORY

William Freehling's article in the February 2002 *North & South*, "Why Civil War Military History Must Be Less Than 85 Percent Military," contains much that is valid and valuable. In particular he is to be commended for his demolition of the fashionable feminist fable that Southern women brought about Confed-

DISTINCTIVE UNIFORMS

I am commenting upon a portion of Mr. Nofi's "Knapsack" column which appeared in your latest issue [*N&S*, vol. 5, #3]. While the focus of the "Some 'Boys in Blue' Who Weren't" is correct, some details are wrong. For example, the "49th New York" was actually the 39th New York, and all members wore the Italian light infantry uniform as the first issue uniform. There were no separately uniformed companies in French or German uniforms. The 84th NY did not wear a zouave uniform, but rather a modified chasseur uniform with straight-legged trousers, not baggy zouave trousers. The 12th NYSM wore sky blue, not red, trousers. Many regiments continued to wear distinctive uniforms throughout the war. In fact, as I pointed out in my book, *Zouaves: The First and the Bravest*, there were more regiments in zouave uniform in 1865 than there had been in 1861.

—Michael J. McAfee, Curator of History & Uniforms, West Point Museum

erate defeat by rebelling against rebellion—and also for his courage in performing the demolition in print! Likewise he is quite right in contending that too much Civil War military history focuses too narrowly on battles while neglecting the broader context in which they occurred....

Freehling is correct, too, in stating at the outset of his article that Civil War military history now occupies a low status in academia, especially among the prevalent PC element. To remedy that situation he urges that it become less than 85% military in content by incorporating a large measure—ideally at least 30%—of what he calls “social history.”

By calling attention to the defects of the purely “guns and bugles” approach to Civil War military history Freehling, who is a professor at the University of Kentucky, a school noted for its basketball prowess, scores a net-swishing scholarly goal. The same, though, cannot be said for his proposed cure for these defects, nor for the illustrations he employs; they either rim the basket or turn into airballs. Thus he places under the term “social” matters more precisely and accurately named political, ideological, psychological, geographic, demographic, economic, technological, circumstantial, and even accidental. Presumably he did this out of considerations of space, but surely he could have found room for a brief explanation of what he means by “social history,” thereby making its usage more comprehensible to readers unfamiliar with current academic jargon.

More comprehensible—but not necessarily more persuasive. Despite a professed “love” for “strictly battlefield lore,” Freehling reveals in his application of “social history” to the “battlefields” a shaky knowledge of basic facts pertaining to Civil War military operations. To whit:

(1) Grant did not plan for Sherman to march to the sea; instead he assented to the march reluctantly and solely for the purpose of bringing Sherman’s army to Virginia to assist in overwhelming Lee. (2) Don Carlos Buell did not occupy Louisville; this was done by Union troops belonging to Robert Anderson’s command in September 1861, at which time Buell was stationed near Washington. (3) Contrary to Freehling, the Confederates did “puncture the landed part of the [Union] siege” at Fort Donelson but then their commanders failed to take advantage of the opening. (4) When “a Union army [Ambrose Burnside’s] belatedly marched into eastern Tennessee” in September 1863 “some 27,000 white folk” did not join it then or later. (5) No “key intelligence officer” in William S. Rosecrans’ army at Chickamauga “erroneously guessed that a fatal gap had opened in the Union lines”; instead a Union general with a grudge against Rosecrans knowingly opened up the gap through which the Confederates poured to drive the right wing of the Federal

army from the field. (6) Sherman did not use his “superior numbers to tighten a siege around” Atlanta but rather to cut the railroad lines supplying the Confederate army in that city; in the normal sense of the word the Confederates never were “encircled” at Atlanta, nor, for that matter, were they in any danger of becoming so while holding Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga. (7) Following the fall of Atlanta Sherman did not send George H. Thomas to “tail the western rebel army [John B. Hood’s]”; Thomas’ basic assignment was to defend Tennessee should Hood, as he did, invade Tennessee when Sherman set off on his march to the sea. (8) Sherman indeed was a racist who opposed the use of black soldiers, but although he did not allow them in his field army he employed them to garrison forts protecting his railroad supply line in northern Georgia. (9) The Confederates after Appomattox decided not to “take to the hills and commence a guerrilla war” for more realistic reasons (which will be found in the memorandums of the subject prepared by Jefferson Davis’ cabinet) than “because Uncle Billy [Sherman] would have been back in their largely uninvaded Lower South...devastating their central social system” (i.e., slavery); by April 1865 most of the Lower South already had been invaded or was being so and the Confederate government itself had recognized that slavery was doomed by authorizing the enlistment of slaves into its army.

Such errors of commission and omission regarding the military aspects of the Civil War are unlikely to gain adherents for the application of “social history” to those aspects—certainly not in the fashion Freehling applies it. By the same token it also is unlikely that any admixture of “social history” with military history would appease, much less gain the respect, of the ayatollahs of PC in academia, who view the practitioners of military history as being at best backward juveniles, at worst dangerous reactionaries who, by writing about war, glorify it and thus perpetuate its wicked existence.

The only way to restore scholarly vitality to Civil War military history is for historians to write it as accurately, intelligently, and readably as they possibly can while dealing with subjects of present as well as past importance and incorporating into what they write all that is implied by Clausewitz’s classic dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other, that is violent, means, a concept that embraces most of what Freehling places in practice under the rubric of “social history.”

And it may be that the environment for striving to attain this objective now is vastly improved. Americans yet again have discovered that their nation has enemies, that nothing that can be done will turn them into friends, and that the most that can be hoped for is to gain their respect, which in (continued on page 93)



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Albert A. Nofi

Knapsack A CIVIL WAR DIGEST

FROM THE GRAPEVINE

- On the march through Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, on the road to Gettysburg, a Texan noted that a woman had pinned the "Stars and Stripes" to her ample bosom, and remarked, "Take care, madam, for Hood's boys are great at storming breastworks when the Yankee colors is on them." This prompted her to "beat a precipitate retreat."
- Union army regulations apparently penalized swearing by a fine of one dollar. It seems unlikely that this penalty was imposed very often, though given the propensities of troops to use foul language it might have proven an interesting way to help finance the war.
- The only living person ever honored on an American postage stamp was Jefferson Davis.
- At the Battle of the Opequon (September 19, 1864), some of Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early's infantry formed square to meet the charge of five of Union Major General Philip Sheridan's cavalry brigades, a rare instance of the use of this tactic in the Civil War, and perhaps the last time it was used by American troops.
- Because the Dred Scott decision determined that blacks could not be citizens, it took a special act of Congress before Robert Smalls and his comrades, who had escaped from to slavery by stealing a Confederate naval vessel from Charleston, could be awarded the \$9,168 due them in prize money.
- Kansas probably holds the distinction of providing proportionally the greatest number of soldiers in the war—18.8 percent of the state's 106,000 people served, virtually all of them in blue. (Though this figure does include some non-residents recruited to Kansas regiments.)

We make every effort to check the accuracy of anecdotes published in "Knapsack," but many were written down years after the event and in some cases are undoubtedly folk tales rather than genuine reminiscences.

- James Garrison, the brother of noted abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, was a seaman in the U.S. Navy during the 1820s, and by his own account accumulated quite a number of "stripes" from the whip, though he claimed they were undeserved.
- Counterfeiting was so common during the Civil War that by its end perhaps as much as half of all U.S. paper currency in circulation was bogus, a matter which prompted the formation of the Secret Service on July 5, 1865.

SHORT ROUNDS

The Ship that was Commissioned After it Sank

The success of the innovative U.S.S. *Monitor* in her fight with the C.S.S. *Virginia* at Hampton Roads in March 1862 led the U.S. Navy to order additional ves-

sels on the same basic pattern, including ten units of the *Passaic* Class. These were about twice the size of the original *Monitor* (nearly 1,900 tons to her almost 1,000), better protected and better ventilated.

Laid down in the spring and summer of 1862, the ten ships were built quickly, and were all launched by April 1863. All, that is, save one.

When the U.S.S. *Camanche*, built in Jersey City, New Jersey, was ready to be launched, she was disassembled on the shipway and put aboard the transport *Aquila* for shipment to San Francisco. There she was to be reassembled and put into service protecting the West Coast from the threat of Confederate raiders. And so while her sisters gained some distinction supporting Union operations against the Confederacy, *Camanche* un-

Some Alumni of the 23rd Ohio

Although it fought hard, earning itself a place in William F. Fox's famous list of the "300 fightingest regiments" in the Union army, the 23rd Ohio hardly had the most distinguished combat record of any regiment in the war. But no regiment had a more distinguished alumni.

Organized at Columbus, the regiment was mustered into federal service at Camp Chase on June 11, 1861, 950 strong, under Colonel William S. Rosecrans, a West Pointer and regular army man who would for a time be among the most successful Union commanders. One Eliakim P. Scammon was lieutenant colonel and Rutherford B. Hayes was a major.

Rosecrans was shortly promoted brigadier general. Scammon, a West Pointer and veteran of the Mexican War, was promoted colonel, and Hayes moved up to lieutenant colonel. Scammon, who had served in the Old Army's elite Corps of Topographical Engineers, had been cashiered from the army in 1856 and worked as a teacher for some years before the war. Under Scammon, the regiment took part in the West Virginia Campaign that summer, fighting its first battle at Carnifax Ferry on September 10, 1861. Scammon was soon assigned to command a brigade, and was replaced by Hayes.

Hayes commanded the regiment from late 1861, but was not promoted to colonel for nearly a year. By the time he took command the West Virginia Campaign was over. The regiment went into winter quarters and underwent a long period of training and drill, not seeing action again until the Spring, when it participated in several small engagements on the fringes of Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign. Much of the regiment's wartime service was in such small affairs, being essentially engaged in security operations in West Virginia, protecting Unionist sympathizers and lines of communication from Confederate raiders and irregulars. Nevertheless, Hayes led the regiment at South Mountain



BATTLES & LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

William S. Rosecrans

"When he warred he warred in earnest."

—Theodore Roosevelt, on Lincoln.

dertook the long, tedious, and dangerous voyage around Cape Horn.

Aquila arrived at San Francisco in November 1863. She had taken a considerable pounding during her 18,000 mile voyage from Jersey City to California. As a result, shortly after she arrived, and before her precious cargo could be off-loaded, *Aquila* foundered

in San Francisco Bay. A massive salvage job ensued. Gradually the disassembled sections of *Camanche* were brought to the surface. Section by section the pieces of the ship were slowly fished out of the water. *Camanche* was reassembled on a shipway, and on November 14, 1864, was launched, more than two years later than any of her sisters.

Camanche was commissioned on May 24, 1865, some eighteen months after she had sunk.

"A Damn Yankee Jew!"

Myer Levy, a Union soldier from Philadelphia, was one of perhaps ten thousand Jewish men who served in the war.



The monitor *Camanche* in San Francisco Bay, photographed about 1908.

and Antietam in September 1862, for which he was finally promoted colonel on October 24th. Thereafter the regiment went back to its security duties in West Virginia, seeing lots of action but little battle until the spring of 1864, when the Shenandoah again became the scene of major operations.

The 23rd Ohio took part in the abortive operations of Major General David Hunter and the more successful ones of Major General Philip H. Sheridan, fighting in a number of skirmishes, and also in the major actions at Winchester (September 19, 1864), Fisher's Hill (September 22), and in the brilliantly recovered near-disaster at Cedar Creek (October 19), by which

time Hayes was commanding a brigade and the regiment was under Lieutenant Colonel James M. Comley. Thereafter, with the Confederate threat to the Valley decisively crushed, the 23rd Ohio reverted to its old role as a security force, being mustered out in the summer of 1865. Although the regiment's combat record included few great battles, 290 of the 2,230 men who passed through its ranks died as a result of combat or disease, a death rate of thirteen percent, making it one of the 300 hardest hit regiments in federal service.

So, among the veterans of the 23rd Ohio can be numbered two future presidents, three future generals, and a future ambassador:

- William S. Rosecrans, later a major general, who commanded the Army of the Cumberland with some distinction in 1862 and 1863, until Chickamauga.
- Eliakim P. Scammon, who rose to the rank of brigadier general.
- Rutherford B. Hayes, who ended the war a brigadier general, with brevet of major general and was later President of the United States.
- James M. Comley, who later had a distinguished political career and served as Minister to Hawaii.
- William McKinley, who had enlisted as a private in Company E in 1861 and rose steadily up the ranks, to end the war as a captain and brevet major, and later became president.



Eliakim P. Scammon



Rutherford B. Hayes



James M. Comley



William McKinley

In a letter to his family he recounted an incident that occurred during the Jewish holy days, while he was on duty in Virginia. It was early in the war, at a time when the army made no provision for the religious needs of persons of the Jewish faith (it took the personal intervention of Abraham Lincoln to force the army to commission Jewish chaplains). Taking a walk through the streets of a small Virginia town, Levy noticed a little boy who was sitting on the steps of a house and eating matzo.

Identifying himself as a fellow Jew, Levy asked if he could have a bit of the matzo.

By way of reply, the boy jumped up and ran into the house, shouting, "Mother! There's a damn Yankee Jew outside!"

This brought the boy's mother running. Not only did she scold her rude offspring, but she immediately invited Levy to sit with the family at their seder.

The Battle of Santa Rosa

California entered the Union in 1850. Although most of the people in the state were recent immigrants from the North, there were substantial numbers of Southerners as well. During the "Secession Winter" of 1860-1861 a number of secessionist outbreaks in various parts of the state were relatively easily put down by the numerous Unionists.

In some areas an uneasy peace prevailed between the two groups. For example, about fifty miles north of San Francisco were the villages of Santa Rosa and Petaluma, both first settled in the 1850s, and about twenty miles apart. Apparently Petaluma had been settled mostly by northerners, while Santa Rosa had been settled mostly by southerners, with Missourians dominating.

The local press in Santa Rosa was very pro-Confederate, and the people of Petaluma organized a militia company, "The Emmett Rifles," in case the Santa Rosans gave any trouble. An uneasy peace prevailed between the two communities for most of the war, marred by occasional petty harassment by one side or the other. According to legend the bell in the pro-Unionist Baptist Church in Petaluma, which was rung regularly to celebrate Federal victories, was smashed one night in a covert raid by some Southern sympathizers. Then came news of the assassination of President Lincoln. What ap-

parently happened then comes down to us by a somewhat garbled oral tradition. Enraged over the murder of the president, the citizens of Petaluma decided to do something about it. Led by Major James Armstrong, the Emmett Rifles mounted up and galloped off—or, according to different version of the tale, formed ranks and started marching—northward along the stage road, intent on inflicting harm upon the "nest of Copperheads" in Santa Rosa.

About half way to Santa Rosa the Emmett Rifles came upon a large roadside inn, the Stony Point Road Tavern—or perhaps the Washoe House, near the modern town of Cotati. Tired, hot, and thirsty, the men of the Emmett Rifles decided to stop for a cold beer. And then they had another, and apparently another on top of that. Soon not only was their thirst quenched, but so too was their ardor to beat upon the Secessionists. And so they never did get back on the march toward Santa Rosa, but rather slowly drifted homeward.

FOR THE RECORD


Extract from "A Declaration of the Causes Which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union":

"We hold as undeniable truths that the governments of the various States, and of the confederacy itself, were established exclusively by the white race, for themselves and their posterity; that the African race had no agency in their establishment; that they were rightfully held and regarded as an inferior and dependent race, and in that condition only

could their existence in this country be rendered beneficial or tolerable.

That in this free government all white men are and of right ought to be entitled to equal civil and political rights; that the servitude of the African race, as existing in these States, is mutually beneficial to both bond and free, and is abundantly authorized and justified by the experience of mankind, and the revealed will of the Almighty Creator, as recognized by all Christian nations; while the destruction of the existing relations between the two races, as advocated by our sectional enemies, would bring inevitable calamities upon both and desolation upon the fifteen slave-holding States. By the secession of six of the slave-holding States, and the certainty that others will speedily do likewise, Texas has no alternative but to remain in an isolated connection with the North, or unite her destinies with the South.

For these and other reasons, solemnly asserting that the federal constitution has been violated and virtually abrogated by the several States named, seeing that the federal government is now passing under the control of our enemies to be diverted from the exalted objects of its creation to those of oppression and wrong, and realizing that our own State can no longer look for protection, but to God and her own sons - We the delegates of the people of Texas, in Convention assembled, have passed an ordinance dissolving all political connection with the government of the United States of America and the people thereof and confidently appeal to the intelligence and patriotism of the freeman of Texas to



On this contemporary envelope, the devil holds the Texas state seal and a Confederate flag.

ratify the same at the ballot box, on the 23rd day of the present month.

Adopted in Convention on the 2nd day of Feby, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one and of the independence of Texas the twenty-fifth."

PROFILE

The Y.M.C.A. Goes to War

The Y.M.C.A. was founded in London in 1844. Americans and Canadians traveling to England learned of it, particularly after the World's Fair there in 1854, and introduced the "Y" and its scriptural concept "That all may be one" (John 17:21) to the U.S. and Canada. The first North American convention of the Confederation of Associations was held in 1854, and conventions continued to be held for the next six years. During those years, the Y grew, but also began to tear itself apart over the issue of slavery, as did the rest of the country.



Wounded soldiers gather with a group of others before the office of the U.S. Christian Commission in Washington, D.C. (c. 1865).

Abolition-minded associates petitioned for the Association to issue anti-slavery statements. Their attempts were blocked. The Confederation sought a religious neutrality in all political issues. However, sectional bickering became so intense that Canadian Ys withdrew from the Confederation in 1858 to form their own organization.

By 1861, with the national convention scheduled for St. Louis, there were over 25,000 Y.M.C.A. associates active in one hundred and fifty Ys. But then came secession and the firing on Ft. Sumter, which shattered the concept of "all being one."

Initially, southern Ys attempted to maintain unity. In May 1861, the Associations of Richmond, Charleston, and New Orleans sent letters to their Northern counterparts, expressing the hope that the

St. Louis convention would proceed as scheduled, and stating that they wanted nothing more than continued Christian fellowship and good will. The New Orleans letter emphasized that war would be unnatural, and unrighteous. The Southerners sought peace and the prevention of further friction between Associations North and South. But there was no hope that such unity could be preserved.

The Northern Associations reacted bitterly. The New York Y replied that the Southerners had no right to think that, having lost an election, they could secede. The South was destroying the nation. The New York Y told the South, "Your Christians will meet ours in battle. The 7th Regiment of New York numbers many of our members." The New York Association put their position clearly, stating, "It is not that we love you less, but that we love our country, our whole country, more." The St. Louis convention was never held.

And so, as civil war spread across the land, Southern Ys began to separate themselves from the Confederation. While the Northern associations remained united in a centralized movement, however, the Southern Ys reflected regional attitudes toward local autonomy. So while England, Canada, and the United States had their national Confederations, the Confederate States of America did not. Across the South individual associations responded on their own with no centralized control structure. The records show the Richmond and Charleston associations were the most active.

Following First Bull Run, and for the remainder of the war, Richmond became a city of hospitals. The Y converted three private residencies into hospitals, each accommodating up to fifty patients. These

were staffed by physicians who were Y.M.C.A. members and worked without charge for nearly four months until the institutions were taken over by the government.

In 1862, the Southern Ys opened a chain of lodging facilities for soldiers in transit. By the end of the year over 4,700 soldiers had found shelter and comfort in them. This sort of effort persisted throughout the war, despite the fact that in the South the Y lost personnel to the war effort and became increasingly strapped for cash. To keep operating Ys across the South had to sell furniture, pianos, and even building fixtures for money.

The Northern Y became the backbone of the United States Christian Commission. On August 22, 1861, following First Bull Run, those in the Northern Ys called for a convention to develop a coordinating agency to provide religious services and conduct relief work among the troops. Held in New York on November 14, 1861, this convention resulted in the formation of the United States Christian Commission. Through the end of the war, and for a short time afterward, the U.S.C.C. gave 58,308 sermons, held 77,744 prayer sessions, and distributed 1,466,748 bibles. It passed out 296,816 bound books as well as nearly 2,000,000 newspapers. Nor were these services confined to Union troops.

Throughout the war, Northern Ys provided services to Confederate prisoners of war. Captain W. B. Haygood, 44th Georgia, imprisoned on Johnson's Island, Ohio, found the Y.M.C.A. active there. So appreciated was this work that on October 31, 1863, forty-eight Confederate officers held as prisoners of war wrote a letter to their government demanding recognition of the work of the Northern Y.M.C.A., and United States Christian Commission, for their efforts among prisoners of war, and urging that should any Northern Y members of Christian Commission workers fall into Southern hands, they be treated with the utmost kindness, and released as quickly as possible.

In the course of the war, forty-three members of the Y.M.C.A., including three women, died of disease and illness.

—Contributed by Stephen D. Lutz
Portage, Michigan

TERROR: 1860s STYLE



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

FOR THE FIRST TWO YEARS of the Civil War the Confederacy contested the North's military efforts with mixed success. In the East matters were encouraging for Jefferson Davis and his armies; in the West things were not as hopeful. However, in the summer of 1863 the South's prospects of gaining independence darkened. As serious as the military setbacks of Gettysburg and Vicksburg were, Davis had come to the realization that it was not Union generals who stood in the way of Southern independence; it was Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln's pen and unwavering will to wage war had done more damage to the Confederate cause than all his generals combined. Lincoln was determined to prosecute the war, no matter how many Confederate battlefield victories there were, or how costly the war became in terms of money or human carnage. In June 1862 he stated his position in a letter to his secretary of state,

William Henry Seward: "I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me."¹ It was the latter that eventually became the focus of Confederate hopes: if Northern morale could be sufficiently eroded, Lincoln might well be forsaken by the country.

As Confederate resources began to wither, Davis realized that something had to be done to wear down the resolve of the Northern people.

Among Lincoln's greatest sins in the eyes of Confederate leaders was the Emancipation Proclamation. While the proclamation dampened Confederate hopes of European recognition, its effect went well beyond the diplomatic. More than any other action on the president's part, it aroused Southern hatred and fear of Lincoln beyond all previous levels. Southerners viewed the call for emancipation as a call to murder, a license sanctioning slave insurrection, an act outside the bounds of civilized warfare. Jefferson Davis described the proclamation as the "most execrable measure recorded in the history of guilty man."²

Emancipation, however, was only one edge of the sword Lincoln thrust at the Confederacy's heart in 1863. There was also his call to enlist blacks into the Union army. Southerners reacted virulently to this. To the Southern mind, the arming of blacks exceeded even emancipation in criminal intent. The South's original fears about Lincoln and his policies appeared all too true—he was now seen as a man without moral restraint, and as such undeserving of the protection afforded by the civilized rules of warfare.

As black troops took the field, incidents of Confederate atrocities against them began to filter north. Captured

black troops were often summarily executed or forced into slavery.³ Nor was this simply a matter of spontaneous excess. In a letter to Confederate General Richard Taylor, General Kirby Smith's assistant adjutant general, S. S. Anderson, in answering what disposition should be made of black soldiers, wrote: "No quarter should be shown them. If taken prisoners, however, they should be turned over to the executive authorities of the States in which they may be captured, in obedience to the proclamation of the President of the Confederate States."⁴ On hearing that Taylor's troops had taken black soldiers prisoner, Kirby Smith wrote to Richard Taylor: "I hope this may not be so, and that your subordinates who have been in command of capturing parties may have recognized the propriety of giving no quarter to armed Negroes and their officers. In this way we may be relieved from a disagreeable dilemma."⁵

Word of the "disagreeable dilemma" soon reached Lincoln, who responded by issuing an "Order of Retaliation," which stated in part:

The government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers, and if the enemy shall sell or enslave anyone because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.

It is therefore ordered that for every [black] soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for everyone enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war.⁶

Neither Davis nor Lincoln acted upon these threats. Nevertheless, as the war

Opposite: Sites of some of the fires set by the Confederate arsonists. Map based on an illustration in Nat Brandt, *The Man Who Tried to Burn New York* (Syracuse, New York: 1986).

NEW YORK, 1864



progressed both sides began to act in ways that, at both personal and governmental levels, fell under the concept of black flag warfare. By the winter of 1864 the burdens of a cruel war began to bear heavily on Davis and Lincoln, both of whom began to consider broader strategies.

As Confederate resources began to wither, Davis realized that something had to be done to wear down the resolve of the Northern people. A demoralized citizenry might well destroy Lincoln's quest for reelection, and result in the victory of a "peace candidate" willing to negotiate Southern independence. Benjamin H. Hill, state senator from Georgia, said in March 1864: "The presidential election... is the event which must determine the issue of peace or war.... I say we can control that election."⁷ To achieve this the Confederates needed to persuade sufficient numbers of voters that reelect-ing Lincoln would only prolong misery and death.

Then in February 1864 an event occurred that reinforced, in Southern eyes, the justification of Lincoln's removal from power, by whatever means. A Union cavalry force under Judson Kilpatrick undertook a raid against Richmond, a two-pronged effort designed to free Union prisoners being held at Belle Isle prison camp. Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, son of Admiral John Dahlgren, commanded one prong. Dahlgren was ambushed and killed, and papers were found on his body that shocked Confederate leaders and raised hatred of Lincoln to a new level. The papers were operational plans for the raid, and included instructions for the burning of the city and the assassination of Jefferson Davis and members of his cabinet. To Confederates the Dahlgren Raid, as it came to be known, was simply one more example of Abraham Lincoln's lack of moral restraint. His own actions had made him a legitimate target.

Within days of Dahlgren's disastrous raid, Jefferson Davis embarked on a bold initiative, establishing a group of agents in Canada whose purpose was to disrupt the war effort throughout the North and bring about Lincoln's defeat in the upcoming election. Included in Davis' initiative was a plan to free Confederate prisoners held in Northern prison camps located near the Canadian border. As with the Union prisoners held at Belle Isle, once freed, the prisoners would be

armed and marched south to rejoin the Confederate army, destroying anything or anyone that came in their path.


Thomas H. Hines, a Kentuckian who had served in John Hunt Morgan's cavalry, was dispatched by Davis to Toronto, where he was instructed to undertake an attempt to free Confederate prisoners at Camp Douglas near Chicago. Seven weeks later Davis sent several more agents to Toronto, including Jacob Thompson and Clement C. Clay, who were to oversee the Canadian operations. Thompson and Clay carried with them a draft for one million dollars in Confederate gold⁸ and a letter from President Jefferson Davis that read in part:

I hereby direct you to proceed at once to Canada, there to carry out such instructions as you

have received from me verbally, in such manner as shall seem most likely to be conducive to the furtherance of the interests of the Confederate States of America which have been entrusted to you.⁹

It was Thompson and Clay's charge to wreak as much havoc throughout the northern states as they could. In part, this was to take the form of attacks against the civilian population, including the burning of major cities, the bombing of manufactories and ships, and the spread of infectious diseases. Such attacks can only be described as terrorist in nature.

The first terrorist effort to be mounted from Canada was a plot to infect thousands of civilians with yellow



fever. Key to this operation was Dr. Luke Pryor Blackburn, a physician from Kentucky. Blackburn's plot was initiated in April 1864 shortly after Thompson set up his operation in Canada, and at the time a major yellow fever epidemic had hit the Island of Bermuda. Blackburn left Halifax in Nova Scotia and arrived in Bermuda, where he offered his medical skills to the government. He then set about carefully collecting the clothing and bedding of victims who had died from yellow fever, packed them into eight large trunks, and had them shipped back to Halifax. Before leaving for Bermuda in April, Blackburn had enlisted Godfrey Joseph Hyams, a Confederate agent working in Canada, to take charge of the trunks and smuggle them into the United States. Blackburn instructed Hyams to take the trunks to Washington, Norfolk, and New Bern, and arrange for the clothing to be sold at auction, thus gaining the widest possible distribution.

and he agreed to arrange for their transport. Using the alias of J.W. Harris he shipped five of the trunks through Boston to Washington, where he contracted with the auction house of W.L. Wall and Company to dispose of the infected clothing. Because Norfolk and New Bern were within the military lines of the Union army, Hyams had to utilize the services of an army sutler to dispose of the infected clothing in those two cities.

His initial effort at spreading disease accomplished, Blackburn returned to Bermuda on July 15 and again offered his services to the island government. Welcomed again, Blackburn set about securing another supply of infected clothing, this time filling three trunks, which he intended to ship to New York.

Blackburn's motive, and that of his superiors, seems clear. They attempted to unleash biological warfare against civilian populations as a terror tactic. Their ignorance of infectious disease in no way


could not be accumulated without detection. Like the yellow fever plot, the poisoning of New York's water supply would have killed indiscriminately.¹⁰

Blackburn's plot was exposed in April 1865 when Hyams, disgruntled at not being paid for his work, walked into the United States Consul's office in Toronto and offered to blow the whistle on several of the Confederacy's clandestine operations. Among Hyams' revelations was a reference to a Confederate "bomb house" in Toronto. He revealed that explosives and incendiary devices were being manufactured in a special house for use against the U.S. fishing fleet and other civilian targets. The operation was under the control of William L. Larry MacDonald, another of Jefferson Davis' capable agents in Canada.¹¹

Among the devices developed was one made of cast iron in the shape of a large lump of coal. The hollow interior was filled with black powder, and the surface covered with a mixture of pitch and coal dust. These "coal bombs" were designed to be placed into coal supplies and find their way into furnaces and boilers in northern manufactories, locomotives and ships. Hyams claimed that several of the bombs were hidden beneath the floorboards of the bomb house. Canadian police raided the premises, took up the floorboards, and found several of the devices described by Hyams. The U.S. Consul in Canada described them in his dispatch to Washington:

These torpedoes are covered with a mixture of broken coal & pitch, & resemble pieces of Bituminous coal—[the bombs] are made of thin cast iron of irregular shapes, hollow & are filled with powder—& covered with the preparation above mentioned.... Hyams says that they are to be thrown into coal bins in manufactories, steam boats, furnaces, etc. where they will without being noticed, be shoveled along with the coal into the fire, & effect the purpose for which they were designed.

Union colonel Edward Hastings Ripley, who commanded the first troops to occupy Richmond after its evacuation, found just such a bomb on Jefferson Davis' desk. The coal bomb was the invention of a man by the name of Thomas Edgeworth Courtenay. In December



Dr. Luke Pryor Blackburn

Blackburn was put in charge of burning Boston.

Among Blackburn's targets was Abraham Lincoln. Blackburn prepared a small black valise containing several expensive dress shirts that he had previously exposed to contaminated clothing. He then instructed Hyams to take the valise, along with a letter, to President Lincoln as a special gift by an anonymous benefactor. Blackburn believed that, even if Lincoln did not choose to wear the shirts, their mere presence would infect him with the deadly disease. Hyams, apparently afraid of the risk of taking such a "gift" to the White House, declined. The trunks, however, were another matter



Thomas Edgeworth Courtenay

"I propose to organize a 'secret service corps'"

mitigates their guilt. Indeed, they believed that the trunks of infected clothing that had reached New Bern were responsible for a yellow fever epidemic that killed over two thousand people. Blackburn's intended gift of infected shirts to Lincoln demonstrates that the president was indeed targeted for assassination by the Confederate Secret Service.

Blackburn also plotted with Robert Martin to poison the Croton Reservoir that supplied New York City with its drinking water. The plan was aborted only when Jacob Thompson concluded that the large quantities of poison needed

1863 Courtenay wrote directly to Jefferson Davis offering his services and newly designed "torpedo" to the Confederate cause: "Sir, I propose to organize a 'secret service corps' to consist of such numbers of men as may from time to time be required. Said corps to be employed in doing injury to the enemy....I propose to send a number of the 'corps' to the Northern States, West Indies Island and Europe, to operate on steam vessels, locomotives and all Federal property wher[e] steam is used." Three months later, on March 9, 1864, Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon wrote Courtenay, authorizing him to employ up to twenty-five men "for secret service against the enemy." Seddon approved use of Confederate facilities and materiel for the production of Courtenay's device.¹² Eighty years later the ingenious device caught the eye of the U. S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II and a detailed description of Courtenay's coal bomb was included in one of their sabotage manuals.

At the time Courtenay was authorized to form his special "bomb squad," Seddon specified that his men were to be paid for their work on a commission basis: "For the destruction of property of the enemy or injury done, a per centage shall be paid in Four per cent bonds in no case to exceed fifty per centum of the loss to the enemy...."

In February 1864 the Confederate congress passed a special act authorizing payment for the destruction of Union property. As in Seddon's earlier authorization of Courtenay's plan, the payment was to equal fifty percent of the value of property destroyed, both the validity of the claim and the value of the property to be determined by a commission established for the purpose.¹³ During the trial of the Lincoln conspirators, Edward Frazier, an admitted "boat burner" with between eight and twelve steamboats to his credit, told the court of numerous boat burnings by Confederate agents including the steamboat *Robert Campbell*, on which a large number of people died. Frazier also told of the burning of an army hospital in Louisville in "June or July, 1864." According to Frazier's sworn testimony, Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin authorized \$50,000 as payment for the burning of the hospital:



A Confederate agent is about to set a pile of furniture on fire in this illustration from a Northern newspaper. The plan was to use an incendiary chemical known as "Greek Fire," a liquid accelerant that combusted when exposed to oxygen.

"\$35,000 down in gold, \$15,000 on deposit,—to be paid in four months.... He gave us a draft on Columbia, S.C., for \$34,800 in gold, and \$200 in gold in Richmond."¹⁴

Colonel J. H. Baker, provost marshal general for the Department of Missouri, compiled a report in May 1865 on the boat burning activities of Confederate agents within his jurisdiction. Baker listed forty steamboats registered in St. Louis that had been destroyed by enemy sabotage during the war. Included in the report was a list of thirty-two Confederate agents identified as "boatburners."¹⁵

That boat burning was an effective activity of the Confederacy is evidenced by the sixty-plus steamboats that were sent to the bottom as a result of sabotage. That terror was an object is made clear from a letter to Jefferson Davis by W.S. Oldham, who wrote: "We can burn every transport and gunboat on the Mississippi River...and fill his [Abraham Lincoln's] people with *terror and consternation*.... we have the means at our command, if promptly appropriated and energetically applied, to *demoralize the Northern people* in a very short time."¹⁶

Included among the plots designed to strike terror into the people of the North were plans to burn major cities. Principal among these was New York City. The *Richmond Whig* had been urging Davis and his advisors for some time to burn New York in retaliation for Sherman's torching of Atlanta and Sheridan's burning of the Shenandoah Valley. In an editorial dated October 15, 1864, Confederate leaders were told, "There is one efficient way, and only one that we know to arrest and prevent this and every other sort of atrocity and that is to burn one of the chief cities of the enemy....New York is worth twenty Richmonds."¹⁷

Whether Jacob Thompson had read the *Whig* editorial or not, he was in complete agreement with its proposal. Thompson met with several of his agents in Toronto's Queen's Hotel, where he had his headquarters. Thomas Hines, originally in charge of the attempt to free prisoners at Camp Douglas, was assigned the task of burning Chicago. The infamous Dr. Blackburn was put in charge of burning Boston, and Thompson assigned the task of burning New York to Colonel Robert M. Martin. A total of eight men would attempt to fire the North's most populous city.



As with each of the hotels, the fire at P. T. Barnum's American Museum sputtered and was soon extinguished by the New York Fire Department. A year later another fire would burn the museum to ashes, as shown in this contemporary illustration.

The plan to burn New York included a takeover of the city. While police and firemen were distracted fighting the fires and attempting to keep order, Copperheads would rise up and seize certain federal buildings, liberate Confederate prisoners being held in Fort Lafayette, and declare New York a "free city."

November 25 was set as the day to burn New York. Fires were to be started in nineteen hotels. Seven of these were clustered in lower Manhattan, five others were strung out to the north along Broadway reaching as far as 25th Street, and the remaining seven were scattered throughout the city. Each of the hotels could have served as the nucleus of a major conflagration consuming several city blocks, and it is reasonable to believe that most, if not all, of lower Manhattan could have been destroyed. Civilian casualties would have been unavoidable.

In his account written years later, John Headley, one of the arsonists, attempted to play down the probable outcome of the plan, writing that it was their purpose "to set the city on fire and give the people a scare if nothing else."¹⁸ Yet, if successful, the burning of the entire business district of New York would have gone well beyond giving people "a scare."

Such a conflagration would inevitably have consumed people as well as buildings. Casualties in New York, together with Boston, Chicago, and Cincinnati, could well have run into the thousands.

The plan was to use an incendiary chemical known as "Greek Fire," a liquid accelerant that combusted when exposed to oxygen. The original scheme called for fires to be set on Election Day, November 8, in an effort to disrupt Lincoln's bid for a second term. But this was aborted following the arrival of Major General Benjamin F. Butler and a contingent of Union soldiers. The cancellation was temporary, however, as Headley and his crew were determined to go forward with the plan.

Headley was provided with the address of a store on Washington Place where he was to pick up the Greek Fire. Years later he described what happened. Visiting the shop, he was given a leather valise containing 144 glass four-ounce bottles containing the liquid fire. Each bottle was securely sealed and wrapped with paper. Headley noted that they gave off a peculiar odor similar to that of rotten eggs.

At six o'clock on the evening of the 25th Headley and his band of arsonists met at a prearranged "cottage," where the

bottles were distributed. It was agreed to set the fires at 8:00 pm. The men then returned to their target hotels, in Headley's case the Astor House. His account continues: "After lighting the gas jet I hung the bedclothes loosely on the headboard and piled the chairs, drawers of the bureau and washstand on the bed. Then stuffed some newspapers about among the mass and poured a bottle of turpentine over it all... I opened a bottle carefully and quickly spilled it on the pile of rubbish. It blazed up instantly and the whole bed seemed to be in flames before I could get out."¹⁹ Having set fire to the Astor, Headley then made his way to two other hotels where he repeated the performance. Each of the conspirators had carried out similar acts at the other hotels. The plan, however, failed. Headley later explained, "All had observed that the fires had been put out in all of the places as easily as any ordinary fire....It seemed to us that there was something wrong with our Greek Fire."²⁰

Not among the original targets was P. T. Barnum's fabulous American Museum located on the corner of Broadway and Park Row. It became one of the targeted sites more by accident than design. Having set fire to their assigned targets, two of the arsonists, Robert Cobb Kennedy and James Chenault, met near City Hall Park and began walking up Broadway. On reaching Barnum's Museum they decided to go inside to get off the street. They took the stairs to the fifth floor where they could get a better view of the surrounding neighborhood. Soon they heard the fire alarms and, satisfied that their plan had worked, returned to the street. On the way down the stairs, Kennedy deliberately smashed a bottle of the flammable liquid on the wooden stairs, where it erupted in flame. Within minutes of reaching the street the two men began to hear screams, soon followed by people stampeding from the building. Several of Barnum's employees pleaded with men on the street to help them save the numerous animals trapped inside. As with each of the hotels, however, the fire sputtered and was soon extinguished by the New York Fire Department. A year later another fire would reduce the magnificent museum to ashes.

The attempt to burn New York failed. Headley and his compatriots blamed the Greek Fire for having failed to live up to expectations. Had it been

sabotaged or altered in some way to ensure its failure, or was it simply a question of its manufacture by a less than qualified chemist? Others surmised that the fires failed to take hold because each of the rooms was sealed tight, denying an adequate flow of oxygen to the fire. Whatever the cause, the plot to burn New York joined the rest of the Confederate attempts to terrorize the North. Years later Headley wrote of Sherman's burning of Atlanta, pointing out that the burning of New York was simply retaliation for Yankee terrorism.

Like Headley, who viewed the attempt to burn New York as a "scare," Kennedy viewed the plot as an instructional lesson. In a statement made shortly before his execution²¹ he said: "killing women and children was the last thing thought of. We only wanted to let the people of North understand that there are two sides to this war, and that they

can't be rolling in wealth and comfort while we at the South are bearing all the hardships and privations."²²

Instead of demoralizing Northerners, the Confederates' futile projects did more to unite the citizenry behind Lincoln than it did to turn them against him. But that was because the efforts failed. Had an infectious epidemic spread through Northern cities, coupled with devastating fires and thousands of freed Confederate soldiers fighting their way south through Union territory, Lincoln's support may well have withered away, leaving him isolated in his determination to prosecute the war to its end. Peace at any price may well have become the rallying cry of pro-war Democrats and Republicans alike joining with Copperheads to defeat Lincoln's reelection bid.

On November 8, 1864, Abraham Lincoln was elected to a second term. For the next five months the Confederacy

would fight on desperately, reaching for the elusive goal of independence. In her desperation she would turn to a variety of previously unthinkable strategies, including the enlistment of slaves into the army and the use of terror to demoralize her enemy's people. Frequently cloaked in language that described these efforts as directed only at legitimate military targets, reasonable people understood that such claims were spurious at best. Unleashing germ warfare and burning cities, by their very nature, are acts of terror. But the Confederate terror campaign proved to be too little too late. ■

EDWARD STEERS, JR. is an acknowledged expert on the Lincoln assassination and Lincoln's early life. He is author of *His Name Is Still Mudd* (Thomas Publications, 1997). His most recent book, *Blood On The Moon* (University Press of Kentucky, 2001), is a fresh look at the assassination.

NOTES:

1. Roy P. Basler (ed.), *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 1953), V: p. 292.
2. Dunbar Rowland (ed.), *Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers and Speeches* (Jackson, Mississippi: 1923), 5: pp. 409-11.
3. Ted Alexander, "Retreat from Gettysburg: Ten Days in July," *North & South*, volume 2, #6 (June 1999), p. 13.
4. U.S. Congress, House, Report on the Assassination of Abraham Lincoln, 39th Cong., 1st sess., July 1866 (Washington, D.C.: 1866), p. 2. This report is commonly referred to as "The Boutwell Report."
5. *Ibid.* Emphasis added.
6. Basler, *Collected Works*, VI: p. 357.
7. Quoted in David Long, "I say we can control that election," *Lincoln Herald*, vol. 99, No. 3 (Fall 1997), p. 115.
8. The one million dollars came from a special fund appropriated by the Confederate Congress (February 15, 1864) designated "Secret Service." A request dated April 25, 1864, issued to Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin with the notation "Thompson," was signed by Jefferson Davis. One dollar in gold was equal to 2.2 dollars in greenbacks. The amount appropriated, is equivalent to about 23 million dollars in current U.S. dollars. See William A. Tidwell, *April '65: Confederate Covert Action in the American Civil War* (Kent, Ohio: 1995), p. 129.
9. Wilfrid Bovy, "Confederate Agents in Canada During the American Civil War," *Canadian Historical Review*, March 11, 1921, p. 47. See also Albert Hemingway, "Neutral Border Violated," *America's Civil War*, May 1988, p. 43.
10. Nat Brandt, *The Man Who Tried to Burn New York*, (Syracuse: 1986), p. 71; Ben Perley Poore, *The Conspiracy Trial for the Murder of the President*, 3 vols. (1864; reprint, Arno Press, 1972), 3: p. 135. Hereafter referred to as Poore, *Conspiracy Trial*.
11. It is worth noting that John Headley, one of Thompson's agents in Canada, wrote years later that he believed Hyams was a turncoat or double agent who passed on information about the Canadian operations to Union officials. See John Headley, *Confederate Operations in Canada and New York* (New York: 1906), p. 281. Hereafter referred to as Headley, *Confederate Operations*.
12. Thomas E. Courtenay, letter to Jefferson Davis, December 7, 1863, manuscript letter in the possession of Thomas Thatcher, great-great grandson of Thomas E. Courtenay.
13. The original act is photographically reproduced as a part of the Investigation and Trial Papers Relating to the Assassination of President Lincoln, Record Group 153, Microcopy 599, reel 4, frames 0220-0222.
14. Poore, *Conspiracy Trial*, 3: p. 428.
15. Report of Colonel J.H. Baker, NARA, RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General's Office, Letters Received (1854-1894).
16. W.S. Oldham, letter to Jefferson Davis, NARA, M-599, reel 15, frames 0338-0340 (emphasis added). Also see: Poore, *Conspiracy Trial*, I: pp. 405-06.
17. *Richmond Whig*, October 15, 1864, quoted in Oscar A. Kinchen, *Confederate Operations in Canada and the North* (North Quincy, Massachusetts: 1970), p. 164.
18. Headley, *Confederate Operations*, 271.
19. *Ibid.*, 274-75.
20. *Ibid.*, 277.
21. Kennedy was arrested and tried before a military tribunal. He was found guilty and sentenced to hang. His sentence was carried out on March 25, 1865.
22. Statement of Robert Cobb Kennedy, NARA, M-599, reel 4, frames 0131-0134.



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Jacob Thompson, Canadian-based Confederate operations.

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

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
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"BETTER OFF IN The Evolution of the Kansas

Matt Matthews and Kip Lindberg




"Hell in its fury," reflected Kansas lawyer James Christian in the 1880s, "could not match the malignity and depravity of the acts that were committed on the border of Kansas and Missouri during 1861, 1862, and 1863." Indeed, by the midpoint of the Civil War, much of this once peaceful rural area had been transformed into a landscape of horror. Charred

foundations, blackened, skeletal chimneys, and fresh graves offered mute testimony to the effects of unrestrained warfare and widespread lawlessness, but only silence as to the identity of the perpetrators. The names of pro-Confederate participants in this mayhem, such as William Quantrill and "Bloody" Bill Anderson, are well known. Less well known are the names and activities of their nominally pro-Union opponents, the "Red Legs." This article is an attempt to answer the following questions: Who were the "Red Legs"? How and when were they organized, and for what purpose? Were they a legitimate counter-guerrilla force or merely a band of murderous thieves? And, finally, what was their ultimate fate?¹

HELL”

Red Legs



“Kansas Jayhawker”
by Ernst Ulmer
(see page 93)


WITHOUT A DOUBT the factional conflict of Kansas' territorial period contributed directly to the emergence of the Red Legs. Opened to white settlement in 1854, the Kansas Territory soon became the focal point for the national conflict over slavery. Congress had determined that "popular sovereignty" would reign, allowing the incoming settlers themselves to decide if slavery would be permitted within the developing state. Quickly the pro-slavery faction poured into the territory, most making the short trek from their homes in adjacent Missouri. Formed into paramilitary companies these "border ruffians," as they were dubbed by the eastern press, worked to bring Kansas into the Union as a slave state. Through fraudulent elections and the intimidation of opponents by means of arson, theft, and physical violence, the pro-slavery faction was initially dominant. However the free-state settlers, once organized, began to fight back. Some, designating themselves "Jayhawkers," not only defended their lives and property but took the war "into Africa" by freeing slaves and retrieving stolen property from western Missouri. Escalating reciprocal terrorism gave rise to "Bleeding Kansas," and the campaign initiated by the "Border Ruffians" succeeded only, in the words of historian Stephen Starr, in "[laying] up in Kansas a reservoir of hatred which within a decade turned the richest part of... [Missouri] into a blood-soaked, ruined, deserted wilderness."²

Entering the Union as a free state in January 1861, within months Kansas responded to President Lincoln's call, sending her troops to fight the secessionist armies. Now, with federal support and approval, the war could be taken to Missouri. James Lane, a veteran of the Mexican War and the serving United States senator for Kansas, was quick to organize a mixed brigade of infantry, cavalry, and artillery to protect Kansas and "play hell with Missouri" by eradicating rebellion and slavery. In September 1861 Lane led his force to Osceola, Missouri, to attack a supply point for pro-Confederate forces. The attack met only minor resistance and the supplies were burned, along with much of the town, after first being looted by Lane's command. The Kansans appropriated an estimated three hundred and fifty horses and mules and four hun-

dred head of cattle, as well as sufficient rolling stock to carry away an enormous quantity of foodstuffs, dry goods, and personal property. In addition several hundred slaves took the opportunity to gain their freedom, joining the column as it rolled away. The haul was apparently divided among the command, with Lane's share rumored to include "a fine carriage, a piano, and a quantity of silk dresses, all of which he sent to his home in Lawrence." Lane later admitted these acts to fellow Union general Samuel Sturgis. An Iowa newspaper correspondent present, Franc Wilkie, reported that Lane alluded "with a humorous twinkle in his eye and a pleasant laugh at the fun of the thing, to reminiscences of Negroes stolen, houses burned, citizens robbed, and prisoners shot after being compelled to dig their own graves."

When Sturgis queried Lane as to the murder of an Osceola banker, and the theft of between \$8,000 and \$10,000 from his widow, Lane apparently responded with "I grant you my fellows have done some wrongs," and a laugh of infinite gusto." All in all General Lane struck Wilkie as "Nero fiddling and laughing over the burning of [a] Missouri Rome." With the attack on Osceola, Lane had escalated "jayhawking" to a new level, making it possible both to serve the Union and personally profit in the process, a lesson enthusiastically embraced by many.³

Later that same month, Colonel Charles R. "Doc" Jennison, a leader of the territorial jayhawking movement and a Lane associate, received word of secessionist harassment of Unionists from William Miles, marshal of Independence, Missouri. Engaged at the time in recruiting men for his yet-to-be organized 7th Kansas Cavalry, Jennison hastily assembled an armed band, including numerous so-called "volunteer citizen scouts," as well as many of his prewar jayhawking associates. After a night march from Kansas City, Jennison's command entered Independence early in the morning, simultaneously from all directions. By noon most of the male population had been forcibly taken from their homes and hiding places, gathered in the town square, then interned under guard within the iron fence surrounding the Jackson County Courthouse. Part of Jennison's command set about plundering the town, first gathering up the extra



James H. Lane

horses and wheeled vehicles necessary to remove their expected haul to Kansas.

George C. Bingham, Missouri state treasurer and Jackson County resident, reported that Jennison's followers, in addition to assaulting Union citizens as well as known secessionists, ransacked private businesses and residences,

seizing whatever pleased their fancy or excited their cupidity. Watches and jewelry were pounced upon with the greatest avidity.... Finely wrought bed quilts, scarfs [sic], and silk dresses were appropriated without hesitation, and... All slaves... who could be induced to desert their owners were furnished with escorts to Kansas....

Soon piles of furniture, household goods, and store inventories covered the stone sidewalks, while the line of commandeered livestock and vehicles extended nearly around the entire square.⁴

During the frenzy of activity Jennison and Joseph B. Swain, described by an eyewitness that day as Jennison's "right-hand man" and as seemingly "in command of active operations that day," entered the shop of shoe and boot maker John P. Duke. Swain, having taken the highly imaginative and ironic alias "Jeff Davis," was well on his way to becoming "notorious as having killed more rebels than probably any one man in Kansas." Swain was immediately taken with a pile of red-dyed sheepskins that occupied one of the cobbler's shelves, which Duke used



This sketch of guerrilla depredations by J.W. Matthews is entitled "Seizing Horses."

as a decorative topping for the high boots he made. Jennison's men immediately appropriated the red sheepskins, and fashioned them into pairs of leggings.⁵

As the looting concluded, Jennison addressed the hundreds of citizens assembled in the town square. He called out the names of Union men supplied by Marshall Miles, asking them to step forward to reclaim their property. Jennison then harangued the remaining men, telling them that he would return and kill ten of them for every Union man harmed by local secessionists. As the heavily loaded wagons, carriages, and buggies withdrew from Independence, many slaves, including women and children, jumped on board. The caravan, guarded by about one hundred and fifty men now sporting red sheepskin leggings, must have appeared somewhat surreal. Held tightly in place by strips of calfskin, also obtained from the unlucky shoemaker, the colorful accessories instantly came to symbolize all future such depredations as the work of "Red Legs."⁶

The official records, documents, and source material related to the organization and activities of the Red Legs are limited. Early accounts of the Red Leg movement are confusing and seemingly contradictory. Confederate guerrilla John McCorkle called them "a company of free lances," while Kansas historian Leverett W. Spring referred to them as "a loose jointed association, with members shifting between twenty-five and fifty, dedi-

cated originally to the vocation of horse-stealing, but flexible enough to include rascalities of every description." Captain Henry Palmer, an officer serving with the 11th Kansas Cavalry, believed there were three hundred Red Legs, and that they were "sworn to shoot rebels, take no prisoners, free slaves, and respect no property rights of rebels or their sympathizers." In contrast, Albert R. Greene, a member of the 9th Kansas Cavalry, claimed they "did more to protect the homes of Kansas than any regiment of men in the service, and was the organization of all others most dreaded by Quantrill." Charles Monroe Chase, a newspaperman with the *Sycamore*, Illinois, *True Republican and Sentinel*, believed the "Red Leg" was "regarded as more purely an indiscriminate thief and murderer than the Jayhawker or Bushwhacker." Further muddying the issue was a newspaper report of speeches given at Mound City, Kansas, which claimed the people there:

generally believed in Jayhawkers and Red Legs; the young people are taught to believe in them. They are told that a Jayhawker is a follower of John Brown, that he believes all men have a right to life, liberty and property, except traitors and scoundrels; that he acts on this belief. They are told that a Red Leg is also a disciple of that illustrious abolitionist, loves his memory, hates Judas Iscariot, and believes

that what will be will be, and that traitors are to be hung, accepts the issue, hangs them and saves powder as he goes marching on.⁷

It appears then that the name Red Legs was given to three different, sometimes overlapping elements, all of which adopted the insignia for the shock value it came to possess. The first were men nominally associated but primarily engaged in profitable criminal activity. Others were devoted entirely to illegal enterprises, regardless of the political caste of their victims, and finally there were those who served alongside regular federal forces as scouts and in a counter-insurgency role, who only occasionally lapsed into criminal activity.

Indicative of the first category of Red Leg was the group formed by Joseph Swain following the successful raid on Independence. During the winter of 1861-1862 Swain and John L. "Jack" Bridges, who followed Swain's lead and adopted the satirical *nom-de-plume* "Beau-regard," along with eleven other men, served as scouts for Captain William S. Oliver of the 7th Missouri (Union) Infantry. These men were not on the government payroll, but worked as volunteer citizen scouts helping Oliver track down the Confederate guerrilla leader William Quantrill. In compensation for their service they were allowed to keep all captured property, including weapons, horses, mules, and other livestock, all of which could be readily sold for cash. During this time the scouts were involved in nine engagements with Quantrill's guerrillas and succeeded in killing six of his men, as well as shooting three of the guerrilla chieftain's horses out from under him. A witness remembered the men in this party wearing red leather leggings, which he claimed was "adopted as an insignia by the scouts." The group adhered to the fundamental principal that most, if not all, rebels should be killed, and that the seizure of their property was completely justified. Soon Swain and his men became less concerned with the political sympathies of their victims and more interested in their own financial gain. However, as long as they provided some service to the Union, sympathetic federal authorities were willing to ignore their transgressions.⁸

The second group was a renegade band of lawbreakers who disguised them-

selves as Red Legs in an effort to mask their criminal activities against both Union and Confederate sympathizers. Unlike the previous group, this band of miscreants had no political support and none of the protection it offered. When captured by federal authorities, their punishment was frequently severe.

Early in the war a twenty-one-year-old former Pony Express rider and wagon freighter named William Sloan Tough raised a force of seventy-five men from the squalid Leavenworth, Kansas, underworld. Tough's motive for raising this gang of cutthroats was revenge, for Missouri guerrillas had pilfered his wagons, taken his mules, and twice attempted to murder him; recovering from his wounds he made the decision to carry the war back to the Missouri bushwhackers. Although there is no direct evidence, it is highly probable that Tough's sizable command participated in Jennison's raid on Independence.⁹

Throughout the fall and winter of 1861-62 Tough and his band roamed the border counties around Kansas City—looting, burning homes, and killing. Reporter Charles Chase interviewed Tough in the summer of 1863, stating that his crew “belonged to no military organization, but ran an independent concern,” and that the “plunder was divided among his men who would sell it and get pay for their service.” Interestingly, one of Tough's chief lieutenants was Walter Sinclair, who before the war had conducted numerous raids with the noted abolitionist John E. Stewart to free slaves in Missouri. Sinclair was also involved in cattle theft, and in 1860 both he and William Quantrill were apprehended by authorities on Stewart's property with eighty head of stolen cattle. Tough's pre-war activities had also brought him into contact with Quantrill, whom he would again see before the end of the war.

The outrages against civilians in Missouri, and increasingly in Kansas, grew so acute that federal authorities were forced to respond. On January 6, 1862, William F. Cloud, provost marshal for the city of Leavenworth, issued orders prohibiting the sale of “horses, mules or other livestock in this city without... permission.” He further ordered “all persons belonging to organizations of a military character, not authorized by the State of Kansas, or United States [be] declared...

outlaws and highwaymen,” their arrest punishable by the decision of a drum-head court martial.¹⁰

In May 1862 Brigadier General James G. Blunt was appointed commander of the Department of Kansas. A doctor and farmer with no prior military experience, many were surprised by Blunt's appointment, none more so than Blunt himself. Blunt thought the assignment “unpleasant and embarrassing” and had great “misgivings” about his qualifications. Although overwhelmed with the administrative duties of running a large department and of waging a conventional war against regular Confederate forces, Blunt immediately issued orders for the apprehension of those committing depredations inside his department. He wrote that “marauding parties have become so frequent and alarming as to render insecure the lives and property of all classes of citizens.” Within a week the most notorious brigand in Kansas, Captain Marshall Cleveland, a former officer in Jennison's 7th Kansas Cavalry, was shot dead by the soldiers of Blunt's command. The Leavenworth *Daily Times*, a blatantly anti-Blunt newspaper, called the general's actions “truly commendable,” and Blunt assured them “that measures are now on foot which will certainly result in ridding the State of these outlaws.”¹¹ Soon after Blunt's decree William Tough was arrested for “Red Leg” depredations in Atchison, Kansas, and federal authorities soon arrived and took their prisoner across the Missouri River to St. Joseph. On June 28 Tough and several other prisoners armed with makeshift clubs attempted to escape from their lockup. The jail guard fired five or six shots at the prisoners, wounding one, and forcing the others back into their cell. Tough's activities had been, for the moment, successfully curtailed.¹²

In July 1862 a vigilance committee was formed by many of the leading citizens of Wyandotte County, Kansas, to stop an outbreak of robbery and horse stealing, which the civilian law enforcement officials were powerless to stop. The committee believed the “Six Mile House,” owned by J.A. Bartles and his son, Theodore, had become a “den of thieves, operated by a gang of Red Legs.” They demanded that the two men leave the county immediately, and threatened



**The “Jayhawker Chief”
Charles Rainsford Jennison**



William Sloan Tough

to hang “any man who spends his days and nights in consorting with suspicious characters.” On July 18 the committee members descended on the Six Mile House, intent on tearing the place down. Theodore Bartles, however, had already been alerted to the danger, and made his way to Fort Leavenworth, to seek protection from General Blunt. When the outraged mob approached the house a company of the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry met

KANSAS STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, TOPEKA

KANSAS STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, TOPEKA



"Your Money or Your Life," by J.W. Matthews, depicting Confederate robbers.

Tough's motive for raising his gang of cutthroats was revenge, for Missouri guerrillas had pilfered his wagons, taken his mules, and twice attempted to murder him.

them. Blunt ordered all sixty committee members arrested, as well as Bartles, Sr., who was locked in the guardhouse at Fort Leavenworth. Within a few days, after posting bond, all were released with the understanding that the Six Mile House would, for the time being, be left standing.¹³

Whether William Tough pleaded his case or made some other kind of arrangement with federal authorities is not known, but by August 1862 he had been released from jail and was working as a guide for the 10th Kansas Infantry. Whatever the cause of his freedom, the Union high command quickly realized the value of men like Tough. Lieutenant Colonel John T. Burris, who was scouting near Independence on August 14, reported that the young guide brought in eight prisoners and a herd of cattle, captured fourteen miles east of the city.¹⁴

Tough and another scout, Jack Harvey, awed Lieutenant James Burton Pond of the 3rd Wisconsin cavalry. While scouting the border with Tough, Pond recalled being "wonderfully impressed with his hazardous riding and brave exploits." He claimed prisoners brought in by Tough and his men were so frightened that they would divulge any secret. When Pond asked to go with Tough on a scouting foray Tough replied, "Why, my man, do you know there is great danger where we are going? You soldiers are all afraid of being killed!" Pond at last convinced

Tough to bring him along, but only after the latter procured Pond a better horse and saddle, a civilian butternut colored coat for a disguise, and replaced the percussion caps priming Pond's pistols with his own waterproof caps.¹⁵

When Blunt headed south in the fall to conduct active operations, Tough went with him as his officially appointed "Chief of Scouts." During the fall Burris continued to use the other volunteer citizen scouts to help hunt down Missouri guerrillas. Joseph Swain began working for Burris, again with the understanding that since the volunteer scouts received no pay from the government they would be allowed to keep captured property. Not only did Burris agree to this arrangement, but according to Major W.C. Ransom, General Blunt approved.¹⁶

It is a commonly held misconception that Blunt, along with Colonel Thomas Ewing, created the Red Legs. While Blunt apparently condoned the practice of letting the volunteer civilian scouts keep captured property, and had hired Tough and some of his men, he at no time formed an official organization. While Tough's men wore red leggings, as did the volunteer civilian scouts and the gang at the Six Mile House, in the late summer of 1862 there was no such officially sanctioned group. Although Tough and his men would latter be called red-legged scouts, they were officially on the pay roll as either scouts, spies or detectives.

The real beginnings of the structured Red Legs started not long after Blunt departed Fort Leavenworth. Blunt was in high spirits as he headed south to join his troops in the field, and although still responsible for his department, he was delighted to leave behind his administrative and law enforcement duties. Others were just as pleased to see him depart.

Charles Jennison, who had resigned from the 7th Kansas Cavalry in May 1862 under a cloud of official disapproval regarding the jayhawking actions of his regiment, was without doubt the man chiefly responsible for the creation of the organized Red Legs. Jennison claimed that he had resigned from the service because he "did not enlist to return slaves or protect rebels, but to crush slavery and to kill rebels, and while in the service, I gave a good deal of attention to these two points." He assured his followers that "when the Government adopts that policy, I shall be again a soldier; until that time, I shall be a citizen."

Now "Citizen" Jennison hurriedly established a partnership with Leavenworth businessman J.G. Losee, freighting goods to the gold fields of Denver, Colorado, and other locations in the West. Anticipating an increase in trade, the two men quickly constructed a new building to hold their goods. Although there is no direct evidence, it is reasonable to assume that with the ban on unauthorized livestock sales in Leavenworth the Jennison-Losee warehouse and livery stable was used to store goods and house livestock collected by the Red Legs until the pilfered merchandise could be hauled west for sale. Indeed, Jennison's own brother, a detective working for the provost marshal, was implicated in a scheme wherein he confiscated horses, mules, and property from escaped Missouri slaves who could not prove ownership. The magnitude of the operation is astonishing. One Jennison-Losee wagon train bound for Denver reportedly contained goods valued at seventy thousand dollars.¹⁷

Soon a new player arrived on the scene whose name would be as much linked to Red Leg activities as Jennison's. Captain George H. Hoyt disembarked at the Leavenworth landing in July 1862. He had been mustered into the 7th Kansas Cavalry as a second lieutenant the previous November, serving in the com-

pany commanded by John Brown, Jr. At the age of twenty-five he was already something of a celebrity, having served as counsel for John Brown, following his abortive attempt to capture the United States armory at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1859. Promoted to captain following the younger Brown's resignation, Hoyt spent most of his time in the 7th as Jennison's aide-de-camp, and the two soon became solid companions. After serving for six months, Hoyt resigned his position due to failing health, having been described as "delicate in appearance" even prior to the rigors of active campaigning. A doctor who examined him at the time of his discharge noted he suffered from "glandular swelling and spinal curvature," as well as tubercular infections of the lungs. The surgeon further claimed that Hoyt "had no physical endurance and became exhausted by the slightest over exertion." When he arrived at the Leavenworth landing he was so ill his black servant had to carry his emaciated seventy-five pound body ashore. Despite his poor constitution Hoyt was chosen by his former commander to head the expanding Red Leg operations, while Jennison concentrated on obtaining another profitable appointment.¹⁸

On August 23, 1862, fifteen men under the command of Joseph Swain, whom local authorities were now describing as "a desperately bad man," conducted a raid into Clay County, Missouri. Jennison had sent Swain to procure recruits for the colored infantry regiment Senator Lane proposed to raise. Jennison, in turn, sought to obtain command of the regiment from Lane as reward for providing ample recruits. Swain and his men stole forty head of horses and forcibly captured twenty-five black men, most of whom were claimed as property by pro-Union citizens. While committing these acts they assaulted several women, slapping them in the face when they refused to give them clothing and money. After a running gun battle with the local pro-Union state militia, eight men, including Swain, were captured and thrown into the Liberty, Missouri, jail. A United States marshal who examined the prisoners claimed they were "outlaws and thieves of the worst description." Within a day Jennison sent another of his men to Liberty, demanding the discharge of the inmates under threat of retaliation.

"I will hold the county responsible," he warned, "if they are not released and given up." Initially Union authorities refused to comply with Jennison's demand; however, within a few weeks Swain and the other prisoners were free.¹⁹

On October 1, 1862, the acting provost marshal at Fort Leavenworth, Captain Nathan L. Stout of the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry, arrested Jack Bridges, alias "Beauregard," at the Six Mile House on the charge of horse stealing. Interestingly, Stout and Jennison had been acquainted before the war, corresponding about the events in "Bleeding Kansas," although the extent of their association is not known. About the time of Bridges' arrest, Stout organized a group of forty men who became known publicly as the "Red Legs"; it is possible that the arrest may have been a subtle hint to Bridges to quit free-lance operations and join a new team. Theodore Bartles, resident of the Six Mile House, joined Hoyt's Red Legs at this time as well.²⁰

As provost marshal it was Stout's responsibility to arrest thieves like Bridges; instead he provided some of the most infamous criminals in Kansas with law enforcement credentials. A provost marshal was authorized to hire detectives, whose powers were rather impressive. Typically a detective's appointment papers stated that he was

empowered to arrest all thieves, deserters and disloyal persons and seize all Government, contraband or stolen stock, or other property found in improper hands. All officers and soldiers in the United States Service... and all loyal citizens are requested to furnish [him] all needful aid.

As Hoyt's Red Legs grew in size and scope, detective papers would become one of their most powerful tools.²¹


The extent of the mayhem generated by the Red Legs was horrendous; citizens in both Kansas and Missouri were robbed and terrorized. The narrative accounts of Missourians accosted by them are numerous, but one of the most illuminating comes from a Kansas cavalry officer, and involved Joseph Swain. Swain and seven of his followers made a nighttime raid on the home of a Missouri farmer named Lawrence. The party demanded the man turn over to them all his money and silverware. Lawrence said he could not comply with their de-



George H. Hoyt, the notorious "Chief of the Red Legs."



Major General James G. Blunt



An Adalbert Johann Volck etching entitled "Jennison's Jayhawkers," which depicts the actions of the 7th Kansas Cavalry.

mand as he had sent all of his money to a bank in Canada for safety. Dragged to a nearby tree with a rope around his neck, Lawrence was repeatedly hauled into the air and strangled as Swain tried to extract the location of his wealth. When Lawrence failed to produce the goods the men ransacked his home, smashing open locked drawers, emptying trunks, and ripping open mattresses. In the parlor they found the coffin of Mrs. Lawrence, who had died that day, resting across two chairs. In the words of author Henry E. Palmer:

One fellow...suggested that maybe money was hid in the coffin, and with that he knocked off the lid of the casket and searched for gold. A ring on the finger of the dead woman attracted his attention, and whipping out his bowie knife he cut off the finger to release the ring. Before leaving, this gallant party of Union defenders said to the terror-stricken daughters: "If you want to plant the old lady, drag her out, for we are going to fire the ranch." Unaided they dragged the coffin from the burning home.

Although the incident took place later in the war (in the spring of 1864), it serves as an excellent example of their mode of operation and the viciousness commonly associated with the Red Legs.²²

When word of the worsening Red Leg depredations reached Blunt in north-

ern Arkansas he took immediate action. On November 15 he issued General Order Number One, in which he fired approximately twenty detectives, provost marshals, and special agents at Fort Leavenworth. He further directed "the band of irresponsible men popularly known as 'Red Legs' or 'The Forty Thieves,' organized under the auspices of Capt. Stout, late Provost Marshal...to disperse." He warned his officers to be "vigilant in promptly arresting these marauders whenever or wherever found." Unfortunately for Blunt his order calling for the Red Legs to disperse had little effect, as he would find out to his utter dismay when he returned to Fort Leavenworth.²³

Blunt found the situation around Fort Leavenworth intolerable upon his resumption of command in the early spring of 1863. "Matters left in charge of subordinates had been running rather loosely," he maintained. "An organization had sprung into existence known as 'Red Legs,' and," Blunt lamented, "whatever had been the primary object and purpose of those identified with it, its operations had certainly become fraught with danger to the peace and security of society." Blunt was convinced that

the organization embraced many of the most desperate characters in the country, while the inducements of easy gain had allured into it many persons who, in ordinary time,

would never have consented to be connected with such an enterprise. Officers, soldiers and citizens had become infected until the leaders became so bold as to defy interference with their operations.

Blunt claimed to have intercepted letters from members of the organization that indicated that the criminal enterprise extended into Colorado, Nebraska and Iowa. Blunt regarded it as his duty to try and shut down their operation, although he daily received anonymous letters threatening him with assassination.²⁴

Blunt immediately issued an order to arrest all men not in military service found bearing arms in Kansas and engaged in nefarious activities. "Take as few prisoners of this class as possible," he wrote, ordering that those so captured be summarily tried and sentenced by a drumhead military court martial. If found guilty they were immediately to be executed. In a second proclamation Blunt further prohibited any armed persons or parties not in his service from entering the state of Missouri, with those caught sharing the same fate. "This injunction will apply expressly to an organization known as 'Red Legs,' which is an organized band of thieves and violators of law and good order." Blunt also stated that since there was every reason to believe officers in the military service of the United States were implicated in the offenses of these Red Legs, any evidence of their failure to obey his proclamations would result in immediate dismissal.

Still the activities continued unabated, leaving some citizens to question Blunt's sincerity and his dedication to the new campaign. It was feared Blunt might "be guilty of... duplicity and knavery as to issue an order for the suppression of such characters and then secretly connive at their villainy and share with them their ill-gotten spoils."²⁵

It seems that Blunt did make a half-hearted attempt to shut down Red Leg operations. The evidence seems to suggest, however, that he made no attempt whatsoever to stop the Jennison-Hoyt operation, and was content to go only after other individuals styling themselves as Red Legs. The first test of Blunt's decrees came at the end of May 1863, when the citizens of Atchison County, Kansas, were terrorized by four Red Legs. A vigilance committee captured the men and

immediately lynched two of them. The sheriff of Atchison, Donald Carmichael, asked Blunt what he should do with the remaining two. Blunt issued orders for them to be turned over to the citizens of Atchison, who promptly lynched them both.

News of the act and of Blunt's complicity reached the White House via Kansas Governor Thomas Carney. In response to the presidential inquiry Blunt wrote Lincoln: "Civil law was powerless to arrest and punish them. There was no place in the state where they could be confined if arrested...." Blunt further explained to the president that his department had been stripped of most of his military force by his superior, Major General John Schofield, leaving him with no means of protecting the peaceful citizenry. Blunt enclosed papers indicating support for his actions on the part of Sheriff Carmichael and the Atchison Citizen's Delegation.²⁶

Blunt had little time to effect additional changes. The same day he penned this defense of his actions he was relieved of command. Schofield had broken up the Department of Kansas, assigning Blunt to the new District of the Frontier, headquartered over a hundred miles farther south at Fort Scott. Brigadier General Thomas Ewing now commanded the "District of the Border," encompassing Leavenworth and the surrounding Red Leg territory.

It was hoped that Ewing would have greater success preventing guerilla raids into Kansas, and in stopping outrages committed by the Red Legs. In July he gave a sensational speech in Olathe, telling the audience "there are very many men in Kansas stealing themselves rich in the name of liberty. I shall inflict on all men, who go into Missouri to plunder, the severest penalties...."

But firmly established now, Hoyt increased operations. The Leavenworth *Daily Conservative* proclaimed him "head of the Kansas Red Legs," and reported that he was "no canting Abolitionist—he kills rebels." At the same time Hoyt and his men set up shop in Lawrence, Kansas, using the Johnson House Hotel as their headquarters. A citizen of Lawrence claimed the Red Legs boasted "that nobody dared to interfere with them [as] they did not hesitate to shoot inquisitive and troublesome people." The Lawrence

THE HANGING OF TWO "RED LEGS" IN KANSAS

Fort Leavenworth, June 9th 1863

Sir:—

At the request of the Hon James H. Lane, U.S.S. from Kansas, I have the honor to transmit to you the enclosed papers, with following statement in relation to the hanging of one Mooney and Brewer by the citizens of Atchison Co. Kansas.

On my return from Arkansas in January last I found the country on the border of Kansas and Missouri overrun with bands of marauders, thieves, and robbers, styling themselves "Red Legs." Their organization was so formidable, and their depredations committed with such impunity, as to have become the terror of all law-abiding and honest men. No man's life or property was secure for a moment.

The civil law was powerless to arrest and punish them. There was no place in the State where they could be confined if arrested. I therefore declared them outlaws, and ordered them shot down when caught in their acts of crime; and that, in all other cases they should be tried and punished summarily by Military Commissions.

After nearly all my troops were taken from me, and I was left with no means to protect peaceable citizens, robberies and murders were committed with fearful impunity. About the 20th of May last four men were arrested

by citizens of Atchison County for robbery and murder. Two of them were tried & hung by a citizens court before I had notice of the affair. The other two—Mooney and Brewer—were lodged in the jail. On the 21st of May a delegation of about twelve of the most responsible men of Atchison County, headed by the Sherriff [Carmichael], visited me to know what should be done with Mooney and Brewer. Sherriff Carmichael, as well as all others, was of the opinion that if the ends of justice would be best subserved by turning them over to the citizens to be tried impartially by responsible men.

They requested my consent to deliver them up, which I gave, as you will see by the enclosed paper.... I have yet to be convinced of error in my judgement of the case. The result has shown the wisdom of this course. It has stricken terror to the evil-doers, and in that part of the State at least, the life and property of honest citizens has become secure. The act has been approved by all except thieves and their abettors, and as an evidence of this, I refer you to testimony of Judicial and civil officers of the State, which will be forwarded to you in a few days.

Respectfully
Your Obedient Servt
Jas. G. Blunt
Major Gen'l

Source: Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.

stables began to fill to capacity with horses taken from Missouri, and any owners who came to Lawrence looking for their property were liable to be beaten or worse. A witness saw "Hoyt... without a word of explanation or warning, open fire upon a stranger quietly riding down Massachusetts Street. He was a Missourian whom Hoyt had recently robbed."²⁷

Around the time of Blunt's departure Captain Sidney Clarke arrived at Fort Leavenworth, assuming the post of assistant provost marshal for Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado. Clarke was one of Senator James Lane's closest confidants, having served as his personnel secretary, and was now to have an almost free hand in hiring detectives for the department. A.C. Wilder, another colleague of Lane's, advised Clarke to "look over the field and make such appointments as you think will be true to us." Soon Clarke, either on his own or on Ewing's behalf, appointed Hoyt as a detective for the district. In short order, Hoyt appointed

"Jack" Bridges, the infamous "Beau-regard," and John W. Blatchly as his deputies. Solomon Miller, a staunch Unionist and Republican, expressed his disgust over the selection of detectives:

A system of terrorism was practiced upon loyal citizens... by means of deputy marshals, so-called detectives, and desperate, irresponsible men under other guises, to keep them to the wishes of [Senator] Lane....they first despoiled men of known disloyal sentiments, [and] when that harvest was exhausted they began to make disloyal men—that is, they would trump up charges of disloyalty... and proceed to steal their horses.

Like Blunt, Ewing was willing to denounce Red Leg activity publicly, but was reluctant to challenge Jennison or Hoyt.²⁸

On August 21, 1863, William Quantrell and his guerillas raided Lawrence, killing over one hundred and fifty men



Lieutenant Colonel George H. Hoyt (center) with other officers of the 15th Kansas Cavalry.

and boys and burning most of the town. One of their first stops was the Johnson Hotel, but Hoyt and his men were not there at the time. Red Leg depredations in Missouri were cited as one of the reasons for Quantrill's attack. Arriving on the scene after the massacre, Hoyt and his men trailed Quantrill's force as they retreated into Missouri. Although they were unable to overtake the guerillas, three prisoners captured by the pro-Union Missouri militia were handed over to the Red Legs. Hoyt was intrigued by one of the captives, whose loot consisted of "marbles, jews-harps, mouth organs, toys, shoestrings, [and] cheap buttons." "Hoyt looked over the collection in astonishment," stated one man present, "then drawing his pistol, said: 'I will just kill you for being a damn fool,' and shot the guerilla dead." Hoyt then finished the job, killing the two remaining prisoners.²⁹

In retaliation for the Lawrence Massacre, Ewing issued his infamous Order Number 11, depopulating three-and-a-half Missouri border counties. Red Legs were used to help implement this order; not only were Hoyt's men working for him as detectives, but W.W. Denison, a private in the 11th Kansas Cavalry, stated that he was detailed with several others to enforce General Order Number 11, dressed in civilian clothes and red leggings furnished him for that duty.³⁰

By October 1863 the Kansas-Missouri border was engulfed in utter chaos. Union Missouri militia colonel James H.

Moss was horrified when he returned to his home in Liberty. "I found that the entire military force in Clay and Platte [counties]," he reported to his superior, "was nothing more or less than an armed mob, and a portion of them in full fellowship with the Kansas Red Legs." One disgruntled militia company, in a show of solidarity with the Red Legs, paraded around the countryside with strips of red paper pasted on their pant legs, cheering for Jennison and Lane and singing the abolitionist anthem "John Brown's Body."

Despite his best effort Jennison was unable to obtain a colonelcy in either the 1st or 2nd Kansas Colored Infantry Regiments. Instead, upon hearing that the governor was authorizing the formation of another cavalry regiment, Jennison championed himself for its command. Enlisting many of his Red Leg operatives, and promising to "shoot, kill, burn, and confiscate [in Missouri] until Lawrence... was avenged," he was able to fill his quota rapidly. On October 17, 1863, the 15th Kansas Cavalry was mustered into service with Jennison as colonel, and Hoyt as his second-in-command. If the 7th Kansas could be called "Jennison's Jayhawkers," the 15th deserved the title of "Jennison's Red Legs."³¹

The third group to whom the appellation Red Legs was applied was a legitimate counter-guerrilla force known as the "Red-legged" or "Buckskin Scouts."

Their membership, which included defectors from the other groups, performed hazardous reconnaissance duty and gained an almost legendary status. Although they were paid a handsome wage for their work, they lapsed at times into criminal activity when sufficient reward beckoned.

When Blunt left Leavenworth to take command at his new headquarters at Fort Scott in June 1863, he brought with him William Tough and a full contingent of spies, scouts and detectives. While the newspapers took to calling them "Blunt's buckskin scouts," one of the men, Josiah C. Ury, recalled they "wore red and tan colored buckskin leggings and were known as the Buckskins, and sometimes as Red Legs."³² Arguably, one of the major factors behind Blunt's battlefield success was his use of these men; although an amateur, Blunt probably obtained better intelligence through their use than any other commander in the Trans-Mississippi. Colonel James M. Johnson ran across four hard and dangerous-looking men during Blunt's 1863 campaign in the Indian Territory. They proved to be a party of the general's scouts roaming over the country in search of information, and they told Johnson "that our Army of the Frontier has its scouts & spies dressed in citizens' dress, in Federal uniform, in Rebel uniform, in butternut & buckskin."³³

When not actively engaged in scouting for Blunt's command, Tough and his men conducted what could be termed counter-guerrilla operations. Lieutenant Pond witnessed one such operation near Montevallo, Missouri. Two brothers known as the Mayfield boys had been bushwhacking Federal patrols, and Tough, with Pond and another scout, set out to track them down. The trail ended at a secluded log house, with a pair of horses hitched outside. Stealthily they approached the structure, getting close enough to look in the window and see the Mayfield boys asleep inside. Tough and his companions woke them up and disarmed them. "We could not possibly afford to be hampered with prisoners just at this time," Pond later stated, "so they shot the two Mayfield boys and brought in their horses and equipment. There was great rejoicing over this capture, for these brothers had really shot a good many of my men."³⁴

Blunt had always taken special precautions with Tough, closely watching his actions to prevent unauthorized mischief. He acknowledged to Major General Samuel R. Curtis that although Tough had "discharged his duty faithfully, and performed much hazardous service...he was given no privileges and kept under my immediate supervision." In the fall of 1863, however, Blunt was relieved of command, and Brigadier General John McNeil promptly selected Tough as his chief of scouts.³⁵



Lyttleton Morgan Tough (left) and his brother William Sloan Tough

Seventeen-year-old Lyttleton served as a special detective in the District of Kansas, and received a salary of one hundred and twenty-five dollars per month. In this photograph William Tough is wearing the uniform of a commissioned officer. Scouts and spies of the Army of the Frontier dressed "in citizens' dress, in Federal uniform, in rebel uniform, in butternut & in buckskin."

Free from Blunt's control, and operating from Fort Smith, Arkansas, Tough was soon back to his former ways. Allowed to pick his own men, he hired John Harvey and Walt Sinclair as detectives, and with approximately thirty others of his choosing employed as scouts and spies it did not take Tough long to take advantage of the situation. A correspondent for the *Olathe Mirror*, who for

obvious reasons wished to remain anonymous, reported that Tough and Major Calkins of the 3rd Wisconsin, acting provost marshal for Fort Smith, were joined in a criminal enterprise. They were "cleaning out the country in this vicinity," he warned. "They are ever ready to pick up the crumbs which may fall from their master's table, and, of course, are always in favor with the powers that be." Every military wagon train returning to Fort Scott and Leavenworth had with it herds of confiscated horses, mules, and cattle. He continued that Tough and Calkins were not alone guilty of such actions:

There are a large number of men following this army, who appear to occupy a position between the civil and military. They steal all the supplies as soon as a State is occupied by our forces and then sell them to the Government at enormous prices.... You may ask why is this thing not investigated by the proper authorities. I answer that the officer who crosses their plans and purposes is marked for sacrifice.³⁶

As long as there was a profit to be made Red Leg activity continued unhindered along the border. Perhaps the most flagrant surviving example of the Red Leg patronage system in operation is a request made in February 1865. Sidney Clarke, former provost marshal and now congressman from Kansas, received a letter from Ms. Fannie Wright, written on the behest of her friend "Beauregard":

The sum of my request is this—that "detective papers" be given him under you, you undoubtedly are aware of the gain pecuniary to be realized from such papers exercising jurisdiction over country south of this, he expecting to *share liberally with his friends*.

Although the record does not show Clarke's response to the request it was most probably granted. After all, Clarke had previously accepted Bridges' services.

At the close of the conflict the border counties of Missouri lay in waste. In places a man could ride fifty miles without spying a single inhabitant. Captain Richard J. Hinton of the 2nd Kansas Colored Infantry noted:

the charred remains of consumed dwellings, the only standing parts of which were brick chimneys... familiarly known as Jennison's Tombstones.... Long lines of gray ashes told where fences had stood; while rank crops of unsightly weeds marked where cultivation had once smiled.

Despite the resulting poverty of the region there were some who could enjoy the benefits of the war. Jennison was elected to serve in the Kansas legislature and retired to live out his life on his three hundred-acre farm, well stocked with the finest breeds of cattle, hogs, and game birds. His stables produced thoroughbred racehorses because, as one newspaper joked, "for some five or six years the Colonel enjoyed unusual facilities for selecting fast horses from numerous stables."³⁷

George Hoyt returned to the practice of law. Notwithstanding his flagrant wartime "Red Leg" activity he was, ironically, elected to the highest law enforcement position in the state and served as the Kansas attorney general.

Hoyt was not alone in pursuing a career in law enforcement. William Tough served as a Kansas peace officer before he, too, retired to a farm. Like Jennison before him Tough raised and sold horses, his clients including racing fans and the British military. Jack Bridges tried to sell a "stone woman" of the Cardiff giant variety he claimed to have found while mining gold in Colorado, but dropped the plan when he discovered his chosen mark was the Wyandotte County sheriff. In the tradition established by Hoyt and Tough, "Beauregard" pinned on a star and swore to uphold the law, occasionally acting again as a scout for the army.

Most, like Joseph Swain, simply disappeared. Doubtless some were killed in the course of further criminal activities, but perhaps many simply left the area before former victims recognized them and took revenge. Unlike Quantrill's band of guerillas, the Red Legs never held reunions, perhaps unwilling draw attention to their wartime activities. ■

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The authors are currently working on a book about the Baxter Springs Massacre, as well as a biography of Major General James G. Blunt. They would like to thank James D. Drees, who provided useful information on the Red Legs. Drees is currently writing a biography of "Jack" Bridges.

NOTES:

1. Charles Robinson, *The Kansas Conflict*, (Lawrence, KS: 1898), p. 451.
2. Stephen Z. Starr, *Jennison's Jayhawkers*, (Baton Rouge: 1973), pp. 5-7. The exact origin of the term "jayhawk" is unclear. It appears in the decade prior to the establishment of the Kansas Territory, often seeming to designate a footloose individual, "on his own hook"; however other sources suggest a fictional predatory bird.
3. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, D.C.: 1880-1891), Series I, Volume III, pp. 454-55 (hereinafter "OR"); Starr, 47-49; Michael E. Banasik, (ed.), *Missouri in 1861: The Civil War Letters of Franc B. Wilkie, Newspaper Correspondent* (Iowa City, IA: 2001), p. 226; Correspondence, William Coffin to President Abraham Lincoln, October 21, 1861; Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, transcribed by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, IL. The entire net worth of contraband and property taken and destroyed was estimated by one of Lane's supporters to be \$500,000, which accounting for inflation would be the equivalent of approximately \$10,000,000 today (see www.cjr.org/resources/inflater for dollar valuation calculator).
4. Wiley Britton, *The Civil War On The Border Vol. I 1861-1862* (New York, London: 1899), p. 177; Starr, 60-64; George Bingham, "Who is Colonel Jennison?" Library of Congress: African-American Papers Collection.
5. William E. Connelley, statement of John P. Duke, April 13, 1903, William E. Connelley Collection; "A Cobbler's Story, How the Kansas Jayhawkers Acquired the Name 'Red Legs,'" *Kansas City Journal* 1889; Civil War Clippings, "Kansas in the Civil War," Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, 165; Unidentified clipping, Jennison Scrapbook. In the *Kansas City Journal* article Duke claims that he ordered the sheepskins from St. Louis. In the same article Duke states, "The jayhawkers used his calfskins....they cut them into thongs with which to fasten the sheepskins around their legs."
6. Statement of John P. Duke; Britton, *The Civil War On The Border, Vol. I, 1861-1862*, p. 179.
7. O.S. Barton, *Three Years With Quantrill A True Story Told By His Scout John McCorkle* (Norman and London: 1992), p. 53; Leverett W. Spring, *Kansas The Prelude To The War For The Union* (Boston: 1885), p. 285; Henry E. Palmer, "The Black-Flag Character Of War On The Border," *Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society*, IX (1905-1906), p. 464; George W. Martin, "Memorial Monuments and Tablets in Kansas," Kansas Historical Collections, XI (1909-1910), pp. 279-80; Lela Barnes, (ed.), "An Editor Looks at Early-Day Kansas The Letters of Charles Monroe Chase," *The Kansas Historical Quarterly*, XXVI (Summer: 1960), pp. 121-22; Unidentified clipping, Charles R. Jennison Scrapbook, Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka.
8. Unidentified clipping, Jennison Scrapbook; "J.B. Hickok Deputy U.S. Marshal," *Kansas History A Journal of the Central Plains*, Vol. 2, Num. 4, (Winter, 1979).
9. Robert McEwen Schaufler, "Biographical Notes On Capt. William Sloan Tough," Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka; Lela Barnes, (ed.), "An Editor Looks at Early-Day Kansas, The Letters of Charles Monroe Chase," *The Kansas Historical Quarterly*, XXVI (Summer, 1960), pp. 121-22.
10. *The Daily Times*, January 14, 1862; Lela Barnes, (ed.), "An Editor Looks at Early-Day Kansas"; Schaufler, "Biographical Notes On Capt. William Sloan Tough"; William E. Connelly, *Quantrill and the Border Wars* (Cedar Rapids: 1910), p. 119.
11. James G. Blunt, "General Blunt's Account of His Civil War Experiences," *The Kansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 1, Num. 1, (November, 1931) pp. 218-19; *The Daily Times*, May 8, 14, 1862.
12. *The Daily Times*, June 26, 29, 1863.
13. *Ibid.*, July 23, 24, 26, 1862; *The Kansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, Num. 4, (Winter 1956), pp. 317-20; Theodore Bartles appears on Connelly's list of thirteen original Kansas Red Legs. Called Six Mile House because it was located six miles from the Wyandotte ferry, "it consisted of nine rooms and two stories, with a wine cellar and secret closets." It was referred to as one of the most "fascinating buildings in the county."
14. OR, Vol. 13, Pt. 1, pp. 231-32.
15. James B. Pond Papers, Private Collection, James B. Pond III.
16. Albert Robinson Greene, "Campaigning In The Army Of The Frontier," *The Kansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. II (1933) p. 297; Joseph B. Swain, Compiled Service Records, National Archives.
17. Unidentified clippings, Charles R. Jennison Scrapbook. At today's values \$1.4 million.
18. George H. Hoyt, Compiled Service Records, Pension File, National Archives.
19. OR, Vol. 13, pp. 618-19, 712-14.
20. *The Daily Times*, October 8, 1862; Unidentified clipping, Jennison Scrapbook.
21. Records Group 110, Entry 36, "Records of Scouts, Spies & Detectives, Records of the Provost Marshal's Office," National Archives, Washington D.C.
22. Henry E. Palmer, "The Black-Flag Character Of War On The Border."
23. General Order Number One, Clipping, Jennison Scrapbook.
24. James G. Blunt, "General Blunt's Account of His Civil War Experiences."
25. *Oskaloosa Independent*, April 25, 1863.
26. Correspondence, General Blunt to President Abraham Lincoln, June 9, 1863: Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.
27. Spring, 286; Shalor Winchell Eldridge, *Recollections of Early Days in Kansas* (Topeka: 1920), p. 193.
28. A.C. Wilder, Letter to Captain Sidney Clarke, Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center Congressional Archives, Sidney Clarke Collection, Box 1, Folder 20; Robinson, 450.
29. Connelly, 412-13.
30. George W. Martin, "Memorial Monuments and Tablets in Kansas," in his book *A Frontier State At War: Kansas 1861-1865* (Ithaca: 1958), p. 153; Castel maintains that George Caleb Bingham's famous painting "Order No. 11" is unfair. He wrote, "anyone familiar with Ewing's efforts to combat the Red Legs realizes at once how viciously unfair this painting is."
31. Starr, 257-58.
32. Martin, Memorial Monuments and Tablets in Kansas; *The Daily Times*, September 11, 1863.
33. William Furry, (ed.), *The Preachers Tale The Civil War Journal of Rev. Francis Springer, Chaplain, U.S. Army of the Frontier* (Fayetteville: 2001), p. 70.
34. James B. Pond Papers, Private Collection, James B. Pond III.
35. Major General James G. Blunt, Letter to Major General Samuel R. Curtis, March 30, 1864, Records Group 110, "Records of the Provost Marshall, Scouts, Spies & Detectives," Entry 36, Box 5, National Archives, Washington D.C.
36. *Olathe Mirror*, February 13, 1864.
37. Starr, 380-82.

THUNDER ON THE PLAINS OF BRANDY

At dawn on June 9, 1863, Federal cavalry under Alfred Pleasonton attacked Jeb Stuart's troopers near the rail stop of Brandy Station, Virginia. Pleasonton employed two crossings of the Rappahannock River to get at the Confederates, but when the Federal wing under David Gregg was delayed at Kelly's Ford, John Buford's men faced Stuart's forces alone just south of Beverley's Ford. As the opposing horsemen slugged it out near St. James Church, Gregg finally got his columns underway and approached Brandy Station—and Stuart's rearguard—largely undetected. When Jeb finally discovered the gravity of his position, he called for his entire force to reconcentrate north of the rail stop and meet the Federals there, setting up the epic battle for Fleetwood Heights.

(PART II)

AS THE TWO SIDES BATTLED NEAR BEVERLEY'S FORD, Alfred Duffié and David Gregg wound their way west. About two miles from Kelly's Ford, the Federal horsemen passed Paoli's Mill as they waded through Mountain Run. Here Duffié dispatched a battalion from the 6th Ohio to occupy Stevensburg. A mile and a quarter later Gregg's division split off and headed north on the Fredericksburg Plank Road and recrossed Mountain Run at Stony Ford. Reconnaissance had discovered this alternative route which would take Gregg past the Rebels' flank on the Kelly's Ford Road and straight to Brandy Station. When they turned onto the Plank Road, the Federal troopers were only four miles from the railroad. Of course, Gregg could not know it at the time, but there was now nothing between him and Jeb Stuart's headquarters on Fleetwood Heights.¹

Coincidentally, just two miles west, marching in the opposite direction to engage the Yankee columns were Colo-

nel Matthew Butler and his 2nd South Carolina. After Stuart had departed for the Beverley Ford sector, Butler's men had assumed a reserve position at Brandy Station. No sooner had they dismounted than an officer of the guard stormed up to report a Federal column advancing on Culpeper. Fearing for his trains parked near Stevensburg, Butler knew he would not have time to communicate with either Stuart or Hampton. On his own initiative, the aggressive Carolinian headed south.

Meanwhile, around 8:00 a.m., as Major Benjamin Stanhope and his battalion from the 6th Ohio made Stevensburg, scouts detected Butler's force approaching from the north. Stanhope found that "the enemy was in sight, skirmishing toward the town," so he deployed his Ohioans just east of the village. Butler saw the Federals and so ordered Wade Hampton's younger brother, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hampton, to take fourteen men and attack the Yankees head on. Concurrently he sent Major T.J. Lipscomb's detachment to the southeast to cut off any enemy retreat in that direction. Amazingly, Hampton's outnumbered squad sent the 6th Ohio tumbling rearward, easily outdistancing Lipscomb's entrapping lunge. Butler followed Lipscomb and arrived just behind wooded Hansborough Ridge about a mile east of the village. There he deployed his 200 men to await the Federal return, with Lipscomb dismounted on the left and Hampton mounted near the roadway on the right.²

The Confederate line covered nearly a mile across the ridge, so Butler's dispositions barely made for a decent skirmish line. Two developments, however, steeled the colonel. His superb scout, Captain W.D. Farley, brought word that the 4th Virginia was on the way, and the thick woods along the ridge hid his numeric weakness from the Federals. As the Southerners deployed, Frank Hampton

reported that the Bluecoats were advancing in force. Just then, reinforcements arrived. Stuart had sent Colonel Williams Wickham and his 4th Virginia south with an artillery piece to support Butler. As Farley guided them onto the same road Butler and Lipscomb had employed, Wickham rode ahead to Hansborough where Butler offered him the command as the ranking officer. The Virginian wisely deferred to Butler's familiarity with the tactical situation. Frank Hampton then suggested that his detachment be supported on both flanks by Wickham's boys. Wickham agreed and departed to hurry up his regiment.

Meanwhile, to the east, Alfred Duffié learned of the Confederate presence north of Stevensburg about 8:30. He enjoined Stanhope to "hold the place at all hazards," but word soon arrived of the Ohioans' retreat. About a half mile east of Hansborough, the Frenchman met the bloodied Buckeyes. Some of Stanhope's skirmishers continued to engage Butler's men on the ridge, so Duffié sent detachments from Di Cesnola's three regiments forward as support. He then positioned the balance of the brigade opposite the ridge: the 1st Massachusetts south of the road, the 1st Rhode Island north of the road, and Stanhope's winded troopers in between. It was near 10:00 a.m., and as the horses bobbed nervously in place, Duffié advanced to examine the Confederate position.³

Bay Stater Benjamin Crowninshield found this new position "uncomfortable," as Hampton's men "delivered a hot fire" on the stationary Federals. Two weak forays against Butler's left ended swiftly when the blue-coated skirmishers recoiled before the Confederate Enfields. An effort to tear down a fence quickly drew Confederate attention; according to one Federal, "the rebs saw what we were doing and knew the reason and didn't the bullets rattle." Still, the majority of the Federals simply watched while Alfred

**Troopers of the 2nd United States
Cavalry gallop forward in one of the
last charges of the battle.**






Benjamin Crowninshield of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry found his position, subject to a hot fire, "uncomfortable."



Henry Brainerd McClellan's small band of couriers were the only thing between the advancing Federals and Stuart's rear.



John Wright "Tuck" Carter, whose single cannon held up an entire Federal division.

Duffié made his deliberate observations. Some of Crowninshield's frustrated comrades called out for an attack, but their officers moved to quiet the outpouring. Suddenly some of the men bolted for the ridge. Up and down the line, Ohioans and Rhode Islanders joined the ragged charge, and the unordered assault quickly became general.⁴

Down by the roadway, Frank Hampton put up a brave front as the overpowering Federal wave surged forward. Just then, the 4th Virginia arrived on the scene. The unit had been trotting south in a column of fours just west of the ridge and entered a heavy growth of pine thickets. After detaching some squadrons to bolster the ridgeline, Wickham led the head of the regiment onto the main roadway. Someone gave the order, "By fours, right about wheel," in effect turning the troopers away from the Federals. Trying to protect the suddenly exposed Virginians, Hampton led some thirty-six men into the swirling fray south of the road. Near the stately residence of "Salubria," a bullet to the stomach and a slash across the face left Frank Hampton mortally wounded. His overpowered comrades fell back, and the revived Federals poured up the road and over Hansborough Ridge. There, Wickham's startled Virginians wheeled again in an effort to meet the onrushing Bluecoats, but pinned in by the thickets and shocked by the attack, they quickly gave way. Wickham tried to rally the column, but he would later admit, "they broke and fled in confusion." Their behavior, according to the embarrassed colonel, was "disgraceful."⁵

With his right flank turned and his supports crushed, Butler realized the game was up. He withdrew the regiment obliquely to Norman's Mill on Mountain Run, about a mile north of Stevensburg. Given the deteriorating situation, the Carolinians retained a surprisingly high degree of cohesion. Even a fair number of Wickham's troopers managed to rally on this line. There, Butler's boys awaited the enemy.

To the south, the Federal cavalry pressed against some retreating Rebels as they "skedaddled toward Culpeper." Meanwhile, Duffié deployed two of Pennington's 3-inch guns on a hill near the eastern edge of Stevensburg. The gunners there beheld an extraordinary view. In the valley north of town, what seemed like a "large body of the enemy" drew up

in line. Some six miles to the north, the face of Fleetwood rose above the plain. Duffié trotted up to the artillery position and gazed in its direction. Even at this distance, the sight must have been awesome. Fleetwood was alive with battle.⁶

HENRY BRAINERD MCCLELLAN had spent the two hours after Stuart's departure overseeing the removal of cavalry headquarters to Culpeper. While the battle raged up near Beverley's Ford, the adjutant noted the arrival of Lieutenant John Carter's six-pounder from Chew's battery which had retired from the front after its ammunition gave out. Standing atop the ridge near its southern terminus, McClellan knew that Matthew Butler and Williams Wickham were south near Stevensburg dealing with a Federal raiding column, while Beverly Robertson supposedly was sealing another Union force in place near Kelly's Ford. Suddenly, a single rider from Beverly Robertson's brigade came pounding up from Brandy with a shocking report: a Yankee column was advancing on Brandy Station unopposed. McClellan dismissed the news outright and ordered the rider to inspect the column more closely. Within five minutes, however, the scout returned and curtly informed McClellan to view the column for himself. Indeed, debouching from the woods beyond the railroad was a long line of enemy cavalry trotting straight for the undefended rail crossing just a mile from Fleetwood. The only thing protecting Jeb Stuart's backside was Henry McClellan and his little band of couriers.⁷

McClellan immediately sent a rider to alert Stuart to the crisis. He also called Carter to bring up his six-pounder as "it was all-important to gain time." Unfortunately, the extent of the lieutenant's ammunition was "a few imperfect shells and some roundshot," but McClellan was determined to hold his critical position. To make sure Stuart got the message, McClellan dispatched a second courier. Meanwhile, Carter positioned his howitzer on the southern crest of the hill and took aim on the Yankees. As the couriers dashed east on the Carolina Road, Carter's cannon roared.⁸



WITH HIS WAXED MUSTACHE and finely cut appearance, dapper Percy Wyndham

had led his brigade north through the picturesque Virginia countryside. Somewhere south of Brandy, the van of Wyndham's column captured Stuart staffer Robert Goldsborough. Soon thereafter, Wyndham caught sight of his objective, Brandy Station. There was little evidence of enemy presence, either at the Station or in the fields beyond, but an artillery report quickly shattered the mid-day calm. Wyndham later reported, "I found the enemy strongly posted in the rear and on the right of the station, with batteries planted on the heights." Obviously unaware of the true nature of the Confederate strength, Wyndham called a halt. He ordered a section of the 6th New York Battery under First Lieutenant M. P. Clark into action then trotted forward to examine the Rebel position.⁹

Back in the column, David Gregg listened as this firing broke out. He had just received another dispatch from Pleasonton "informing me of the severity of the fight on the right and of the largely superior force of the enemy." With the Confederate cavalry seemingly concentrated north near Beverley's Ford, Gregg "sent forward an order [to Duffié] to push to Brandy Station." He quickly had second thoughts: "in order to get the whole force at once to Brandy Station," he ordered Duffié to proceed to Brandy "on the same road that the Third Division was following." Gregg then galloped for the front.¹⁰

As he threaded his way through Colonel Judson Kilpatrick's brigade, Gregg ordered Captain Joseph Martin to advance one of his sections from the 6th New York Battery to Clark's support. Martin proceeded into battery some two hundred yards behind Clark while Gregg rode to the front. No doubt reacting to Wyndham's assessment, Gregg later wrote, "it was discovered that the enemy were there in great force." The question was clear: "I either had to decline the fight in the face of the enemy or throw upon him at once the entire division. Not doubting but that the Second Division was near, and delay not being admissible, I directed the commanders of my advance brigade to charge the enemy."¹¹

LATE THAT MORNING near St. James Church, "Grumble" Jones' scouts reported that the Federals had crossed the Rappahannock in force at Kelly's Ford



and were advancing on Brandy Station from the south. He forwarded the information to Stuart, but the cavalry commander assumed that Beverly Robertson was in place to fend off this threat. Stuart told the courier, "Tell Gen. Jones to attend to the Yankees in his front, and I'll



Private George Henry Williams, 12th Virginia Cavalry, killed at Brandy Station, June 9, 1863.



Percy Wyndham reported that he found the enemy "strongly posted...with batteries planted on the right." In fact he was opposed by a handful of couriers and a single cannon.

watch the flanks." Earlier, Stuart had dispatched Robert Goldsborough to examine the Kelly's Ford Road, and nothing since had been heard from him. Unaware that Goldsborough had been captured, Stuart naturally assumed enough had been done in that sector to secure the area, and his flip reply was based on information Jones did not have. Jones' courier dutifully reported Stuart's response, prompting Grumble to live up to his name: "So he thinks they ain't coming, does he? Well, let him alone; he'll damned soon see for himself."¹²

Stuart was near St. James Church when Henry McClellan's first courier came charging up. Incredulous, Jeb ordered Major Hart to "ride back there and see what all that foolishness is about." Then, a second courier—Frank Deane, one of McClellan's most trusted riders and a man Stuart easily recognized—arrived with confirmation, accompanied by peals of cannon fire exploding from the direction of Fleetwood. Jeb told Frank Robertson to order Hampton "to send a regiment at a gallop" to the rear. Stuart then turned to engineer William Blackford and directed him "to gallop along the line and order every commanding officer of a regiment to move on Fleetwood." In a single moment, Jeb Stuart had determined to fight it out on the Fleetwood Heights.¹³

Again, Wade Hampton needed little guidance. As he recalled, "I discovered the enemy in my rear, attacking the hill upon which the headquarters of General Stuart were located.... I at once began withdrawing my regiments singly, and recalled my sharpshooters, who were ordered to fall back, fighting." As orders arrived from Stuart "to send up one regiment at a gallop, as the enemy had possession of his headquarters," Hampton gathered in his brigade.¹⁴

Down the Kelly's Ford Road, Beverly Robertson was observing the enemy infantry when a courier bolted up. As he later wrote, "I received orders to fall rapidly back toward Brandy, as the enemy was in my rear, and had probably turned my left." Robertson pulled his two regiments out of line and marched north for the railroad.¹⁵

Near St. James Church, "Grumble" Jones received Stuart's orders for two regiments "to meet this force of the enemy" at Fleetwood. Jones first sent the 12th and 35th Virginia to the rear with

the 6th Virginia following in support. Then, when he saw Hampton disengage the Yankees east of the Ford Road, Jones constricted his line. At first the colonel thought to retain his connection with Rooney Lee, but Stuart's subsequent directives ordered him to bring forward the remainder of his force. He sent the balance of his brigade toward the sound of the fighting and directed the artillery to follow the cavalry. Then "Grumble" Jones raced off to join his command.¹⁶

Across the way, the Federals couldn't believe their eyes. Thomas Devin watched as "suddenly the Rebel line wheeled into column and began to work to the right." At first he assumed that the Confederates were massing against the Federal right, but he soon learned that Buford's front had also cleared. Devin pushed his force up to the St. James ridge and ordered Bridgeman's guns to deploy near the Gee House. Over at his command post, Buford could hear Gregg's artillery "becoming more distinct and furious," so he commanded his troopers to press Rooney Lee's retreating Graybacks. His orders were to meet Gregg at Brandy Station, and John Buford was determined to comply.¹⁷

SPURRED ON BY GREGG'S DECISION to attack, Percy Wyndham's regiments maneuvered across the railroad. Lieutenant Colonel Virgil Brodrick led the 1st New Jersey—Wyndham's old regiment—at parade trot through a narrow defile in the railroad embankments and aligned its left on the Carolina Road. Colonel John P. Taylor shook his 1st Pennsylvania into line to the right of the Jerseymen, while the last unit, the 1st Maryland ("little more than a squadron" according to Wyndham) under Lieutenant Colonel James Deems came up on Taylor's right. Advancing in echelon across the broad plain north of Brandy Station, the Federals deployed for battle.¹⁸


As his regiments aligned themselves, Wyndham called for Martin's guns to advance and flush out the enemy on the ridge. Already, the New Yorkers had engaged the hilltop Confederates for fifteen minutes when the Rebel fire slackened noticeably. However, the arrival of Wyndham's orders caused Martin to blanch, even as Clark's lone serviceable gun limbered up and disappeared toward the front. Since Gregg originally had sta-

tioned him, Martin demanded Gregg's direct order to change his position. Within a few minutes, as the artillerist recollected, "an order from General Gregg reached me to cease firing, and report with the two guns to Colonel Wyndham without delay." Martin limbered up and crossed the railroad, spurred on by three messages from Sir Percy to "hurry up." Ahead the captain could see Clark's piece deployed on a small rise some three hundred yards west of the Confederate-held ridge. As Martin drew his cannon into place, he realized that in this advanced position he had absolutely no support. The artillerist sent two messages to Wyndham requesting a covering force. While he awaited answers, his crews went into action.¹⁹

Martin's guns swept the ridge with fire, just as the Confederate response dwindled to nothing. Finally realizing that the enemy defenses were weaker than originally thought, Wyndham ordered his brigade forward. To the accompaniment of the artillery barrage, the 1st New Jersey advanced in perfect array in a column of battalions, with flags and guidons fluttering in the breeze. To the south, the Pennsylvanians and Marylanders spurred forward. In the lead was a familiar figure. Despite his duties as brigadier, Percy Wyndham would later brag, "The charge of the First New Jersey [his old unit].... I led in person." As the regiment crossed sluggish Flat Run, a squadron angled off somewhat to the left, but a majority of the Jersey men headed straight for the ridge. One trooper recalled "the ringing cheer...the men gripping hard their sabers, and the horses taking ravines and ditches in their stride." With parade ground precision, the 1st New Jersey hit the side of Fleetwood and headed up the incline.²⁰

Orders-of-Battle Contributed by Clark "Bud" Hall

This sketch by Edwin Forbes shows Federal light artillery hurrying forward near Brandy Station in September 1863.



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

XXX
Brigadier General Alfred Pleasonton
 (8,756 cavalry and horse artillery; 3,000 infantry—11,756 men)

RIGHT WING: BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN BUFORD

FORCES EAST OF BEVERLY'S FORD ROAD

XX
1st Cavalry Division
Colonel Thomas C. Devin

X
1st Brigade: Major William S. McClure;
8th Illinois (detached west of road)
 8th New York (Major Edmund M. Pope), 3rd Indiana (Major Charles Lemmon), 9th New York (Captain Conway W. Ayres), 3rd (West) Virginia (Captain Seymour B. Conger).

2nd U.S. Artillery, Batteries "B," and "L" (Consolidated—Lieutenant Albert O. Vincent).

FORCES WEST OF BEVERLY'S FORD ROAD BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN BUFORD

X
Second Brigade: Colonel Josiah H. Kellogg (Anchored right on Hazel River)
 17th Pennsylvania (Colonel Josiah H. Kellogg), 6th New York (Major William E. Beardsley); 1st U.S. Artillery, Battery "K" (Captain William M. Graham).

X
Reserve Brigade
Major Charles J. Whiting

1st U.S. (Captain Richard S.C. Lord—Arrived late in day from picket, covered retreat), 2nd U.S. (Captain Wesley Merritt), 5th U.S. (Captain James E. Harrison), 6th U.S. (Captain George C. Cram), 6th Pennsylvania (Major Henry C. Whelan), 8th Illinois (Captain Elon Farnsworth—Detached with Reserve Brigade).

4th U.S. Artillery, Battery "E" (Lieutenant Samuel S. Elder).

X
Brigadier General Adelbert Ames'
Select Infantry Brigade (1,500 men)
 86th New York (From III Corps—Major Jacob H. Lansing), 124th New York (From 3rd Corps—Lieutenant Colonel Francis M. Cummins), 33rd Massachusetts (From XI Corps—Colonel Adin B. Underwood), 2nd Massachusetts (From XII Corps—Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Mudge), 3rd Wisconsin (From XII Corps—Lieutenant Colonel Martin Flood).

LEFT WING

Brigadier General David M. Gregg—Kelly's Ford (5,963 men, including infantry and horse artillery)

XX
2nd Cavalry Division (1,893 men) **Colonel Alfred Duffié**—Stevensburg

X
1st Brigade
Colonel Louis P. di Cesnola

1st Massachusetts (Lieutenant Colonel Greely S. Curtis), 6th Ohio (Major William Stedman), 1st Rhode Island (Lieutenant Colonel John L. Thompson).

X
2nd Brigade
Colonel J. Irving Gregg

3rd Pennsylvania (Lieutenant Colonel Edward S. Jones), 4th Pennsylvania (Lieutenant Colonel William E. Doster), 16th Pennsylvania (Major William H. Fry—in reserve, at Mt. Holly Church—no saddles).

2nd U.S. Artillery, Battery "M" (Lieutenant Alexander C.M. Pennington—six guns—about 150 men).

XX
3rd Cavalry Division (2,170 men)
Brigadier General David M. Gregg
 Fleetwood Hill

X
1st Brigade
Colonel Hugh Judson Kilpatrick

2nd New York (Lieutenant Colonel Henry E. Davies, Jr.), 10th New York (Lieutenant Colonel William Irvine, captured; Major M. Henry Avery), 1st Maine (Colonel Calvin S. Douty), Orton's Independent Compay D.C. Volunteers (Captain William H. Orton, attached to Kilpatrick for battle).

X
2nd Brigade: Colonel Percy Wyndham, WIA; Colonel John P. Taylor

1st New Jersey (Lieutenant Colonel Virgil Brodrick—KIA; Major John H. Shelmire, KIA; Major Myron H. Beaumont), 1st Pennsylvania (Colonel John P. Taylor—to brigade command; Lieutenant Colonel David Gardner), 1st Maryland (Lieutenant Colonel James M. Deems).

New York Light, 6th Independent Battery (Captain Joseph W. Martin—six guns, about 100 men).

X
Brigadier General David A. Russell's
Select Infantry Brigade (1,500 men)

56th Pennsylvania (From I Corps—Colonel J. William Hofmann), 7th Wisconsin & two companies from 2nd Wisconsin (From I Corps, Colonel William Robinson—both), 6th Maine (From VI Corps—Colonel Hiram Burnham), 119th Pennsylvania (From VI Corps—Major Henry P. Truefitt, Jr.), 5th New Hampshire & 81st Pennsylvania (From II Corps—Colonel Edward E. Cross—both).

3rd U.S. Artillery, Battery "C" (Lieutenant William D. Fuller—six guns—about 150 men).

MWIA = mortally wounded in action; WIA = wounded in action; XXX = corps; XX = division; X = brigade;

II = battalion; [cavalry symbol] = cavalry; [infantry symbol] = infantry

HENRY MCCLELLAN had just suffered through perhaps the longest quarter-hour of his wartime experience. "Minutes expanded seemingly into hours," he later observed, desperately fearing that "help could not arrive in time." However, as the Federal troopers pounded out of Brandy Station, McClellan caught sight



Captain Joseph Martin, 6th New York Light Artillery. Said one of his opponents: "They were the bravest cannoners that ever followed a gun." Photographed by JoAnna McDonald.



Lieutenant Colonel Virgil Brodric, killed on Fleetwood Hill, June 9, 1863.

of Colonel Asher Harman and the 12th Virginia trotting toward Fleetwood from the east. The adjutant charged down the hill and informed Harman of the proximity of the enemy. Harman barked out some quick commands, and the forefront file—Company B—broke off from the regiment and galloped up the incline. Cresting the ridge, the detachment lost all semblance of order, while at the bottom of the hill the balance of the unit spurred on in a ragged column of fours. On the hilltop, after Lieutenant John Carter shot off the last of his ammunition, his crew limbered up their six-pounder. Just then, Lieutenant Milton Rouss and the twenty Virginian troopers from Company B swept past the cannoners and thundered down the western face of the ridge. One hundred and fifty feet away, in perfect battle array, came the 1st New Jersey.²¹

Rouss and his Virginians slammed into the Jerseymen, throwing the Federal van into confusion. Within seconds, however, the Bluecoats poured over Rouss' squad and swarmed onto the crest. There, the balance of the 12th Virginia galloped into the melee, but their disordered formation proved their undoing. The Federals crashed into the Southrons "like a thousand brick," and pushed the Greybacks across the crest. One Confederate recalled the pandemonium: "On each side, in front, behind, everywhere on top of that hill the Yankees closed in upon us. We fought them single-handed, by twos, fours and by squads, just as circumstances permitted." Another eyewitness poetically wrote, "sabers flashed, crossed and clashed, pistols rang." Fight as they could, the 12th Virginia tumbled off Fleetwood, overwhelmed by the 1st New Jersey's sledgehammer blow.²²

Hot on the 12th's heels charged both Jeb Stuart and Lige White's 35th Virginia Battalion. Stuart could now see for himself the size of the Federal force, so he sent back word for his entire command to concentrate on Fleetwood. White meanwhile fanned his troopers out just south of the Carolina Road, formed in battalion front and pulled up to Fleetwood's eastern face. As the 12th Virginia tumbled off the ridge, however, some of Harman's horsemen broke the right wing of White's formation. The troopers of the 35th quickly realigned themselves and charged up the incline.

As he approached the crest, White ordered Major George M. Ferneyhough to lead one squadron to the right of the Fleetwood House while White drove another squad to the left. Across the way, the Federals no longer showed the firm front that had hammered Harman's unit. Just before contact, one Virginian recalled the scene: "The enemy's array was no longer compact. His squadrons in the tumult of battle were separated."²³

White's group crashed into a small knot of Jerseymen south of the buildings and forced them off the ridge. But the pursuit was doused when White saw the other Federal units coming up to support their comrades on the hill. White would later report, "I ordered 20 men to continue the pursuit from which I was thus reluctantly forced to desist, and returned with the remainder of my command to renew the contest for the possession of the hill." Lige White and the balance of his squadrons circled to return to the heights.²⁴

Meanwhile, at the top of Fleetwood, Brodric's Jerseyites battled viciously with Ferneyhough's Virginians. As the Northerners flashed their sabers, some Southerners berated them for fighting in so ungentelemanly a manner. But there was little of polite society swirling across the ridgetop that day. Dust began to whip up, limiting visibility and confusing the combatants further. Despite their disordered state, the Yanks began to push Ferneyhough's squadron up the ridge-line, prompting one Jerseyman to brag that "Stuart's headquarters were in our hands, and his favorite regiments in flight before us." The tide, however, was about to turn.²⁵

At the eastern base of the ridge, a raging Asher Harman bellowed above the battle din, "For God's sake form. For my sake form." His 12th Virginians heeded the command and gathered along this line to provide a rally point for White's scattered horsemen. Once formed, the Southrons again stormed up the hill, just as Major Flournoy and the 6th Virginia came charging up on the Confederate left. Coincidentally, as this new gray wave swept forward, the 1st Pennsylvania came up in support of the 1st New Jersey's right flank. Pennsylvanian Colonel Taylor divided his command to avoid the Fleetwood buildings; the men reunited just as the Virginians swarmed over the

crest. In the dust and smoke, the fighting raged anew.²⁶

Across the ridge, the battle became a claustrophobic swirl of violent, personal encounters. One Federal recalled the initial impact: "First came the dead heavy crash of the meeting columns, and next the clash of saber, the rattle of pistol and carbine, mingling with the frenzied imprecation, the wild shriek that follows the death blow, the demand to surrender, and the appeal for mercy, forming the horrid din of battle." Badly scattered, the troopers of the 1st New Jersey rallied on their surviving officers, forming "bands of independent combatants" as one cavalryman termed it. Another Northerner recalled that there was "no longer a line of battle, fighting hand to hand with small parties of the enemy." "Round and round it went," wrote one Confederate, "here it was pell mell, helter skelter—a Yankee and there a rebel—killing, wounding, and taking prisoners."²⁷

Jersey adjutant Thomas Kitchen sabered a Rebel, "the blood gushing out in a black-looking stream." When a Rebel bullet killed Kitchen's horse, the pitching animal threw the Unionist some twenty feet in the air. Trembling in shock from the hard landing, Kitchen still managed to take refuge behind his steed's corpse and ward off a pursuer with his pistol. Farther up the ridge, Lieutenant Colonel Brodrick was unhorsed in the melee, so a bugler named James Wood gave the officer his own mount. As Brodrick plunged back into the fighting, a Confederate took Wood prisoner, but the young musician found a carbine on the ground and managed to reverse his situation. Wood proudly marched the Rebel off the field; it was only later that he discovered the carbine was empty.²⁸

Henry Meyer was serving with David Gregg that day, and as he accompanied the general to the front, he was intrigued by the officer's demeanor. When they approached Fleetwood, the normally taciturn Gregg was "swinging his gauntlets over his head and hurrahing." As the battle raged over the ridgeline, Gregg ordered Meyer and Captain Weir to direct Kilpatrick to commit his brigade. Weir galloped off while Meyer ascended the Heights in the naive hope of bagging a prisoner when Kilpatrick arrived. Instead, when he crested the ridge, he found the enemy pushing back Wyndham's survivors. Ahead, a Rebel

officer was sabering a Federal trooper who was begging for mercy, so Meyer tried to intervene. The two traded blows, with Meyer suffering a cut to his collarbone. Then, when four of the enemy tried to corner him among the buildings, Meyer urged his mount over a fence and rode south to safety.²⁹

Over the battle noise, Captain Daniel Grimsley of the 12th Virginia recalled the voice of Jeb Stuart ringing out, "Give them the sabre boys!" Elsewhere, a badly wounded Asher Harman galloped "here and there, wherever he could see a corps of his impromptu commanders." Heartened as always by the courage of their leaders, the Grayclad horsemen pressed the enemy back, and the Northerners reeled before the Confederate onslaught. Federal horseflesh took an especial pounding, as some Jersey companies fell back with two-thirds of their horses shot down. Overpowered by the relentless pressure, the Jersey men reluctantly began to fall back off "the bloody hillside." Just to the south, the 1st Pennsylvania joined their comrades in the retreat. One Virginian vividly recalled the moment: "The brave hearts of the Twelfth and White's Battalion pressed forward, dealing vigorous blows, and the enemy, yielding to the fierce assault, finally gave way and abandoned the hill."³⁰

To the south, the fortunes of battle had also broken poorly for Sir Percy's remaining unit, the understrength 1st Maryland. Foregoing a charge up the heights, the Marylanders had galloped along Fleetwood's base with Captain John K. Buckley and Lieutenant Henry Appel in the van. However, as they cleared the southern tip of the ridge, the Unionists were mauled by elements of the 6th Virginia pouring down from the heights. While stunningly swift, the fighting here was every bit as confusing as the mêlée on the ridgetop. In short order, Buckley was captured then rescued. But, when Appel went down with a wound, one Federal admitted, "his men faltered and shivered before an overwhelming force." The ravaged 1st Maryland melted before the fury of Fournoy's Virginians.³¹

As the Federals recoiled, a startled Joseph Martin looked up from his three guns to see the ridgeline crawling with "a dense mass of the enemy's cavalry." With his closest support dribbling away toward Brandy Station, Martin's cannon now lay completely exposed just three

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA



CAVALRY DIVISION
(9,700 cavalry and horse artillery) **Major General James Ewell Brown Stuart**



Jones's Brigade (3,000 men)

Brigadier General William E. Jones

6th Virginia (Major Cabell Edward Flournoy), 7th Virginia (Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Marshall), 11th Virginia (Colonel Lunsford L. Lomax), 12th Virginia (Colonel Asher W. Harman, WIA, remained in command), 35th Battalion Virginia (Lieutenant Colonel Elijah V. White, WIA, remained in command).



Rooney Lee's Brigade (1,529 men)

Brigadier General W.H.F. "Rooney"

Lee, WIA; Colonel James Lucius Davis; Colonel John R. Chambliss, Jr.

2nd North Carolina (Colonel Solomon Williams, KIA; Lieutenant Colonel William H.F. Payne), 9th Virginia (Colonel Richard L.T. Beale), 10th Virginia (Colonel James Lucius Davis; Major Joseph Rosser), 13th Virginia (Colonel John R. Chambliss).



Hampton's Brigade (1,894 men)

Brigadier General Wade Hampton

Cobb's Legion (Colonel Pierce M.B. Young), 1st South Carolina (Colonel John L. Black), 1st North Carolina (Colonel Laurence S. Baker), Jeff Davis Legion (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph F. Waring), 2nd South Carolina (Colonel Matthew C. Butler, WIA; Major Thomas J. Lipscomb—regiment detached at Stevensburg).



Fitz Lee's Brigade (1,613 men)

Colonel Thomas T. Munford

1st Virginia (Colonel James H. Drake), 2nd Virginia (Lieutenant Colonel James W. Watts), 3rd Virginia (Colonel Thomas H. Owen), 4th Virginia (Colonel Williams C. Wickham—regiment detached at Stevensburg).



Robertson's Brigade (1,135 men) **Brigadier General Beverly H. Robertson**

4th North Carolina (Colonel Dennis D. Ferebee), 5th North Carolina (Colonel Peter G. Evans).



Stuart's Horse Artillery (500 men, 22 guns) **Major Robert F. Beckham**

Hart's Battery (Major James F. Hart), Breathed's Battery (Captain James Breathed), Chew's Battery (Captain Roger Preston Chew), Moorman's Battery (Captain Marcellus N. Moorman), McGregor's Battery (Captain William M. McGregor).

Note: 15th Va Cavalry (Rooney Lee); Phillip's Legion (Hampton) and 5th Va Cavalry (Munford), detached at time of battle on picket duty and are not included in above totals.

WIA = wounded in action; KIA = killed in action;

II = battalion; XX = division; X = brigade;

= cavalry; = horse artillery

hundred yards from the swarming Southern ranks. Suddenly, a wave of screaming Confederate horsemen came charging down the ridge. Elijah White and his troopers were heading straight for Martin and his guns.³²

ONCE THE YANKEES WERE DRIVEN from Fleetwood, the Confederates barely took time to pause. As Beckham's arriving artillery deployed north of the Fleetwood buildings, Stuart and White turned their eyes to the enemy cannon just west of the ridge. White had been busy reorganizing his command, but the enemy cannon were too tempting a prize to let get away. After Stuart reinforced the 35th with a company from the 6th Virginia, White and his boys bolted down the ridge.

Three hundred yards away, Martin called for cannister. The cannoners could easily see what was coming. Still they rammed the shot-filled tins down the throats of their guns. The first blast sheathed the front in blinding smoke, but Lige White felt the volley's effect: "the terrible and destructive rain of grape and canister and leaden bullets poured upon [us] by the battery." Another Virginian simply called it "murderous." Some Federal horsemen rallied long enough to take the Virginians under fire, but their support was short-lived. About twenty of White's Confederates angled off to push those Federals farther south. The rest of the Southerners pounded through the battle smoke, appearing to all like hazy phantoms. Ahead, the frantic New Yorkers rammed home another round, then a second explosion rent the air. Still White and the Virginians came on.³³

Some of White's harder riders circled the guns to attack from the rear. Martin tried to swing one of his pieces around to counter the ploy, but all at once the Virginians flooded the knoll and, as White recalled, "swept like a whirlwind over the battery." Vicious fighting exploded across the hillock, bitter combat marked by a fierce spirit on one side to protect their weapons, an equal determination on the other to take them. "Once in the battery," Martin reported, "it became a hand-to-hand fight with pistol and saber.... [N]ever did men act with more coolness and bravery, and show more of a stern purpose to do their duty unflinchingly, and, above all, to save their guns." Their bravery did not go unnoticed. Said one Confederate of his oppo-

nents, "The artillerymen fought like heroes." Admitted another, "They were the bravest cannoners that ever followed a gun."³⁴

In a blur of chaos and violence, the Southrons hacked away at the Bluecoated crews, while the Northerners responded with any weapon at hand to beat back the assault. White paid tribute to the Federal grit when he later wrote, "The men at the battery fought with desperation, continuing to fire their small-arms after they were completely surrounded." One Virginian marveled that "the gunners were unconquered and refused to yield." Martin grimly agreed: "Not one of them flinched for a moment from his duty." Still, the outnumbered New Yorkers could not hold off the Virginians forever. As the fighting wound down, White remembered, "There was no demand for a surrender or offer of one until nearly all the men, with many of their horses, were either killed or wounded." With only a few of his men left standing, Martin ordered the cannon disabled and the fuses destroyed. Then, amid the smoke and the gore, the captain somehow led the surviving artillerists south to safety.³⁵

It went very quickly, this fight for the guns. It does not take long for a cavalry battalion to charge three hundred yards, and Martin himself recalled that the spiking of his cannon took "less time than it takes to write [about] it." But the action on that little knoll seared forever the men who endured it. "Lige" White attempted to describe what it meant to him when he wrote, "Such a glorious charge as was then made by the gallant band that I shall ever be proud to have commanded on that occasion, I have not witnessed during this war." For his part, Martin would report, "Of the 36 men that I took into the engagement, but 6 came out safely, and of these 30, 21 are either killed, wounded, or missing, and scarcely one of them but will carry the honorable mark of the saber or bullet to his grave."³⁶

Martin went off to locate supports to help them retake the guns, but none could be found. As a result, Martin and his little band of cannoners were done for the day. Elijah White and his Virginians, however, were about to face a new crisis.

SCATTERED BY THE SHOCK OF BATTLE

and dazed by the dust and confusion, much of Percy Wyndham's command had become little better than an armed

mob. However, as White's Confederates tarried among Martin's abandoned guns, part of the 1st Pennsylvania swung up to take on the victorious Rebels. Hampton Thomas, who was serving as Gregg's inspector-general, found two squadrons from the 1st Maryland and ordered them forward, this "despite a dust so thick it was almost impossible to tell a Reb from a Yank." Other Federals fighting on their own hook also joined the charge. Suddenly, "Lige" White faced a wall of the enemy descending "from every quarter" on his winnowed command.³⁷

White and a few of his men dismounted and tried to turn the guns on the charging Yankees. A quick look up Fleetwood found no supports moving to his relief, so White took the only way out. He and his troopers bolted for safety, even as the Federal web nearly snared his entire unit. Of his troopers, White later wrote, "the coolness and bravery which had led them to deeds of noblest heroism throughout that terrible day did not desert them now, and they cut their way through the thick, close ranks of the foe,

BATTLE NARRATIVE demands a certain emphasis on the movement of combat units through time and space. But anytime you describe a battle in such broad strokes, you risk losing the essence of the action. At Brandy Station, as in any cavalry combat, the real battle resided in the contests between the mounted opponents. Consider John Thompson, a flag-bearer for White's Comanches. During one of the battalion's many charges, the Confederate veered past a saber-wielding Federal, circled the unsuspecting man, and planted his flag tip behind the Bluecoat's ear. "Grumble" Jones saw Thompson's work and pointed out another large Yankee. "There, little one," Jones called out, "do that — Dutchman the way you did the other one." Thompson thought the Federal too large and told Jones to shoot him, which Jones did. Thompson was indeed small, as one of his comrades recalled, "but a nobler boy never lived."¹

Elsewhere in the dust and the confusion, Virginian Harrison Strickler heard a call to surrender. Appearing before him was a young Federal "armed to the teeth." With a healthy fear of prison life, Strickler replied to the Yank's command, "No, sir." As the battlelines swirled about, Strickler sized up his opponent and said, "I can't take you prisoner, for I am afraid I will not get out." The Northerner replied, "I can't take you, for I'm afraid I will not get out." Suddenly it was over. They each receded into the dust and never saw each other again. "I could not harm him after that conversation," Strickler decided,

though not without the loss of half their number." Brandy Station proved to be a hard day for the 35th Virginia Battalion.³⁸

As a member of the 6th Virginia who had joined White's boys in the charge on Martin's cannon, John Opie endured a hair-raising adventure. From his position near the Yankee guns, Opie guessed that two full enemy brigades were descending on him and his comrades. In a moment, the Federals "broke us all to pieces; and we lost all organization, and sought safety in flight." However, as he sped off, Opie's horse began to falter. Yankee bullets began to zing uncomfortably close by, prompting the Virginian to later write, "I felt as if lizards' and snakes were crawling up my spine, and expected to be perforated every moment." With a passel of Yankees in heated pursuit, Opie "bulged through a cedar hedge" and finally reached a safe haven.³⁹

AT A RISE ON THE RIDGELINE just north of the Carolina Road, Robert Beckham assembled what remained of his artillery

and analyzed the fields of fire. From a point east of the ridge, McGregor's battery had helped repulse Wyndham's assault and arrived on the Heights just a short time after Hart and Chew's people deployed. Easily seen were the Federal troopers from Judson Kilpatrick's brigade flooding onto the plain south of the railroad. Just west, the battle over Martin's guns was winding down. To the northeast, the balance of Stuart's command raced for Fleetwood. Suddenly, from north on the ridgeline an enemy column swung into view and bore down on the artillerists. Despite the proximity of thousands of horsemen, not one trooper was arrayed in support of Beckham's beleaguered command.

As Beckham had discovered, one potent Federal force still remained on Fleetwood Ridge. Well to the north, Lieutenant Colonel Brodrick and elements of the 1st New Jersey had finally battled Ferneyhough's Virginians off the heights. Turning south to rejoin the fight, Brodrick found the way blocked by Beckham's artillerists. He determined

adding that his opponent "was so nice about it."²

Such warrior brotherhood did not extend to all the participants of the battle. Captain Tucker of the 1st Maine found himself captured and escorted to the rear by three guards. However, he noticed that the Confederate on his left held his saber a bit too carelessly. In a flash, Tucker wrenched the weapon from the guard and struck him down, then "disposed of" the captor to his right. When the leading Rebel turned to see what was the matter, Tucker leveled the saber at his chest and ordered his surrender. As one Maine trooper reported, "Captain Tucker rejoined his command with a prisoner and two captured horses."³

At a pond near Beverley's Ford, the 6th US had lined up to water their horses. One trooper named Viall—a particularly lively man who drew much teasing from his comrades—was grazing his horse a short distance away when a Confederate battery near Yew Ridge fired off a shot. Some of the regulars following the projectile's arc goodnaturedly called out for Viall to "look out." Assuming another joke from his mates, Viall "raised his laughing face." The "cruel" shot caromed off the ground and struck him flush, "carrying away the upper part of his head."⁴

Finally, "while the battle was raging hottest," Charles O'Ferrall of the 12th Virginia struck down a Federal officer. The antagonists were so close that the Northerner grabbed O'Ferrall's coat with a vise-like grasp. The two

wrestled for a short time until the Virginian "tapped" the Northerner on the head with a pistol, dropping the wounded man to the ground. The next day, O'Ferrall found his opponent resting in a makeshift hospital at Brandy Station. The reunion proved bitter when the Federal accused O'Ferrall of braining him in a helpless condition. On top of everything, the Northerner added that he had been robbed of a gold watch, supposedly by one of O'Ferrall's men. The Confederate's suspicions were immediately piqued. He had heard that one of his people had relieved a Yankee corpse of a watch, so he took the Northerner's description of the timepiece and returned to camp. Summoning the suspect, O'Ferrall discovered that the "relieved" watch matched the wounded fellow's description. In a rage, he confiscated the piece and returned to the hospital to give it to the Federal. With deep gratitude and genuine embarrassment for his earlier "harsh language," the Northerner declared the two "good friends."⁵

1. *Confederate Veteran*, vol. XVIII, p. 323.

2. *Ibid.*, vol. XXXII, p. 63.

3. Samuel H. Merrill, *The Campaigns of the First Maine and First District of Columbia Cavalry* (Portland, Maine: 1866), p. 113-14.

4. Sidney Morris Davis, *Common Soldier-Uncommon War* (Privately Published, N.D.), 400.

5. Charles T. O'Ferrell, *Forty Years Of Active Service* (New York: 1904), pp. 67-69.

immediately to fight his way through. George Shreve was deploying McGregor's two pieces when Brodrick's troopers appeared. As Shreve recalled, both sides were stunned by the Yankees' arrival: "The unexpected suddenness of this movement seemed to paralyze us all, friend and foe alike, for the enemy passed at a walk, accelerated to a trot, and did not design to fire upon or charge us, or attempt to make us surrender." The calm was short-lived. One Confederate called out, "Boys lets die over the guns." Like Martin's Federals earlier, McGregor's cannoners grabbed anything they could to ward off the Yankees. Shreve remembered one gunner using a hand spike to capture a Yankee, while Shreve himself tried unsuccessfully to talk a Federal trooper off his mount. But a Confederate named Edward Sully gained lasting fame when he used his sponge staff to brain a Bluecoat. Word of Sully's exploits made it all the way to Robert E. Lee.⁴⁰

To the Confederates, it appeared that the Federals "had not the time to bother us." However, the gunners took the situation seriously and inflicted some telling damage on the troopers. Brodrick was unhorsed and fell under a wave of pistol shots and saber blows. Another artillerist shot Lieutenant John Shelmire, but the dying officer summoned the strength to saber the Confederate. Mortally wounded, both men fell in a heap. After a few brutal minutes, the Northerners finally cleared the guns and thundered down the Heights, not stopping until they reached the railroad.

As Brodrick's men reached safety, a short-lived lull descended over the field. Five miles to the south, the Stevensburg fight reached its climax.⁴¹

ABOUT A MILE NORTH OF STEVENSBURG,

Matthew Butler struggled to delay the Federal regiments boiling out of town. The Southerners grimly held the Mountain Run line while the enemy lapped at their right and artillery exploded across their front. As the lone Confederate cannon deployed on the high ground, Captain Farley trotted up to the colonel to discuss the dispositions. As they spoke, Federal artillery on the heights east of Stevensburg blasted off another shot.

Butler saw the shell hit the ground some thirty feet away and carom directly his way. The projectile smashed through his leg just above the ankle, bore through

his and Farley's horses, and snapped off the scout's right leg at the knee. Both men were thrown hard, but they somehow summoned the wherewithal to apply tourniquets to their ravaged limbs. Lieutenant John Rhett and Captain John Chestnut hurried to their stricken colonel, but the Carolinian implored them to "take charge of Farley." They lifted the scout onto a flat trough and made arrangements to bear him to safety, but the game Virginian asked Rhett to bring him his severed leg, explaining, "It is an old friend, gentlemen, and I do not wish to part from it." He then shook hands with the troopers, and thanked them for their help, saying, "It is a pleasure to me that I have fallen into the hands of good Carolinians at my last moment." Within a few hours, he was dead.⁴²

As another crew carried Matthew Butler to the rear, control of the regiment devolved to Major Thomas Lipscomb. The continuing Federal pressure forced Lipscomb to move his battered command another mile north to Jonas Run. Despite the loss of their colonel, the Carolinians appeared to be in good shape as rallying elements of the 4th Virginia managed to add some extra weight to the line. Then, inexplicably, enemy pressure began to fade. To the relieved Confederates, the Federal attempt to reach Brandy Station via the Stevensburg Road appeared to have ended.

Perhaps Alfred Duffié simply had no intention of forcing the road to Brandy Station. Up to this point, his work this day as a divisional commander certainly had been undistinguished: a delayed crossing of Kelly's Ford, a turgid march on Stevensburg, and a timid pursuit of the defeated Confederates. If the men of the 1st Massachusetts had not begun the attack on their own hook at Hansborough Ridge, Duffié may well have continued his observations long into the afternoon. As it was, Duffié used his artillery to drive the Rebels to Jonas Run and was in the act of deploying the 1st Massachusetts when word came from David Gregg "to return and join the Third Division, on the road to Brandy Station."⁴³

On a day replete with crucial moments, this was a critical one. It was early in the afternoon, not 1:00 p.m. Five miles to the north, Wyndham and Kilpatrick were battling Jeb Stuart for control of Fleetwood Ridge. Were Duffié's 1,900

troopers to blast their way through Butler's small command and ride hard for Brandy Station, they probably could have joined the fight well within the hour. Instead, Alfred Duffié left Colonel J. Irvin Gregg with the 3rd Pennsylvania and a section of artillery as a rearguard. As he later put it, "I then withdrew my command... and retired on the same road by which I had advanced." At a point when he could have crucially tipped the tactical balance of the conflict, Alfred Duffié obeyed the letter of David Gregg's orders and marched away from the battle of Brandy Station.⁴⁴

HUGH JUDSON KILPATRICK was exactly where he wanted to be. A small, athletic man possessed of a reckless tongue and bottomless ambition, "Kill" led his brigade in Percy Wyndham's wake and was now approaching Brandy Station from the southeast. Across the landscape north of the railroad roared the huge cavalry battle, and David Gregg's orders soon arrived for Kilpatrick "to move to the right of Colonel Wyndham and engage the enemy." With Wyndham then fighting for his life on Fleetwood, Kilpatrick led his column across an open glen bisected by two branches of Flat Run and trotted north toward the railroad.⁴⁵

As he approached the Orange & Alexandria, Kilpatrick found himself almost due east of Fleetwood, a geographic quirk that would come back to haunt him. While the squadrons from the 10th New York cantered into place, the battle suddenly swayed in the enemy's favor. Wyndham's troopers began to tumble off the ridge, pushed hard by Confederate cavalry. Gregg had ordered Kilpatrick to support Wyndham, but Sir Percy's troopers had ceased to exist as an organized force. However, where others saw disaster, Kilpatrick saw opportunity. He rode over to Lieutenant Colonel William Irvine of the 10th New York and commanded him "to charge and drive the rebels from the hill and hold it." The regiment first struggled over the large railroad embankments, but Irvine finally coaxed his boys forward and led them northwest toward Fleetwood. Three hundred yards from the ridge, the colonel bellowed out the charge.⁴⁶

Just at that moment, the Georgian troopers of Cobb's Legion and the 1st South Carolina—accompanied by Hart's

battery—stormed over and around Fleetwood's eastern inclines. Wade Hampton had spared nothing in driving his men from the St. James sector to the ridge: one horseman recalled covering the intervening space at "almost a full run." Colonel P.M.B. Young had the Georgians in the advance, sweeping away the remnants of Wyndham's brigade on the plain south of the Heights. In a fortunate turn of events for the Confederates, Young's charge pounded straight at the right flank of the unsuspecting 10th New York. Near the railroad, Kilpatrick saw what was coming and launched his second regiment in line—Lieutenant Colonel Henry Davies Jr.'s 2nd New York—in support of Irvine's right. He then tried to run out Lieutenant J. Wade Wilson's section of the 6th New York Battery in an effort to slow the gray wave, just as the 1st South Carolina thundered up on the Georgians' left.⁴⁷

The concussion was severe, and the rout complete. First, Hart's artillerists slammed caseshot into the heaving Federal lines. Next, Cobb's Legion hit the 10th New York about one hundred yards



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

north of the railroad and hammered the Federals in "an indescribable clashing and slashing, banging and yelling." The clouded memory of the mayhem prompted one Federal to write, "In an instant everything was mixed up and confused." The New Yorkers buckled back toward the railroad with the Georgians in hot pursuit. "The rebel line that swept down upon us came in splendid order," wrote one Northerner, "and the rapidly-moving panorama left no distinct recollection....[I]t was a hand-to-hand struggle now." In a rising storm of dust and noise, Young's swarming troopers pressed the Yankees against the railroad embankments and drainage ditches, trapping those who couldn't coax their mounts over the hurdles.⁴⁸

From the Confederate perspective, it was a rout of the first order. "We killed and captured 60 of the enemy," Young would brag with good reason, "utterly

routing him, with but little loss to ourselves." Colonel Irvine desperately slashed away at the Gray horde, but his horse went down near the railroad where he was overpowered and captured. One mob of Confederates surrounded a small Federal contingent led by Lieutenant Robb who was trying to guide his boys to safety. Three Southrons set upon him when his horse stalled in a large ditch, and one sabered the officer completely through his body. "Every man for himself," was the unfortunate Robb's last order, one the New Yorkers were diligently trying to obey.⁴⁹



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Judson Kilpatrick (right): "To hell with them! Let Gregg look out for his own guns." Cavalry charge (below) near Brandy Station. Sketch by Edwin Forbes.



At least one Confederate squad suffered much in this fighting. The Georgians of Company K claimed to have led the charge; and of the twenty-seven horsemen who entered the combat here, only two escaped unharmed. Their leader, Captain Edgeworth Eve, was reported to have been sabered five times "and knocked in the head with a carbine." He survived, however, as did most of his comrades. While the 10th New York crowded down toward Brandy Station, the Cobb Legion broke off the pursuit and triumphantly circled back to Fleetwood. Meanwhile, on the plain behind them, yet another Federal unit came to grief.⁵⁰

In trying to protect the 10th's flank, the 2nd New York got off poorly. Davies admitted that the regiment became disordered when "by reason of an order improperly given, as is alleged, the head of the column was turned to the left, and proceeded some distance down the railroad." Already slowed by the faulty communication, the regiment advanced barely one hundred yards north of the railroad when it too was hammered on its right flank, in this case by Colonel John Black and the 1st South Carolina. Black had observed the 2nd's brittle maneuvers and angled his attack to inflict the most damage. The shock smashed the 2nd New York into pieces, which prompted Davies to deceptively write, "After the first charge, the command was broken up into detachments, which attacked the enemy in different directions." One Maine trooper was less kind as he watched the 2nd New York "scatter and flee." While some of the New Yorkers made it all the way to the site of Martin's artillery, most simply wheeled to the left and bolted for the safety of the railroad.⁵¹

Black's Carolinians pursued the New Yorkers to the railroad embankments where, according to one Northerner, they "were cutting down the fugitives without mercy." Black remembered that one of his squadrons halted at the embankment where "a fire with effect was opened." When another Confederate column—probably the Jeff Davis Legion—threatened the Federal flank, the stunned Yankees simply ran. The Southerners managed to fire off a few more volleys before they were summoned back to Fleetwood. Again, a Confederate regiment had blindly rushed into the battle and landed exactly on the flank of an at-

tacking Federal unit. The results of both encounters were the same: the utter rout of the Northerners.⁵²

With the destruction of two-thirds of his brigade, Kilpatrick was beside himself. He would later write rather blandly, "The enemy, in two heavy columns, struck their advance and threw them into confusion." The heat of the moment told a different story. The 2nd New York—originally referred to as the Harris Light Cavalry—was Kilpatrick's old regiment; these were men he knew, and knew well. When they disintegrated before the Confederate onslaught, one New Yorker bemoaned the fact that "they were repulsed under the very eye of our chief, whose excitement was well-nigh uncontrollable." A member of the 10th recalled that Kilpatrick bitterly referred to the troopers of the Harris as cowards, and long after the war was over, "Kill" described the New Yorkers floating off the field "like feathers on the wind." In the extreme, he turned to his remaining regiment, the so-called "Puritans" of the 1st Maine.⁵³

One Maine trooper caught the panorama perfectly: "The field presented the frightful spectacle of fleeing friends and pursuing foes, of horses galloping to and fro with empty saddles, and men seeking to escape on foot, resounding meantime with the thunder of artillery, the heavy thug of solid shot, the strange scream of shells, the roar of musketry, the clashing of steel, and the fierce shouts of eager combatants." With the full bore of battle as a backdrop, Kilpatrick thundered up to Colonel Douty and demanded, "What can you do with your regiment?" Douty sternly replied, "I can drive the rebels." Kilpatrick himself recalled exclaiming, "Men of Maine, you must save the day," a grim reminder that they were the last fresh Federal unit on the field. The troopers drew their weapons, gingerly negotiated the railroad embankments, and lurched forward.⁵⁴

Up on Fleetwood, Beckham's artillerists saw the advance and took the charging Federals under fire, a succession of shells "screaming with harsh voice." Despite the bombardment, the Maine men retained their formation and galloped on. As they knifed through the chaos, the Unionists discovered Rebel riders galloping in league with the column; in the heat of the moment, no one attempted to capture them. Finally, the 1st Maine reached the base of the ridge

east of the Fleetwood buildings. "With a wild shout," one eyewitness recalled, "they dashed up the steep ascent."⁵⁵

Douty split the regiment in two, sending one detachment under Major Boothby to the left of the Fleetwood buildings and another under Lieutenant Colonel Smith to the right. Here, the attack caught the disorganized Confederates totally unprepared. One Federal described the scene: "The sharp clash of sabers, the incessant crack, crack, crack of revolvers, and rattle of carbines, mingling with the confused shouts of contending squadrons, told of stern and desperate encounter." Lieutenant Frank Robertson of Stuart's staff found himself in the middle of the Confederate skedaddle. He was searching Fleetwood for his commander when a portion of the 12th Virginia came bolting around a skirt of trees followed closely by the Puritans. As he later wrote, "I was obliged to run once more for my life, with a Yankee Orderly Sergeant right at my heels popping away at my back every jump of his horse—how he happened to miss me I can't imagine." Robertson survived the two hundred yard chase when the 11th Virginia cooled the Federal pursuit, but for the time being the southern stretch

of the ridge was now clear of Confederates. The Puritans then turned to the north. Ahead of them stood Robert Beckham's guns.⁵⁶

Facing off a small contingent of Federal horse was one thing. Taking on an entire regiment was something altogether different. Unlike their resistance to the earlier attack by Brodrick's 1st New Jersey, the Confederate gunners responded to the Maine assault by fleeing from their pieces. Most who stayed were struck down or captured. For a moment, the guns were in Federal hands, but with pockets of Confederates pricking at their



COOK COLLECTION, VALENTINE MUSEUM



ALFRED R. WAUD DRAWING, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

flanks and swarming in their wake, the Northerners resumed the charge. One Maine man rapturously recalled the plunge from the Heights, "faster and faster, if that were possible, driving the enemy a mile or more. Oh, it was grand!" Down Fleetwood's western face and across Flat Run toward the Barbour House, the 1st Maine thundered.

The Puritans finally halted somewhere west of Flat Run. With Doubtless missing in the maelstrom on the ridge, Smith assumed command of the now isolated unit. He first paused to gather in the scattered troopers (he recollected, "we were all broken to pieces, but our men came to us from both flanks and the rear very fast, so we were able to re-form quite a force"). Pursuing Confederates merely "huddled" in the Maine wake, so Smith settled on a daring course. When he finally massaged his boys into "tolerable shape," Smith launched them directly at Beckham's guns up on the ridge. As one

Left: Wade Hampton. His men had performed in "the most brilliant manner and with complete success." Below: Illustration of the death of Colonel Doubtless (far left) of the 1st Maine at Aldie, Virginia, killed eight days after the battle at Brandy Station. The officer in the forefront is George Armstrong Custer.



of the troopers remembered, drama hung heavy in the air, for "there was an ominous silence on all sides, broken only by the tramp of the horses." The Confederates scrambled to load their guns and bring them to bear, but as the Maine men reached the heights, Smith changed their direction hard to the right along the base of the ridge. The Confederates got off one weak barrage which missed its target completely. Meanwhile, the Puritans slammed through some light resistance south of Fleetwood and reached the railroad.⁵⁷

Over near Martin's abandoned guns, Hampton Thomas from Gregg's staff was still trying to enlist help to save the pieces. When the 1st Maine's attack hit the heights, Thomas saw Judson Kilpatrick observing the charge. He rushed over to the colonel and "begged him to rescue the guns." "To hell with them!" Kilpatrick blurted out, "Let Gregg look out for his own guns." Thomas was taken aback but reiterated his plea. "No! damned if I will" was Kilpatrick's last reply. Thomas returned to the guns, hoping against hope for a miracle.⁵⁸

Despite the heroic charge of the 1st Maine, the curtain was drawing on the final act for Kilpatrick's New York regiments. Wade Hampton's remaining units—the 1st North Carolina and the Jeff Davis Legion—had crossed the trail of the 1st Maine's charge on Fleetwood. Instead of following the Maine riders, Hampton's boys slammed into what remained of the 2nd and 10th New York "with a shock that made the earth tremble." Colonel Lucius Baker and his 1st North Carolina led the assault, with William Cowles' company in the van. They chased the Empire Staters across the railroad where, as one Southron put it, "a most handsome tournament ensued." The Carolinians particularly stung the 10th New York; after one ringing encounter they galloped away with the 10th's regimental colors. On Baker's left, Lieutenant Colonel Waring and the Jeff Davis Legion also crossed the tracks and pushed the Federals west toward Brandy Station. All the while, Hampton's troopers led a passel of captured Federals to the rear.⁵⁹

Wade Hampton's blood was up. Already his men had performed, in his own words, in "the most brilliant manner and with complete success." But the South Carolinian saw more work to do, noth-

ing less than the complete capture of the Federal force near Brandy. Hampton only had elements of Baker's and Waring's units under his immediate command, but he aggressively pushed them against the retreating Bluecoats. Suddenly, the head of his column came under fire from Beckham's artillerists on Fleetwood. Realizing the artillery had mistaken his people for the enemy, Hampton sent off word to cease the bombardment. Later he would bemoan the consequences of the halt: "The delay rendered necessary to make this fire cease enabled the enemy to gain the woods in his rear."⁶⁰

Soon the barrage ceased, and Hampton prepared to resume the chase. He ordered the Cobb Legion and the 1st South Carolina to join him, but he then received more galling news. "In response to my order, their officers informed me that they had been directed by General Stuart to remain where they were, to support the battery on the hill." Hampton was furious with what he perceived as unwarranted meddling: "No notice of this disposition of half of my brigade by General Stuart had been given to me by that officer, and I found myself deprived of two of my regiments at the very moment they could have reaped the fruits of the victory they had so brilliantly won. This division of my command left me too small a force to operate to advantage, and when the other regiments rejoined me, I received orders to assume a position to protect the hill." As the Federals melted into the forest south of the railroad, an angry Wade Hampton led his force back to Fleetwood Hill.⁶¹

Not all the Confederate troopers heard the recall. Unlike his comrades, William Cowles sped his twenty-five North Carolinians through Beckham's artillery barrage and pursued the Yankees into the woods. Isolated in the midst of Gregg's troopers, Cowles and his boys still managed to bag some sixty Federals, including a reporter from the *New York Herald*. When the Unionists cut off the Carolinians, Cowles calmly took to the country and eventually led his troops—prisoners and all—back to Fleetwood.⁶²

One final clash of arms marked the endgame in the Brandy Station sector. Throughout Kilpatrick's ill-fated attempts to take Fleetwood, Lieutenant Wade Wilson's artillery section had done its best to support the Federal thrusts, coming into action according to Wilson

at eight different times during the course of the day. With the Federals crowding into Brandy Station, Wilson found himself some one hundred yards north of the railroad with some nearby dismounted troopers acting as his only support. Kilpatrick sent word for the artilleryists to limber up and join the retreat, but as the gunners pulled up stakes, another wave of Rebels came roaring down Fleetwood.

Wilson's annoying barrage had caught Jeb Stuart's attention, so the general galloped down the line and reined up to Lunsford Lomax and the 11th Virginia's position. Could he silence the battery? Lomax sternly replied, "I will do it or lose every man in the attempt." Stuart ordered him to do so. Raising his sword to the Yankees, Lomax cried out, "Men, we want those guns; follow me." The 11th pounded down the Carolina Road past Martin's abandoned pieces, and galloped toward Wilson's cannon.⁶³

On the plain, the remaining Federals watched Lomax and his troopers sweep down the hill. Still keeping vigil near Martin's guns, Hampton Thomas departed his position first. "Not wishing to be on too intimate terms with my Southern friends," Thomas doffed his cap and left the artillery to the Confederates. Wilson, however, could not match Thomas' celerity. The Confederates swept through Wilson's guns and slammed into his supports. Suddenly surrounded, Wilson assumed that he and his guns would be instantly captured. However, Lomax's men seemed intent on fighting it out with the Federal troopers, so Wilson's boys simply fought their way through the throng until they reached the woods south of the railroad, "stopping now and then to throw a few shell" at the Rebels for good measure.⁶⁴

Indeed, the Virginians had first set their sights on Wilson's dismounted support, catching them ill-prepared for mounted combat. According to one Confederate, "Lomax and his men of the bloody Eleventh were among them, slashing left and right." With the artillery's supports dispersed, the 11th then attacked the railroad, where Lomax "found three regiments of cavalry, under Sir Percy Wyndham, plundering and destroying the property there. I charged, and drove them from the station." The colonel then sent a detachment toward Culpeper because of an erroneous report

that Federals were operating near there. He took the rest of the Virginians and pressed the Federal retreat on the Stevensburg Road, capturing another thirty-four Yankees before returning to the Heights. No one seemed to notice Wilson and his artillery crews rolling away to safety.⁶⁵

About this time, Beverly Robertson and his two regiments came trotting up from the east. Earlier, when the Carolinian reached the railroad, he had noticed the Federal presence at St. James Church, so he continued his trek to Fleetwood. Couriers from Stuart had beseeched him to hurry forth with a regiment, but by the time Robertson arrived the Federal assault on the Heights was over. He drew up in support of Hampton's brigade and awaited developments, eventually ordering one of his regiments to report to Hampton himself. Except for an occasional redeployment, Robertson spent the rest of the day marking time near Fleetwood.

ALFRED PLEASANTON HAD HAD ENOUGH.

From his headquarters at the Gee House, the cavalry chief was well aware of how badly his operation had come undone. Needless to say, the Federals were not going to be galloping into Culpeper this day, so Pleasanton determined to retreat across the Rappahannock. At 2:40 p.m., he sent off word to some nearby supports: "I will recross this p.m. I send my trains to Bealeton. Please give them protection." For Alfred Pleasanton, the battle of Brandy Station was over. Now, he had to get his troopers to safety.⁶⁶

With the assault on Fleetwood effectively over, David Gregg went about reordering his command. He managed a concentration about a mile south of the railroad, just out of range of the enemy artillery on the Heights. Word then arrived from David Russell. His infantry had pursued the retreating Rebels up the Kelly's Ford Road and managed to connect with Devin near St. James Church. Gregg determined that a further concentration was in order: "I moved my command in the direction of Rappahannock Bridge, and soon united with General Buford's left." Still, the threat of a Confederate advance from Culpeper shadowed Gregg's every move. He reported train loads of enemy infantry debouching near Brandy and reinforcing the Con-

federates on Fleetwood. Then, as the shadows lengthened across the battlefield, a missive arrived from Pleasanton: the great movement to bust up Jeb Stuart's proposed raid had come to an end. As Gregg would report, "I received orders from Brigadier-General Pleasanton to recross my command at Rappahannock Ford."⁶⁷



WILLIAM A. TURNER COLLECTION

Lunsford Lomax:

"Men, we want those guns; follow me."

Well after the firing had died down and as Gregg prepared to depart, Alfred Duffié's column finally arrived from its circuitous journey. Duffié claimed a number of reasons for the delay, from a stampede of pack mules to the capture of a few Confederates. As it was, Duffié found Gregg's brigades pulling back, and Gregg ordered the Frenchman to shield the river crossings at Rappahannock Station and Beverley's Ford. Duffié spread out his regiments while the Third Division trotted east across the railroad bridge.

The Confederates now crowned Fleetwood in a battered but unbroken line of cavalry more than two miles long. Save the 1st South Carolina, dispatched to support Rooney Lee, Hampton's brigade occupied the southern face and connected with "Grumble" Jones' regiments north of Beckham's positions. At the very northern face of the ridge, Rooney Lee had circled his brigade in anticipation of renewing the fight with John Buford's advancing force. It had been a close thing, but in the face of daunting challenges and near disasters, Stuart had united his command in a position of enormous strength. The day-long series of crises that had befallen the Confederate cavalry had finally come to a conclusion.

Then, to the north, the Federals came on again.

ROONEY LEE HAD LED HIS REGIMENTS

from their positions along Yew Ridge back to the northern inclines of the Fleetwood Heights. Facing northwest and forming Lee's refused left flank was the 13th Virginia. On their right and positioned to the northeast was the 9th Virginia. Arching off the 9th's right were the 10th Virginia, the 2nd North Carolina, and the 7th Virginia. The ground here was broken and hilly, and aggressive Federal attacks from the 2nd and 6th US had managed to bloody the Confederate line near the Welford House. Captain Wesley Merritt of the 2nd US advanced well ahead of his charging regiment and engaged a Confederate officer—identified by some as Rooney Lee—in some spirited swordplay. Losing his hat while parrying one blow, Merritt and a nearby lieutenant discovered that they were nearly surrounded. With tremendous skill, they managed to gallop to safety "amid a shower of pistol bullets."⁶⁸

Of the renewed action, Buford recalled, "Out flew the sabers, and most handsomely they were used." "There was confusion all around," wrote one member of the 10th Virginia of the Confederates' condition on the hillside, "the troops broken and pushed by the Yankees." Lieutenant Isaac M. Ward led a

squadron from the 6th US into the teeth of the Confederate defenses, where he fell "within grasping distance of the enemy's battle flag for which he had been struggling." Colonel John Black brought up his 1st South Carolina in support of Rooney and was surprised that the defenders "were badly posted, having no cover." A captain from the 2nd North Carolina recalled the 9th and the 13th being thrown back "in considerable confusion," but the Carolinians helped to seal the breach and restore order. Finally, around 3:00 p.m. John Buford deployed his entire force to press the issue.⁶⁹

Having advanced south down Yew Ridge and the Welford's Ford Road, Buford's dismounted troopers swept Lee's front with carbine fire. Rooney's men struck back in kind, sending a stream of wounded Northerners to the rear. In "this hotly contested position," Vincent's two guns hammered the Rebel right with a "sturdy" fire. John Black reported however that most of the enemy shells overshot the Confederate lines. Although ammunition was running low, Buford was determined to launch another heavy blow. While his men struck at various points along the line, Buford massed the 5th and 6th US mounted and in column on the Ford Road south of the Welford House. However, one of Pleasanton's staff, Captain Frederick Newhall, arrived with orders to retreat,

and Buford immediately made preparations to abandon the front.⁷⁰

As Buford's couriers rode off to spread the news, Confederate attacks began to sweep down the ridge. Colonel R.L.T. Beale's mounted 9th Virginia savagely hit the 6th Pennsylvania and drove them north until the 2nd US struck the Virginians' flank and forced them to halt. To support their comrades, the 10th Virginia and the 2nd North Carolina galloped into the narrow valley separating Yew from Fleetwood and crashed into the Federal line. Due to the efforts of its officers—Colonel James Lucius Davis in particular—the men of the 10th advanced in notably good order, and their attack hit hard. When the Virginians came up before a line of regulars shielded by a ditch bank, Major Joseph Rosser rode forward to duel a Federal officer who had answered the challenge. When Rosser triumphed, Private John Massie Smith shouted out, "Hurrah for Hell, Wade in." According to one eyewitness, "In one wild struggle all lines became mixed up hopelessly, the battle becoming a fight of individuals."⁷¹

Once again, dust rose in a choking veil as Union and Confederate mounted troopers slammed into one another. Colonel Solomon Williams and his 2nd North Carolina came up on Davis' right and pushed the Federals north. However, as Williams shouted over the din, a Yankee bullet smashed into his skull and killed him instantly. Besides depriving the Carolinians of their well-respected leader, Williams' death occurred at the same time that Rooney Lee went down with a severe leg wound. By dint of this sudden shivering of the Confederate officer corps, confusion gripped the brigade's command structure. After much consultation, Colonel John Chambliss of the 13th Virginia took over direction of Lee's brigade. However, as the Southerners labored to reform, enemy pressure began to fade. After some twelve hours of fighting, the Federals had broken off the contest.⁷²

Across the way, Buford's officers began a skillful, fighting withdrawal. To dissuade pursuit, the 2nd US and the 6th Pennsylvania deployed in a wood lot with the 6th US in support. Farther north, the 5th US stood firmly with Graham's battery on the Hazel River near Yew Ridge and acted as a fulcrum for Buford's retreat. It would be a fortu-



Wesley Merritt (left) and a nearby lieutenant managed to gallop to safety "amid a shower of pistol bullets." Alfred Duffié (right): Gregg's decisions regarding Duffié badly delayed the Kelly's Ford crossing and, as a result, the entire operation.

nate placement, because just west of the regulars, Fitz Lee's brigade, commanded by Thomas Munford, finally arrived on the battlefield.

As Stuart's left flank, Munford's assignment for Robert E. Lee's invasion was to cover the initial infantry movements. His position, therefore, on the upper fords of the Rappahannock was necessarily more isolated than the rest of Stuart's command. As the day progressed, however, Munford had fallen victim to a series of vague orders ("bring your command a little farther in this direction" being a typical dictum), and his actions were guided by an unfortunate but understandable conservatism. As a result, Munford had advanced slowly from his camps near Shady Grove Church and arrived at Welford's Ford around 4:00 p.m. As he shook out a skirmish line—a cloud of sharpshooters from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Virginia—Munford beheld quite a sight. From an eminence near the Welford House (possibly Yew Ridge), the colonel could see Buford's forces, "a division of cavalry, a brigade of infantry, and two or three detachments of dismounted cavalry," all crowding east toward Beverley's Ford. Breathed's battery went to work, but Munford was realistic about his prospects: "The enemy's right flank being protected by infantry, artillery, and twice our number of sharpshooters, made it impracticable at any time to engage them in a hand-to-hand fight."⁷³

East of Yew Ridge, Buford retained his typical calm demeanor, writing later that his command came "off the field in fine shape and at our convenience." However, with elements of the 2nd Virginia poking at his flank and nearly two full enemy brigades following closely in his wake, Buford had to take great care extricating his isolated force. He was aided materially by both the 1st US, which had just arrived from its detached duty, and by a ring of artillery deployed by Captain James Robertson. Munford later claimed a number of local successes, but with the West Point precision characteristic of a true professional, John Buford kept up a firm front as he pulled his exhausted troopers back to the plateau above Beverley's Ford.⁷⁴

ALL DAY, HE HAD KEPT UP with the tides of the battle through signal and messenger. At one point he had advanced some infantry as security against a Federal breakthrough, but their guns were never needed. However, late that afternoon, Robert E. Lee advanced to the Barbour House to observe the field for himself. Unfortunately, one of the first things he saw was a crew carrying his wounded son, Rooney, to the rear. The concerned father did what he could to make his son comfortable, but Rooney's concerns were for his men, not himself. Someone assured the general that the wound was not mortal, which no doubt calmed Lee to some extent. After Rooney was carried

off, Robert E. Lee turned to watch the final moments of the battle.⁷⁵

AS THE SUN SET, GREGG AND DUFFIE

pulled the last of their troopers across the river. Buford's men then navigated Beverley's Ford. Accompanied by a group of staffers, Pleasonton watched the crossing from a rise north of the river. One officer present painted quite a scene: "There could not have been a prettier sight. The river flowed beneath us; as far as we could see to right and left on the southern bank no living object was visible; the plain and woods in front of us were growing misty, but the burnished and glowing horizon threw everything on high ground into wonderful relief." By 9:00 p.m., all of the Federals were east of the river.⁷⁶

Despite enduring fire for fourteen hours and suffering their worst casualties of the war, the Federals were exhilarated. One Illinoian observed, "The severity of the fight is without precedent in cavalry warfare....This, without a doubt, was the hardest fought cavalry battle of the war." Thomas Devin spoke of the pride in his troopers' performance when he observed, "they never wavered but stood to the work like veterans." A New Yorker even questioned the need to retreat, writing later that "it was a mystery to the boys why they fell back." Truly, this was no longer the Federal cavalry of the first two years of the war, the embarrassed shoe-clerks and city boys who had



Confederate signal station near Beverley's Ford. Drawing by Edwin Forbes




John Buford maintained his reputation as one of the best, if not *the* best, Federal cavalry commanders with the Army of the Potomac.

fled at the sight of Jeb Stuart and his gray riders. With more than a hint of pride, one Jersey trooper offered, "Little quarter was asked or given"—words indeed of a warrior.⁷⁷

Alfred Pleasonton certainly shared his troopers' elation. Around 8:00 p.m. he wired Joseph Hooker a short description of the fight west of the Rappahannock. "The troops are in splendid spirits," he reported, "and are entitled to the highest praise for their distinguished conduct." Again the phantom Confederate infantry made its supposed presence felt when Pleasonton revealed, "A large force of infantry had been sent for from Culpeper as well as Longstreet's command at Ellis' Ford. And having crippled the enemy by desperate fighting so that he could not follow me, I returned with my command to the north side of the Rappahannock." However, his strategic objective had been bloodily attained: "Tomorrow morning Stuart was to have started on a raid into Maryland, so captured papers state. You may rest satisfied he will not attempt it."⁷⁸

Joseph Hooker had some well-tuned misgivings. Early the next morning, the army commander ignored Pleasonton's bravado and wrote him, "I am not so certain as you appear to be that the enemy will abandon his contemplated raid." Pleasonton however wired back an interesting addition to his report: "We captured Stuart's camp, with his orders, letters, &c. He was to move to Maryland with 12,000 cavalry and twenty-five guns," another reference to the great raid his operation supposedly had frustrated.



Thomas Munford had fallen victim to a series of vague orders, such as "bring your command a little farther in this direction."

Of course, Pleasonton never did capture Stuart's camp, nor was such a raid ever conceived. The general also described his force as outnumbered by a ratio of three to one, a distortion taken up by nearly all the Federal participants in the battle. Later, when no grand raid materialized, Pleasonton recast the operation as a "reconnaissance in force," and he argued that his "duty was not to seek a fight and not to avoid one" but to simply locate Robert E. Lee. Despite Pleasonton's brave words, none of his men came anywhere near a Confederate foot soldier. At Brandy Station, the "Knight Of Romance" stayed true to form.⁷⁹

Despite Pleasonton's fabrications, the Federal cavalry reveled in the battle's glowing aftermath. "All were imbued," wrote one New Yorker, "with the glory of having met and successfully measured sabers with the much vaunted and by many thought to be invincible rebel cavalry." One officer later recalled the effect of Brandy Station on the 1st Maine: "The battle aroused [the regiment's] latent powers and awoke it, as it were, to a new career. It became self-reliant, and began to comprehend its own possibilities. It became inspired with an invincible spirit that never again forsook it." And of the rebel cavalry, the officer noted, "Brandy Station broke its spirit. It lost its prestige there and never regained it."⁸⁰

Such sentiment was earned with blood. Total Federal casualties came to 866. Eighty-one Unionists were killed in the action, 403 were wounded, and, in a testament to the confused conditions, 382 were missing. The hottest fighting cen-

tered in the St. James-Yew Ridge sector where John Buford's division suffered five hundred casualties. Gregg reported 328 in losses and Duffié totaled twenty-nine. Ames' infantry lost sixty-six men supporting Buford, while Russell only lost nine soldiers sparring with Beverly Robertson. But the casualty lists only told one side of the battle's story. While officers like Alfred Pleasonton, Alfred Duffié, and Percy Wyndham had peaked at Brandy Station, eager young cavalrymen were rising in the chain of command. Unassigned George Custer had attached himself to Davis' brigade and received a commendation from Pleasonton for gallantry during the fight. Ulric Dahlgren did the same and accompanied the 6th Pennsylvania in their storied charge. Elon Farnsworth would soon make the jump from a captain commanding the 8th Illinois to brigadier general. Their experiences at Brandy Station fighting the "vaunted" Confederate cavalry to a standstill would later serve them all well in the Loudoun Valley, at Hanover, and on the farm fields near Gettysburg.

John Buford and David Gregg both entered the battle of Brandy Station with well-earned reputations. Buford maintained his as one of the best, if not the best, Federal cavalry commander with the Army of the Potomac. His field management was superb, his tactical decisions crisp. His men fought with a grim determination that would have been unheard of a year before. One reason is obvious: Buford continuously put his men into position to do good work. Of course, you would expect this kind of dogged devotion to battle from the regulars of the Reserve Brigade, but more and more of the volunteers—the 8th Illinoisians and 6th Pennsylvanians being good examples—were catching the fire. John Buford was supplying the heat.

David Gregg continued to shine in cavalry command, eventually earning the rank of brevet major general. Brandy Station, however, was not one of his better days. His decisions regarding Duffié badly delayed the Kelly's Ford crossing and, as a result, the entire operation. One analyst faulted him for not blasting through Beverly Robertson's regiments as soon as he forced Kelly's Ford. Another claimed that Gregg's emotional reaction to Wyndham's charge led to his losing control of Kilpatrick's subsequent efforts. The charges of the 1st New Jersey and the

1st Maine were breathtaking examples of cavalry power and élan, and Gregg's troopers fought with an obstinate courage that impressed even Jeb Stuart. But on the Fleetwood Heights, Gregg lost the tactical match to his Confederate counterpart, a match he could have—and probably should have—won. All in all, Brandy Station would remain a question mark in an otherwise exemplary career.

Despite the many words that the Federals wrote in the aftermath of the battle, it was left to a former Confederate to draw the perfect phrase. Years later, Henry McClellan included a reflection on the combat at Brandy Station in his book about the war. After denigrating Pleasonton's fatuous claims for the operation's strategic benefits, McClellan offered, with gentlemanly candor, his own take on the effects of Brandy Station: "One result of incalculable importance did follow this battle—it made the Federal cavalry."⁸¹

* * *

JEB STUART MADE A HABIT OF PAINTING

even the dreariest outcome in the brightest light, and Brandy Station would be no exception. He issued a congratulatory order that spoke of "the weight of Southern vengeance" and the "proof-steel" mettle of his men, of saber blows and glorious days. Later he would write his wife, "It was no surprise. The enemy's movement was known and he was defeated." In spite of the flowery phrases and firm denials, the fact remains that Stuart and his cavalry were utterly surprised by the Federal thrust across the Rappahannock River. However, it also remains a fact that after the early morning surprise, Brandy Station was one of Stuart's most accomplished moments. In a welter of confusion, Jeb managed his troopers with resilience and authority, brilliantly countering enemy movements that would have crushed a lesser commander. His men, save the 4th Virginia, fought magnificently, and his officers, save Beverly Robertson, performed extremely well. In the end, Stuart needed every bit of his considerable skill to save the day. But save it he did. During the fourteen hour fight, the Northerners failed to expand on any of their tactical advantages, nor could they penetrate the cordon protecting Robert E. Lee's gathering at Culpeper. That was Jeb Stuart at his very best.⁸²

The aftermath of the battle certainly provided grist for a legion of grumblers. Officers like Lafayette McLaws bemoaned the cavalry's "surprise," civilians like Edmund Ruffin railed at a victory "akin to defeat," and newspapers like the *Richmond Examiner* harshly judged "the puffed up cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia" and its "vain and weak-headed officers." Much of the billowing seemed to reflect attitudes of a personal nature rather than reasoned military evaluations. Jeb himself thought as much, writing his wife, "I understand the spirit and object of the detraction and can, I believe, trace the source." He added, "I will, of course, take no notice of such base falsehoods," even as he did so.⁸³

No doubt what shocked Southern sensibilities the most was the thought of the Northern horde fighting the Southern cavaliers on equal terms, even as Pleasonton retreated with neither stra-

tegic nor tactical advantage. One Virginian put it well: "This body of men, who had afforded us more amusement than work, had now emerged from their state of inefficiency and had become foemen worthy of our steel." Still, other observers including his own officers laid the blame directly on the colorful cavalry commander. Many years after the fact, Wade Hampton, who was still blaming the 4th Virginia for his brother's death, groused privately that "Stuart managed badly that day, but I would not say so publicly."⁸⁴

A view of the Confederate casualty lists might have mitigated some of the anger. Henry McClellan estimated Stuart's losses at 523, about two-thirds of Pleasonton's losses. "Grumble" Jones took the hardest hit, losing 238 troopers. Hampton endured 120 casualties, Rooney Lee ninety, Munford a surprisingly high sixty-three, and Beckham

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26. Frye, 39.
27. William P. Lloyd, *History of the First Reg't Pennsylvania Reserve Cavalry* (Philadelphia: 1864), p. 54.
28. Pyne, 149-50; Clark B. Hall, "The Battle of Brandy Station," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, Volume XXIX, Number 2, p. 39; Edward Longacre, *Jersey Cavaliers* (Hightstown, New Jersey: 1992), p. 145.
29. Henry C. Meyer, *Civil War Experiences* (New York: 1911), pp. 28-30.
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twelve. In an indictment that even Jeb Stuart tried hard to soften, Beverly Robertson admitted to a loss of four horses; not one trooper serving under the North Carolinian fell to enemy fire. His report tortuously attempted to explain the lackluster performance; and when he recognized how underwhelming his case was, Robertson submitted a second detailing of his experiences. Jeb graciously accepted Beverly's pained reasoning, but Robertson's days with the cavalry were numbered.

On the other hand, Robert E. Lee appeared satisfied with the results of the battle. In a congratulatory letter issued a week later, Lee commended Stuart for his handling of the fight—"The troops were well and skillfully managed"—and he thanked God for the results. The general assumed early in the fight that the Federals had little more than a reconnaissance in mind, and he had full con-

fidence that Stuart could easily contain such a move. Despite the morning surprise, Brandy Station did little to sway Lee's confidence in his cavalry commander.⁸⁵

Whatever the perceived results of the battle, Brandy Station did indeed represent a watershed moment in the Civil War. A large part of the battle was fought not by the saber-wielding rider but by the dismounted cavalryman. Flying artillery provided both offensive push and defensive weight, while carbine and pistol fire caused far more wounds than the sword. Perhaps most importantly, horses were used as often to transfer troopers from one battleline to another as they were to take up the charge. From Brandy on, Hampton's action at Beverley's Ford and Rooney Lee's defense of Yew Ridge would come to represent the concept of cavalry action far more often than the charges across Fleetwood.

AFTER THE BATTLE, Jeb Stuart returned to his headquarters on the Heights. He had planned to spend the night there but the stench forced him and his staff elsewhere. The next day, as burial details policed the area, Stuart and his exhausted men labored to get their gear in order. Soon, butternut infantry columns began to fill the roadways out of Culpeper, and the cavalry splashed across the upper fords of the Rappahannock River to cover the advance. The Confederates were headed north. □

PATRICK BRENNAN is a nationally known musician, composer, and producer. He has written numerous articles on the Civil War, and has authored two major works on the conflict: *Secessionville: Assault on Charleston* (Savas Publishing), and *"To Die Game": Major General Jeb Stuart* (Farnsworth House Military Impressions).

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

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
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

—James E. T. Lange and Katherine DeWitt, Jr.



Vol. 2, #4: "The Lincoln Assassination: Do the pieces fit?"

Did the Confederate government have a hand in the assassination? Believers and sceptics argue the pros and cons. —William B. Feis,

James O. Hall, William A. Tidwell, Edward Steers, Jr., James E. T. Lange, Katherine De Witt, Jr., and John Y. Simon



• **"It Would Be Wicked to Falter":**

Richard Henry Pratt was not one to truckle to authority. —*Keith Poulter*

MISTER LINCOLN'S JUSTICE: Recent research throws new light on Abraham Lincoln's review of courts-martial. —*Thomas L. Lowry*

FOLLOW THAT GREEN FLAG! The epic tale of Irish Brigade color bearer John Dillon —*Kevin O'Brien*

THE FORGOTTEN BATTLE OF DAVIS BRIDGE: In October 1862 Ulysses S. Grant hoped to catch the Confederate army under Van Dorn between two converging columns. —*Timothy B. Smith*

A QUESTION OF RHETORIC: Is the story of the moving mutual tribute at Appomattox between Chamberlain and Gordon three parts romance? —*William G. Marvel*

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TEN DAYS IN JULY: THE PURSUIT TO THE POTOMAC: Long overshadowed by

the battle at Gettysburg, what followed contained some of the most desperate fighting of the war. —*Ted Alexander*

"HURRY WAS THE ORDER OF THE DAY": The epic tale of a determined commander who brought a wagon train seventeen miles long, crammed with 10,000 wounded, to safety. —*Steve French*

"A NIGHT NEVER TO BE FORGOTTEN": Midnight, Monterey Pass, July 4-5, 1863. Union Cavalry and Confederates clash on a mountain side in the midst of a downpour, the darkness lit only by lightning and the flashes of guns. —*Eric J. Wittenberg*

A GOLDEN BRIDGE: Shrugging off the disaster of July 3, Robert E. Lee conducted one of the most masterful retreats in military history. —*Kent Masterson Brown*

"WE HAD ONLY TO STRETCH FORTH OUR HANDS": In the aftermath of Gettysburg, Lincoln thought he could see the end of the war. —*Frank J. Williams*

"BAD FAITH SOMEWHERE": George Gordon Meade and the Committee on the Conduct of the War. —*Bruce Tap*

ERRORS THAT DOOMED A CAMPAIGN: It might have been possible to trap Lee north of the Potomac. —*Keith Poulter*

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TACTICAL STALEMATE: The way in which the armies of the Civil War were raised, organized, and led, practically guaranteed that most battles would be indecisive —*Gerald J. Prokopowicz*

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"NO GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT": In 1860, coffee was an expensive rarity. The Civil War changed all that. —*Gregory W. Baxter*

CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY PREPARES FOR PICKETT'S CHARGE: The artillery plan for July 3 was the most detailed and complex ever devised by the Army of

Northern Virginia. On its success would hinge the success of the infantry assault. —*Richard Rollins*

FAILURE BEFORE KNOXVILLE: James Longstreet's assault on Fort Sanders was regarded by his own soldiers as "a useless slaughter of men." —*Terry A. Johnston*

FORGOTTEN WARRIOR: William Payne rose to command a brigade under Stuart, yet until now has largely been lost to history. —*John Coski*

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MOSBY IN THE VALLEY: Just what impact did "Mosby's Confederacy" have on the Civil War? —*James A. Ramage*

ALL THE TRUMPETS SOUNDED: An appreciation of Bruce Catton. —*Stephen Sears*


"SHOOT IF YOU CAN BY ACCIDENT": Union death lists included the names of both men and women suspected of aiding Tennessee guerrillas. —*Michael Bradley and Milan Hill*



Vol. 3, #7: "The Lincoln Assassination Revisited"

New evidence regarding the assassination of Abraham Lincoln should not be lightly dismissed.



—*William Hanchett*



Vol. 4, #2: "One Who Got Away"

John Surratt was a key player in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Yet he was never found guilty.


—*James E. T. Lange and Katherine DeWitt, Jr.*



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Before joining the Confederate Secret Service, Lewis Powell was a Florida infantryman and a Mosby Ranger.

—*Betty Ownsbey*



Vol. 3, #6: "The Veiled Lady: The Saga of Sarah Slater"

Today Sarah Antoinette Slater remains a tantalizing footnote to the history of the assassination.

—*James O. Hall*



"THEY FOUGHT CONFOUNDED PLUCKY": For green troops of the Heavy Artillery, the Battle of Harris Farm was a bloody initiation into combat.—*Gordon C. Rhea*

EVERY CONDITION OF HORROR: During Mc-Clellan's Peninsula Campaign, the army's provision for the wounded was woefully inadequate.—*Nancy S. Garrison*

TRUE TO THE UNION: Men had mixed motives for joining the 1st and 2nd Texas (Union) Cavalry.—*James Marten*

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MR. DAVIS' MAILBAG: Jefferson Davis received letters from cranks, critics, patriots, and poltroons....—*Lynda Crist*

ORDNANCE AND LOGISTICS: THE FAILURE OF CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY AT GETTYSBURG: In relying on the artillery to pave the way for Pickett's Charge, the Confederates faced problems both with the guns themselves and with logistics.—*Richard Rollins*

REASON DETHRONED: Loyalty to the Union could be a dangerous thing, in Texas.—*Karen Gerhardt*

A REFLECTION OF THEIR OWN IMAGE: Not all the contacts of the 154th New York with the enemy were hostile.—*Mark H. Dunkelman*

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NUMBERS AND LOSSES IN THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA: During May and June of 1864, Robert E. Lee received over 30,000 reinforcements; but he also suffered far higher losses than previously believed.—*Alfred Young*

"SHANKS": PORTRAIT OF A GENERAL: Alcoholic, arrogant, and insubordinate. Was this a fair picture of Nathan Evans?—*Jason H. Silverman, Samuel N. Thomas, and Beverly D. Evans IV*

THUNDER AT CHANTILLY: Did the counterattack at Chantilly really save the Union army?—*John Hennessy*

THE SECRET YANKEES: Deep in the heart of the Confederacy, in the city of Atlanta, there existed a secret circle of Union loyalists.—*Thomas Dyer*

REVERE THE EMPEROR, EXPEL THE BARBARIANS: In mid-1863 a naval action off Japan threatened to embroil the U.S. in a foreign war.—*Theodore P. Savas*

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TREACHERY IN FLORIDA Nowhere were loyalties more confused than in Taylor county, Florida....—*Pat Imbimbo*

THE FAILURE OF THE CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY IN PICKETT'S CHARGE: No amount of heroism could overcome the shortcomings of the Confederate artillery on July 3, 1863.—*Richard Rollins*

"FORMIDABLE ONLY IN FLIGHT?": Joe Johnston's Atlanta Campaign strategy was based on a false premise. But that does not mean he was a bad general.—*Steven H. Newton*

"MANY ARE ...DELIGHTED": The last days of the Confederacy in North Carolina.—*John Coski*

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THE GENERALSHIP OF ROBERT E. LEE: Lee's offensive strategy was vital to the maintenance of the South's morale.—*Gary W. Gallagher*

DEMOLISHING THE MYTH: Lee's offensive style of operations bled the Confederacy of men and lost the South its chance of independence.—*Alan Nolan*

LEE, PRESCIENCE, AND THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN: The Overland Campaign reveals clearly that prescience was not one of Lee's strong points; but decisive action in the face of the unexpected was.—*Gordon C. Rhea*

LEE'S QUEST FOR THE BATTLE OF ANNIHILATION: Lee's offensive strategy was appropriate up until Gettysburg, but he failed thereafter to adapt to the new situation facing the Confederacy.—*Peter Carmichael*

"AS STUPID A FELLOW AS I AM....": The real genius of Lee was that he clearly grasped the Confederacy's strategic needs.—*Joseph L. Harsh*

HOW GREAT A CAPTAIN?: To what extent can we now draw up a balance sheet of Lee's strengths and weaknesses?—*Keith Poulter*

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THE VEILED LADY The spotlight seldom shines upon *successful* spies, a point made by the history of the mysterious Sarah Slater.—*James O. Hall*

CUT TO PIECES AND GONE TO HELL: The aftermath of the Battle of Poison Spring was a gruesome reminder that "war is hell."—*Gregory J. W. Urwin*

LEE: THE TWILIGHT YEARS: Robert E. Lee's behavior in the years remaining to him after the Civil War cast a revealing light on the man.—*Pat Brennan*

FIRE IN THE STREETS: The preliminaries to the Battle of Fredericksburg included a vicious fire fight in the streets.—*George C. Rable*

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GLORY DENIED: FIRST DEEP BOTTOM: In July 1864 U.S. Grant entrusted an important operation to Winfield Scott Hancock and Philip H. Sheridan. The result was a grave disappointment.—*Bryce Sudarow*

THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION REVISITED: New evidence regarding the assassination of Abraham Lincoln should not be lightly dismissed.—*William Hanchett*

BLACK SLAVERY, WHITE LIBERTY: The prewar conflict in "Bleeding Kansas" was not so much about black slavery, as about the liberty of whites.—*Nicole Etcheson*

RISKING THE WRATH OF GOD: During the Civil War Dr. Luke Blackburn attempted to create yellow fever epidemics in northern and northern-occupied cities.—*Edward Steers, Jr.*

GALLOPING THUNDER The Stuart Horse Artillery Battalion carved for itself a record that could stand with that of any unit north or south.—*Robert J. Trout*

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COMRADES OF THE SOUTHERN CROSS In the aftermath of the defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Confederate Major General Patrick Cleburne came up with an imagina-

tive way to reinforce the *esprit de corps* of his division.—*Mauriel Joslyn*

BREVET MAJOR GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH: THE STUFF OF LEGENDS: For some, no sacrifice was too great.—*Wayne Mahood*

"BUTCHER" GRANT AND THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN: The ghost of "Grant the butcher" haunts Civil War lore. But what of the facts?—*Gordon C. Rhea*

"GIVE 'EM HELL": The Battle of Fayetteville, April 18, 1863, pitted Unionist Arkansans and Confederate Arkansans against one another.—*Russell L. Mahan*

ONE OF THE MOST GALLANT MEN: From Gettysburg to Petersburg, Irish color guard Patrick De Lacy of the 143rd Pennsylvania appeared to have a charmed life....—*Kevin O'Brien*

A NOSTALGIC PANORAMA The Kurz and Allison Civil War illustrations.—*Harold Holzer and Mark Neely*

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"ONLY A MIRACLE CAN SAVE US" Early in August 1864 U.S. Grant resolved to try again to crack the rebel defenses north of the James. The result was the Second Battle of Deep Bottom.—*Bryce Sudarow*

HONOR REDEEMED: Criticized for his poor performance at Shiloh, Lew Wallace redeemed his honor at the Battle of Monocacy.—*Gloria Baker Swift and Gail Stephens*

ONE WHO GOT AWAY: John Surratt was a key player in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Yet he was never found guilty.—*James E. T. Lange and Katherine DeWitt, Jr.*

MY OLD KENTUCKY HOME-AT WAR: For the women of war-torn Kentucky, the Civil War was often literally right at their door.—*Susan Lyons Hughes*

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WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC? Why was it that the army seemed unable to get it together on the battlefield?—*Gordon Rhea, Richard Rollins, Stephen Sears, and John Y. Simon*

"THE BEST HATED MAN IN THE ARMY": The brilliant, stormy career of Major General William Babcock Hazen.—*James R. Furquerson*

RACE IN THE CIVIL WAR: Just as race had helped to cause the war, so attitudes toward—and definitions of—race helped shape it. —*Mark Grimsley*

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT SNAKE CREEK GAP?: Did William T. Sherman really bamboozle Johnstons at Snake Creek Gap? —*Steven H. Newton*

THE OTHER DAHLGREN: Union Admiral John Dahlgren had a Confederate brother. —*Bruce Allardice*

LAST CHANCE FOR VICTORY: At the conclusion of the first day's fighting at Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee had a number of options. Did he choose wisely? —*Scott Bowden and Bill Ward*

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IN THE SHADOW OF WASHINGTON: How far did Lee shape his role on that of Washington? —*Rick McCaslin*

APOSTLES OF SECESSION: What were the arguments of secession commissioners in the winter of 1860-1861? —*Charles B. Dew*

"THE HOTTEST PLACE I WAS EVER IN": The seven-hour Battle of Haw's Shop would show what Wade Hampton was made of. —*Gordon C. Rhea*

DESPAIR, HOPE, AND DELUSION: Even as their military effort collapsed, the morale of many Southerners continued to be high. —*George C. Rable*

TWO TALES OF TENNESSEE: Two actions, one from 1862 and one from 1863, demonstrate the importance both of the commander on the spot and of the overall organization of cavalry to its success. —*Laurence Schiller*

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PICKETT'S CHARGE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR: Pickett's Charge is often seen as a bad move on Lee's part. In fact there were cogent reasons for making the attempt. —*Richard Rollins*

CHARLIE BELL: UNION SCOUT: One of the most successful scouts of the war, Bell carried out no fewer than thirty-seven missions behind enemy lines, and made an important contribution to the Vicksburg Campaign. —*William B. Feis*

"IT HAUNTS ME NIGHT AND DAY": Fate brought Major General James G. Blunt's wagon train and William Quantrill's guerrillas together on the Kansas prairie on October 6, 1863, setting the scene for one of the war's bloodiest episodes. —*Kip Lindberg and Matt Matthews*

"A PERFECT PICTURE OF HELL": Captured *en masse* several times during the war, the men of the 12th Iowa were in a unique position to observe the deteriora-

tion of prison camp conditions. —*Ted Genoways and Hugh H. Genoways*

THE "BEST HATED MAN" IN THE ARMY: PART II: From the opening of the Cracker Line to service on the western frontier, General William Babcock Hazen was an outstanding, and outspoken soldier. —*James R. Furquerson*

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THE INFANTRYMAN IN COMBAT: What was it like to be an infantryman in the Civil War? —*Reid Mitchell*

BACKGROUND TO BLOODSHED: In many ways the lessons the U.S. Army learned in the Mexican-American War were highly misleading. —*Perry Jamieson*

THE CHANGING FACE OF BATTLE: Technological changes rendered frontal assaults more often than not suicidal, but some commanders were slow to learn. —*Herman Hattaway*

ARMS AND THE MAN: Exactly what were the changes that took place in infantry small arms, and what was their effect on the battlefield. —*Louis A. Gara-vaglia and Charles G. Worman*

FIELD FORTIFICATIONS: Did the extensive use of field fortifications truly usher in a "new species of warfare"? —*David Lowe*

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE EVOLUTION OF INFANTRY TACTICS: How did the evolution of Civil War infantry tactics relate to what had gone before and what came after? —*Keith Poulter*

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CONFEDERATE STRATEGY CONSIDERED: Was there a coherent Confederate strategy? Whose strategy was it? And what were its shortcomings? —*David Eicher, Joe Harsh, Richard McMurry, Robert Tanner, Russell Weigley, and Steve Woodworth*

A HOT TIME IN ASHLAND: Three and a half weeks into the Overland Campaign, a Union cavalry brigade found itself surrounded and in acute danger of being destroyed. —*Gordon C. Rhea*

WHY DID ABRAHAM LINCOLN CHOOSE WAR?: Slavery had little to do with Lincoln's determination to crush the secessionist states. —*Jeffrey R. Hummel*

BATTLE FLAG: The Confederate battle flag in historical perspective. —*John M. Coski*

THE OTHER HIGH WATER MARK: Four hundred and fifty miles southwest of Gettysburg, a stone wall runs along a

ridge line. Lacking monuments, unmarked, and hardly visited, it nevertheless marks the high tide of the Confederacy in the west. —*Kenneth W. Noe*

"A REGULAR SLAVE HUNT": Perhaps as many as several hundred free blacks and contrabands—men, women, and children—were seized by the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign, and taken into slavery. Was this the action of a few undisciplined units, or was it the settled policy of the army's high command? —*Ted Alexander*

VOLUME 5, #1

LEE'S LOST OPPORTUNITY: THE BATTLE OF GLENDALE: Robert E. Lee "had only that one day for a Cannae, and the army was not ready for it." —*Stephen W. Sears*

UNDERSTANDING LEE'S AUDACITY: Lee's audacity was rooted neither in biology nor in emotion, but in a cool analytical, professional expertise. —*Richard Rollins*

AFTER THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION: Abraham Lincoln's role in the ending of slavery. —*William C. Harris*

STONEWALL JACKSON AT FRONT ROYAL: Traditional accounts of the battle are sharply at variance with the historical facts. —*Gary L. Ecelbarger*

"POISONOUS TECHNIQUES AND DRESSING": A study of U.S. General Hospital #1 in Frederick, Maryland, through which more than 30,000 patients passed, sheds important light on the practice of medicine in the Civil War. —*Terry Reimer*

SULTANA: A CASE FOR SABOTAGE: New evidence suggests that foul play may have been the cause of the 1865 river disaster. —*D.H. Rule*

VOLUME 5, #2

WHY CIVIL WAR MILITARY HISTORY MUST BE LESS THAN 85 PERCENT MILITARY: In *North & South*, volume 4, #6, editor Keith Poulter described military history as the "meat" of Civil War studies. Historian William W. Freehling ripostes that without the "potatoes" of social history, we cannot have a satisfying meal.

BECOMING JOSHUA LAWRENCE CHAMBERLAIN: Nothing in Joshua Chamberlain's life prior to the Civil War suggested that he would one day become known as "The Hero of Little Round Top." In fact, his life during the antebellum years took him about as far afield of military matters and heroism as a man could get. —*Glenn W. LaFantasie*

COLD HARBOR: ANATOMY OF A BATTLE: Why was the attack launched? How many casualties were there? Which units suffered most, and why? And did General Robert E. Lee really have not so much as one man in reserve? Contemporary records reveal that much that we thought we knew about the battle is fiction. —*Gordon C. Rhea*

THE CAVALRY FIGHT AT SAMARIA CHURCH: After Phil Sheridan's defeat at Trevilian Station, his cavalry retreated toward the James River, accompanied by a wagon train filled with seriously wounded men and prisoners. A single division was detached to act as rearguard at Samaria Church, and that unit swiftly became the target of the entire Confederate cavalry command. —*Eric J. Wittenberg*

REBEL RAID ON THE WATER WITCH: "We are Rebels! Give way boys! Three cheers and board her!" The dramatic capture of a Union blockade ship off Savannah. —*Derek Smith*

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THUNDER ON THE PLAINS OF BRANDY (PART I): "Jeb" Stuart was caught napping when Union troopers burst across Beverley's Ford, but he still fought them to a standstill in the war's greatest cavalry battle. —*Patrick Brennan*

BLACKS IN GRAY: Did blacks really serve in the Confederate army? And if so, who were they and how many of them were there? —*Jason H. Silverman*

STONEWALL JACKSON'S FOG OF WAR: Sandwiched between the victories of Port Royal and Winchester, May 24, 1862, was a day of "order, counter-order, disorder." A step-by-step examination of the day's events can help us understand the confusion that is part and parcel of any campaign. —*Gary L. Ecelbarger*

"IF EVER WAR WAS HOLY": Young Quaker Unionists faced a wrenching dilemma when war broke out: was the cause such as to override their traditional pacifism? —*Jennifer L. Weber*

PORTRAIT OF AN HISTORICAL DETECTIVE: James O. Hall has added more to our knowledge of Abraham Lincoln's assassination than any other man. Who is Hall, and how did he come to put his unique stamp on the study of this defining moment in American history? —*Kieran McAuliffe*

STEPHEN W. SEARS

"We Should Assume the Aggressive"

ORIGINS OF THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

John Beauchamp Jones, the observant, gossipy clerk in the War Department in Richmond, took note in his diary under date of May 15, 1863, that General Lee had come down from his headquarters on the Rappahannock and was conferring at the Department. "Lee looked thinner, and a little pale," Jones wrote. "Subsequently he and the Secretary of War were long closeted with the President." (The same day another Richmond insider, President Davis' aide William Preston Johnston, was writing more optimistically, "Genl Lee is here and looking splendidly & hopeful.")



Custis. "I do not know how to replace him." On this very day Stonewall was being laid to rest in Lexington. But the tides of war do not wait, and General Lee had come to the capital to try and shape their future course.

This conference, held at the War Department in the old Virginia Mechanics Institute building on Franklin Street, easily ranks as a pivotal moment in Confederate history. Yet the record of what was discussed and decided that day is entirely blank. No minutes or notes have survived. Only in clerk Jones' brief diary entry are the participants even identi-

It is inconceivable that Mr. Davis would invite a lowly postmaster general to join *any* such high-level military conference with Seddon and Lee. What poor Reagan dimly remembered was a May 26 gathering (also noted in clerk Jones' diary) at which the president briefed his cabinet on the decided-upon strategy—and at which General Lee most certainly was not present.¹

Despite the blankness of the record, it is possible, from recollections and from correspondence of the three men before and after the conference, to infer their probable agenda and to piece together what must have been the gist of their arguments and agreements—and their decisions. Their decisions were major ones. It was determined that day that the straitened defenders of Vicksburg would have to make do with what forces they had; and, at the same time, that General Lee with the Army of Northern Virginia would invade Pennsylvania. Major decisions indeed.

It was the Vicksburg conundrum that triggered this May 15 conference. The Federals had been nibbling away at the Mississippi citadel since winter, and by mid-April Mississippi's governor, John J. Pettus, was warning Richmond, "the crisis in our affairs in my opinion is now upon us." As April turned to May, dispatches from the Confederate generals in the West became uniformly ominous in tone. In a sudden and startling move, the Yankee general there, U.S. Grant, had landed his army on the east bank of the Mississippi below Vicksburg and was reported marching inland, straight toward the state capital of Jackson. On May 12 John C. Pemberton, commanding the Vicksburg garrison, telegraphed President Davis, "with my limited force I will do all I can to meet him. . . . The enemy largely outnumbers me. . . ." And the next day: "My forces are very inadequate. . . . Enemy continues to reinforce heavily."



Dedicated and determined, Secretary of War James A. Seddon (left) was anxious to find troops to succor Vicksburg. John C. Pemberton (right): "Pemberton seems not to be a fighting man," was Longstreet's comment on the Vicksburg commander.

Hardly a week since, Lee had directed the brutal slugging match with the Yankees around Chancellorsville. Although in the end the enemy retreated back across the Rappahannock, Chancellorsville had to be reckoned the next thing to a Pyrrhic victory. Of the nearly 13,500 Confederate casualties, the costliest one, of course, was Stonewall Jackson. "It is a terrible loss," Lee confessed to his son

fied—President Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War James A. Seddon, General Robert E. Lee.

To be sure, John H. Reagan, Confederate postmaster general, later not only claimed attendance at this conference but said he objected strenuously to what was decided there. But Reagan, who wrote his memoirs forty-odd years later, when he was in his eighties, was badly confused.



"The Battle of Fredericksburg" (c. 1865) by Frederic Cavada. *Courtesy the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.*

Grant's march toward Jackson threatened to drive a wedge between Pemberton in Vicksburg and the force that Joseph E. Johnston was cobbling together to go to Pemberton's support. On May 9 Johnston had been placed in overall charge of operations against the Federal invaders of Mississippi, and by the 13th Johnston had grim news to report. He had hurried ahead to Jackson, he said, but the enemy moved too fast and had already cut off his communication with Vicksburg. "I am too late" was his terse verdict.²


Thus the highly unsettling state of the war in Mississippi as it was known to President Davis and Secretary Seddon as they prepared to sit down with General Lee to try and find some resolution to the crisis. In fact, the Vicksburg question had been agitating Confederate war councils since December, when the Yankees opened their campaign to clear the Mississippi and cut off the westernmost states of the Confederacy. At the same time, a second Federal army, under William Rosecrans, threatened Chattanooga and central Tennessee. For the moment, Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee had achieved a stand-off with Rosecrans. Bragg, however, could scarcely afford to send much help to threatened Vicksburg. The defenders of the western Confederacy were stretched very close to the breaking point.

Early in 1863 a "western concentration bloc" posed the argument for restoring the military balance in the West by dispatching reinforcements from the East. The leading figures in this bloc were Secretary of War Seddon, Senator Louis T. Wigfall of Texas, Generals Joe Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard, and one of Lee's lieutenants, James Longstreet. It was Longstreet, in fact, who was the first to offer a specific plan to rejuvenate affairs in the West.

That spring, on detached service in southeastern Virginia with two divisions of his First Corps, Longstreet came up with the idea of combining his divisions, plus troops from Joe Johnston's western command, with Bragg's army in central Tennessee for an offensive against Rosecrans. Once Rosecrans was disposed of, the Army of Tennessee would march west and erase Grant's threat to Vicksburg. All the while, explained Longstreet rather airily, Lee would assume a defensive posture and hold the



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The "Western Bloc" argued for restoring the balance in the West by reinforcing it from the East. Three of the bloc were Senator Louis T. Wigfall of Texas (left), General Joe Johnston (right), and General P.G.T. Beauregard (opposite).

Rappahannock line with Stonewall Jackson's Second Corps.³

General Lee was unimpressed by this reasoning. He thought it likely that the Federal Army of the Potomac would presently open an offensive on the Rappahannock and he had no illusions about trying to hold that front with only half his army. In any case, Lee believed shifting troops all across the Confederacy would only produce a logistical nightmare. As he expressed it to Secretary Seddon, "it is not so easy for us to change troops from one department to another as it is for the enemy, and if we rely upon that method we may always be too late."

Longstreet was not discouraged by rejection. After Chancellorsville—from which battle he was absent, there having not been time enough to bring up his two divisions to join Lee in repelling the Federals—he stopped in Richmond to talk strategy with Secretary Seddon. In view of the abruptly worsening prospects at Vicksburg, Longstreet modified his western proposal somewhat. As before, the best course would be to send one or both his divisions to trigger an offensive against Rosecrans in Tennessee. But after victory there, he said, a march northward through Kentucky to threaten the Northern heartland would be the quickest way to pull Grant away from Vicksburg.

This was also the thinking of General Beauregard, who from his post defending Charleston enjoyed exercising his

fondness for Napoleonic grand designs. Emboldened by these two prominent supporters of a western strategy, and anxious to do something—anything—about the rapidly deteriorating situation at Vicksburg, Secretary Seddon telegraphed Lee on May 9 with a specific proposal of his own. George Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps was just then in the vicinity of Richmond; would General Lee approve of its being sent with all speed to join Pemberton in the defense of Vicksburg?⁴

Lee's response was prompt and (for him) even blunt. He telegraphed Seddon that the proposition "is hazardous, and it becomes a question between Virginia and the Mississippi." He added, revealing a certain mistrust of Pemberton's abilities, "The distance and the uncertainty of the employment of the troops are unfavorable." Lee followed his telegram with a letter elaborating his arguments. He pointed out that it would be several weeks before Pickett's division could even reach Vicksburg, by which time the issue there would probably already be settled. He repeated his prediction that Pickett's division, if it should get there in time, would be misused by General Pemberton: "The uncertainty of its arrival and the uncertainty of its application cause me to doubt the policy of sending it."

But Lee's most telling argument was framed as a threat. Should any troops be



detached from his army—indeed, if he did not actually receive reinforcements—“we may be obliged to withdraw into the defenses of Richmond.” He pointed to an intelligence nugget he had mined from a careless Washington newspaper correspondent to the effect that the Army of the Potomac, on the eve of Chancellorsville, had counted an “aggregate force” of over 159,000 men. “You can, therefore, see the odds against us and decide whether the line of Virginia is more in danger than the line of the Mississippi.” When Mr. Davis was shown Lee’s response, he endorsed it, “The answer of Gen. Lee was such as I could have anticipated, and in which I concur.” Pickett’s division was not going to Vicksburg.⁵

Yet that hardly marked the end of the debate. On the contrary, Secretary Seddon’s proposition for Pickett initiated a week-long series of strategy discussions climaxed by Lee’s summons to the high-level conference at the War Department in Richmond on May 15. To prepare for the Richmond conference, General Lee called Longstreet to army headquarters at Fredericksburg and over the course of three days (May 11-13) the two of them intensely examined grand strategy and the future course of the Army of Northern Virginia.

With the death of Stonewall Jackson, Lieutenant General James Longstreet became Lee’s senior lieutenant and by default his senior advisor. The nature of their relationship in this period would be much distorted by Longstreet’s self-serving postwar recollections. The truth of the matter, once these writings by “Old

Pete” are taken with the proper discount—and once the fulminations of Longstreet’s enemies that inspired those writings are discounted as well—is that on those May days the two generals reached full and cordial agreement about what the Army of Northern Virginia should do next. The evidence of their agreement comes from Old Pete himself.

On May 13, at the conclusion of their discussions, Longstreet wrote his ally Senator Wigfall to explain the strategic questions of the moment and what he and Lee had agreed upon in the way of answers. A second Longstreet letter, written in 1873 to General Lafayette McLaws, covers the same ground with a candor and a scrupulousness too often absent in the recollections of Longstreet’s later years.⁶

In their discussions the two generals pondered the army’s past record and future prospects. In nearly a full year commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee had fought five major battles or campaigns. By any measure, his record was dazzling. Still, in the context of the Confederacy’s eventual survival, it was a record (as Longstreet phrased it) of “fruitless victories; . . . even victories such as these were consuming us, and would eventually destroy us. . . .”

On the Virginia Peninsula, in the summer of 1862, Lee had driven George McClellan away from the gates of Richmond, only to see the Federals reach a safe haven at Harrison’s Landing on the James. At Second Manassas in August John Pope became Lee’s victim, but Pope’s beaten army escaped without further damage into the defenses of Washington. Sharpsburg, on September 17, could be claimed by Lee as a narrow tactical victory, but the army was too weakened, and McClellan’s Federals too numerous, to continue the fighting to a showdown. Against Ambrose Burnside at Fredericksburg in December, and then against Joe Hooker at Chancellorsville in May, Lee won signal victories. But both times complete victory eluded him when the enemy escaped back across the Rappahannock. Lee was heard to say that Chancellorsville depressed him even more than Fredericksburg had: “Our loss was severe, and again we had gained not an inch of ground and the enemy could not be pursued.” What he wanted in future was battle on his terms, on ground of his choosing, with no barriers to a fi-

nal outcome. For that he had formed a plan.

Longstreet raised the matter of Vicksburg and the dispatching of reinforcements to the western theater. Lee reiterated his objection to putting any of his men directly into Vicksburg under Pemberton’s command. In writing of this to Senator Wigfall, Longstreet was surely reflecting Lee’s blunt opinion when he remarked, “Grant seems to be a fighting man and seems to be determined to fight. Pemberton seems not to be a fighting man.” Should Pemberton fail to take the battle to Grant but instead allow himself to be penned up in Vicksburg, Longstreet went on, “the fewer the troops he has the better.” Should Richmond decide to order Lee to send troops from Virginia, however, it was agreed that the proper course would be to give them to Bragg or Joe Johnston for an invasion of Kentucky. Only in that event was Grant likely to be drawn away from Vicksburg.

This latter western strategy was of course what Longstreet had recently been advocating with some fervor, but now Old Pete underwent an abrupt change of heart. This seems to have been entirely by Lee’s persuasion. “When I agreed with the Secy & yourself about sending troops west,” Longstreet confessed to Wigfall, “I was under the impression that we would be obliged to remain on the defensive here.” Now, he continued, there “is a fair prospect of forward movement. That being the case we can spare nothing from this army to re-enforce in the West.” Indeed, he called on Wigfall to support the sending of any available reinforcements directly to General Lee.

James Longstreet, in short, was made a convert to a new faith. What Lee confided to him was a plan to march north through Maryland and into Pennsylvania, and Old Pete declared himself enthusiastically in favor of the idea. “If we could cross the Potomac with one hundred & fifty thousand men,” he speculated to Senator Wigfall, it should at least bring Lincoln to the bargaining table; “either destroy the Yankees or bring them to terms.” He closed his letter with the observation that in a day or two Lee would be in Richmond “to settle matters. . . . I shall ask him to take a memorandum of all points and settle upon something at once.”⁷


Longstreet’s letter to Senator Wigfall was written on May 13, and the next day

General Lee boarded the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac's afternoon train bound for the capital to confer on future strategy with President Davis and Secretary Seddon. Whether or not Lee carried with him "a memorandum of all points" when he presented himself at the War Department on Friday the 15th, he surely went well prepared to argue his case.


"We should assume the aggressive," Lee had written Mr. Davis just a month earlier. He meant by that, in modern military terminology, seizing the strategic initiative. That had been his watchword from the moment he first took command of the Army of Northern Virginia in June 1862. He recognized then—and it was even more obvious now, a year later—the cold reality that in the evermore-straitened Confederacy his army would never achieve parity with the enemy's army. On campaign he would always be the underdog. Therefore he must assume the strategic aggressive whenever he could, and by marching and maneuver disrupt the enemy's plans, keep him off balance, offset his numbers by dominating the choice of battlefield. It must be Robert E. Lee's drum the enemy marched to.

It may be assumed that Secretary Seddon, determined and dedicated, came to this conference still looking for *some* way to relieve the Vicksburg situation. Vicksburg, after all, remained the Confederacy's overriding crisis of the moment. "Hour of trial is upon us," was the latest stark message from Mississippi's Governor Pettus. "We look to you for assistance. Let it be speedy." If the decision on Pickett five days earlier ruled out direct aid to Pemberton from Lee's army, there was still the possibility of indirect aid in the form of reinforcing Joe Johnston in Mississippi or Braxton Bragg for an offensive in Tennessee. Seddon had managed to wrangle three brigades—some 7,700 men—out of Beauregard in Charleston to send west, but any further troops would have to come from Lee's army.

Lee had addressed this very issue a month before, and it is likely he restated his views now. "I believe the enemy in every department outnumbers us," he had written, "and it is difficult to say from which troops can with safety be spared." He certainly did not see how the Army of Northern Virginia could safely spare



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James Longstreet (left) became a convert to the "northern" plan, and Jefferson Davis (right) fully realized the necessity of it.

any troops. As he had been reporting almost daily to Richmond since Chancellorsville, all the intelligence evidence suggested that the Army of the Potomac was being reinforced. As recently as May 11, Lee's count of these reinforcements had reached 36,000. This promised to make good the Federals' Chancellorsville losses and then some. "It would seem therefore," Lee had explained to Davis, "that Virginia is to be the theater of action, and this army, if possible, ought to be strengthened."

Thus the simple, convincing argument, no doubt laid out in his typically quiet, authoritative way by the Confederacy's most successful general: Any attempt to turn back the tide at Vicksburg as Seddon was proposing was bound to leave Lee's army in Virginia at grave risk. Possibly Lee clinched his argument with some variation of what he had said to Seddon back on May 10: "You can, therefore, see the odds against us and decide whether the line of Virginia is more in danger than the line of the Mississippi."

Robert E. Lee was not by nature a pessimist, however, and he must surely have offered Davis and Seddon some words of counsel on the Vicksburg dilemma. He had done so before. General Johnston, he had said in April, should "concentrate the troops in his own department" and then promptly "take the aggressive." As Lee saw it, it was essential in Mississippi (just as it was in Virginia) to seize the strategic initiative and thereby

baffle the designs of the enemy. Act first, before the enemy could act. Unfortunately, it appeared that Joe Johnston had not taken this advice (or could not). Now it looked as if he and Pemberton, separately, would have to play out their dangerous game with the cards they had been dealt.⁸

Armchair critics would come to call Lee's position on Vicksburg parochial. His strategic focus, it was said, bore solely on the Virginia theater, at the expense of the failing Confederate war in the West. Yet at this Richmond strategy conference in mid May 1863 Lee could scarcely have taken any other stance. His intelligence sources told of his opponent, Joe Hooker, being heavily reinforced. If that pointed to a renewed Federal campaign, it could be met with no better odds than before, which had been bad enough. The return of Longstreet's two divisions to the Rappahannock did little more than make up the army's Chancellorsville losses. Robert E. Lee was right. The choice for President Davis was Virginia or the Mississippi, and just then there were simply no troops to spare in Virginia. It was in truth a Hobson's choice.

Turn to the Virginia front, however, and Lee believed there was a meaningful choice to be made. In effect, he offered an antidote to the sickly prognosis for the West. In laying out for Davis and Seddon his plan to march north, Lee was not unveiling something new and unexpected. Back in April, before Hooker launched his Chancellorsville offensive, Lee had an-



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Lee believed there was every chance that Hooker (above) was demoralized.

nounced a May 1 deadline for an offensive of his own—into Union territory. As a preliminary, he had ordered strong raiding parties into the Shenandoah Valley to disrupt Federal communications and to stockpile supplies for the army's planned advance. At the same time, substantial supplies to support the movement were being gathered by Longstreet in southeastern Virginia. The operation there took on the markings of a giant victualing expedition, and collected enough bacon and corn to feed the army for two months. As it happened, Hooker's attack forestalled these preparations, but a foundation had been laid. Now Lee proposed to build on it.⁹

If it is not possible to list the precise arguments Lee may have used that day to gain approval of his Pennsylvania campaign, it is possible, through his dispatches and recollections, to record his thinking on the subject.

It had become General Lee's basic premise that his army should not—indeed could not—remain much longer on the Rappahannock. In the first place, it was not a good place to fight yet another battle. At Chancellorsville, even in losing, Hooker had certainly improved on Burnside's effort of the previous December, and Lee had to wonder if he could fight off a third attempt. "To have lain at Fredericksburg," he would later say, "would have allowed them time to collect force and initiate a new campaign on the old plan." Even if he managed to repel a new effort, there was no promise of

a showdown battle. The Yankees would simply pull back across the river and be out of reach.

In the second place, his men in their Rappahannock camps were hungry. They had been hungry since the first of the year, and it appeared they were going to be hungry for some time to come if they remained there. In the Army of Northern Virginia the only occasion for full stomachs in 1863 had been immediately after Chancellorsville, when they feasted on the contents of thousands of captured or abandoned Yankee knapsacks. Even now Lucius Northrup, the Confederacy's peevish commissary-general of subsistence, was drafting yet another rationing edict—a quarter of a pound of bacon daily for garrison troops, a third of a pound for those in camp in the field, raised to half a pound only when on active campaign. This was to be in force, said Northrup, "until the new bacon comes in" in the fall.

The paltry rationing imposed by Richmond was made all the worse by a tenuous supply line. The decrepit Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac was simply not up to the task of supplying an army on the Rappahannock. This fact had nearly left Lee in dire straits at Chancellorsville. He was forced to accept battle there short 20,000 men, including Longstreet's two divisions absent on their victualing duty in southeastern Virginia. It was not an experience Lee intended to repeat. The most expedient way to solve this particular problem, he decided, was to live off the enemy's country. Lee was going to requisition the burdened barns and smokehouses of Pennsylvania to feed his army.¹⁰

There were two additional, probable factors behind Lee's determination to march north that he would not have mentioned to Davis and Seddon that day. They were private thoughts pertaining to his own soldierly judgments, thoughts he did not directly articulate but which surely colored his thinking. One had to do with Lee's previous invasion of enemy country, in September 1862. He had intended then, as he intended now, to seek a favorable battleground in Pennsylvania. But McClellan had trumped him, forcing a battle at Sharpsburg in Maryland before Lee was ready for it. Lee liked to think he understood his timid opponent, and this abrupt resolution of McClellan's had seemed totally out of character. Over

the winter, said his aide Charles Marshall, "Gen. Lee frequently expressed his inability to understand the sudden change in McClellan's tactics."

Then, just this spring, Lee had finally learned the truth of the matter. He read in Northern newspapers of McClellan testifying to a congressional committee that "we found the original order issued to General D.H. Hill by direction of General Lee, which gave the orders of march for their whole army, and developed their intentions." To Lee's mind that must have explained a great deal. He had not been wrong in his calculations for that campaign after all. It was Fate or simply sheer misfortune, in the form of the infamous Lost Order, that had checked his plans at Sharpsburg. He might now march forth across the Potomac with renewed faith in his military judgment. There was sure to be great risk in thus marching into enemy country, and the general commanding would require absolute self-confidence to carry it off.¹¹

The second factor was connected to the first. General Lee always formed his designs with the opposing general very much in mind. In September 1862 he had led his army across the Potomac with the failings of George McClellan in his thoughts. At Chancellorsville he had beaten "Fighting Joe" Hooker, whom he privately referred to contemptuously as "Mr. F.J. Hooker," and now was looking forward to beating him again. Lee believed there was every chance that Hooker was demoralized by his recent defeat and would not be at his best in a second meeting. Hooker's army, too, would likely be suffering from demoralization. Nearly 6,000 Yankee soldiers had surrendered at Chancellorsville, hardly a sign of high morale.

Lee's insight into the Army of the Potomac was sharpened by his reading in the Northern papers of numerous regiments of two-year men and thousands of nine-month short-termers being mustered out that spring. It was said these losses would be made good by the newly instituted conscription in the North. However that might be, Lee expected all this to produce a good deal of confusion in the Federal ranks in the coming weeks, and he wanted to take advantage of it. In short, the Army of the Potomac, and its commander, looked just then to be fair game—another good reason for assuming the aggressive.¹²

To General Lee, on this 15th of May, the choice was plain and the case unequivocal. He could not properly subsist his army on the Rappahannock line, and he had no wish to fight another battle there. The army needed to move. He had already made it plain to Secretary Seddon, in opposing sending Pickett to Vicksburg, that if his army was weakened—indeed, if it was not strengthened—he would have to fall back to the Richmond defenses. To do so (as he no doubt now pointed out) would be to surrender the strategic initiative and submit to slow death by siege. The options were clear, said Lee afterward: to “stand a siege, which must ultimately have ended in surrender, or to invade Pennsylvania.” To go on the aggressive, crossing the Potomac and marching on Pennsylvania, opened up all manner of possibilities.

be shaken by the prospect of a Confederate army—a winning Confederate army—marching into its heartland. “If successful this year,” Lee had predicted to his wife on April 19, “next fall there will be a great change in public opinion at the North. The Republicans will be destroyed & I think the friends of peace will become so strong as that the next administration will go in on that basis.” A successful campaign in Pennsylvania—even the army’s simply remaining there for some length of time—ought to give voice to the Northern peace movement. And a success there might even impress the European powers sufficiently to push them toward intervention or at least mediation.

However he made his case, nothing in Lee’s correspondence or recollections suggests that he raised any hopes among his listeners that by marching into Penn-

On the other hand, the implications of a Confederate victory in Pennsylvania were well worth contemplating. Grant’s taking of Vicksburg would pale by comparison. A Lee victory, said an observer, would be “a slogan to arouse the impatient populace to new endeavors. . . .” To Richmond it was beginning to seem that the war might be lost in a year in the West, yet perhaps it could still be won in a day in the East. Should Lee gain another Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville on some battleground in Pennsylvania, especially if it was the more decisive battle he had long been seeking, the war would take on a whole new balance.

It cannot be imagined, during this War Department conference, that President Davis, Secretary Seddon, and General Lee had the slightest doubt that sending the army north across the Poto-



Federal troops fall back at Chancellorsville. Lee was heard to remark that the battle depressed him even more than Fredericksburg.

First of all, it would pull the Army of the Potomac out of its fortified lines and disarrange all its plans for a summer offensive in Virginia. That alone ought to justify a march north. At the same time, it would free Lee of the defensive strictures of the Rappahannock line and allow him to maneuver at will. Once across the Potomac hungry Rebels could feast in a land of plenty, and the ravaged fields and farms of Virginia would have an opportunity for renewal.

In the larger scheme of things, Northern morale and will were sure to

sylvania he would pry Grant loose from Vicksburg. The argument that time and distance precluded the Confederates from sending reinforcements to Vicksburg that spring surely applied in the reverse direction to the Federals. In any case, it was too much to expect that the threat of a Confederate invasion of the North would paralyze Yankee efforts on every other war front. It was possible that an invasion might prevent the Yankees sending (as Lee put it) “troops designed to operate against other parts of the country,” but that was the most that could be hoped for.¹³

mac would result in anything less than a major battle. Despite the talk of hungry troops, this was never designed as merely a massive victualing expedition. Nor was there any thought of an invasion to conquer and occupy territory north of the Mason-Dixon Line—to bring Pennsylvania into the Confederacy. The conferees had to be aware that just as surely as a Southern army would rise to the defense of Virginia, a Northern army would fight an invasion of Pennsylvania. If the Army of Northern Virginia made a campaign in the

North, there could be no avoiding a battle there.

To be sure, in the hindsight atmosphere of his reports and his postwar comments, General Lee was circumspect on this point. Still, it is unmistakable that from the first he intended the operation to result in a battle. In his reports he spoke of a march north offering "a fair opportunity to strike a blow" at the opposing army; and, again, he mentioned the "valuable results" that would follow "a decided advantage gained over the enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania. . . ."

In 1868 an interviewer reported Lee saying that "he did not intend to give general battle in Pennsylvania if he could avoid it." This was a case of evasive semantics. In Lee's lexicon, to *give* battle was to seek it out deliberately and to attack. To *accept* battle (to accept "a fair opportunity"), however—which significantly Lee did not exclude in describing

his plan—was electing to fight if conditions were favorable, or if by maneuver could be made favorable. This was precisely "the ruling ideas of the campaign" that he and Longstreet had discussed at length and agreed upon just before the Richmond conference. According to Longstreet, "Under no circumstance were we to give battle, but exhaust our skill in trying to force the enemy to do so in a position of our own choosing." At the time of the decision-making Lee stated his objective with perfect clarity. On May 25, calling on D.H. Hill for reinforcements, Lee wrote, "They are very essential to aid in the effort to turn back the tide of war that is now pressing South." Only battle could satisfy an objective so grand.

In writing to his wife on April 19 about prospects for the coming campaigning season, Lee displayed a long view of affairs, looking toward breaking

down the Republican administration in Washington. This did not suggest one great war-ending battle of annihilation, a modern-day Cannae. His army was, after all, ever fated to be the smaller of the two armies. More realistically, Lee seems to have projected repeated morale-shattering victories that would eventually sap Northerners' support for the war. Gaining a third successive victory, of whatever dimension, this time on Northern soil, should go a long way toward that goal. That was clearly a risk worth taking. As Lee himself argued, according to a postwar interviewer, "He knew oftentimes that he was playing a very bold game, but it was the only *possible* one."¹⁴

Some two weeks after the Richmond conference, President Davis wrote a letter to Lee that has been interpreted by some to show the president less than wholehearted in his support, and indeed that he was not even aware of Lee's intentions for the campaign. "I had never fairly comprehended your views and purposes . . ." wrote Davis, "and now have to regret that I did not earlier know all that you had communicated to others." In fact, as is readily apparent from the context of this remark, and from their other letters exchanged in this period, Davis was not speaking of the proposed Pennsylvania campaign at all, but rather of the on-going difficulty Lee was having with General D.H. Hill over the matter of reinforcements.

While no directive was issued by Davis or Seddon formally approving the Pennsylvania campaign as Lee had outlined it on May 15, there cannot be the slightest doubt of their approval. Both Davis and Seddon fully agreed with Lee on its necessity. In that same letter, for example, Davis pledged to relieve Lee of any concern for Richmond's safety "while you are moving towards the north and west." Secretary Seddon, the earlier advocate of a western strategy, assured the general, "I concur entirely in your views of the importance of aggressive movements by your army. . . ." Lee could therefore return to his Rappahannock headquarters confident of Richmond's support. As early as May 18 General Dorsey Pender sensed a change in the camps, and wrote his wife, "We have nothing in the world new, but all feel that something is brewing and that Gen. Lee is not going to wait all the time for them to come to him."

An Army in Effigy

ONE OF THE MORE INTRIGUING might-have-beens of the Confederates' Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863 was the mystery army—an army in effigy, General Lee called it—designed to befuddle the Yankees even as the Army of Northern Virginia marched toward Gettysburg.

The idea came to Lee on May 7, 1863, the day after Chancellorsville. He wrote to President Davis about collecting troops from the garrisons along the Atlantic coast to form a corps of reinforcements for the army in Virginia, and about assigning General P.G.T. Beauregard to its command. As he developed the plan for taking his army north into Pennsylvania, Lee further refined the reinforcement scheme. His thought was to station this force in northern Virginia, around Culpeper, ostensibly to threaten Washington while Lee threatened Pennsylvania. "The well known anxiety of the Northern Government for the safety of its Capital," Lee wrote, "would induce it to retain a large force for its defence, and thus sensibly relieve the opposition to our advance."

Assigning General Beauregard to this scheme was an inspired choice. Lee counted on the fact that Beauregard was as well known to the Yankees as any general in the South. He had commanded the opening guns at Fort Sumter and won the field at First Manassas. He had led an army in the western theater. More


than once in 1862 a nervous General McClellan had invoked the shade of Beauregard and his army sweeping out of the west to fall on him. As recently as April, in command at Charleston, Beauregard had driven off a fleet of Union ironclads, inflicting grievous damage. To form a corps under the celebrated "Great Creole" and to make no secret of stationing it within striking distance of Washington was sure to attract the Yankees' attention. "His presence," said Lee of Beauregard, "would give magnitude to even a small demonstration, and tend greatly to perplex and confound the enemy."

But Richmond failed to respond to the Beauregard scheme, and when the time came to start the army north, Lee urgently proposed a scaled-back version of his idea. "If the plan that I suggested the other day of organizing an army, even in effigy under Gen. Beauregard at Culpeper C.H. can be carried into effect much relief will be afforded," he wrote President Davis.

In the end, of course, nothing came of the idea. Perhaps it was too bold or too chancy for Richmond to comprehend. Perhaps it foundered on Mr. Davis' deep antipathy for General Beauregard. It appears that Lee did not press as hard as he might have for its adoption. Consequently, Beauregard remained in Charleston, and the Confederates missed one of the more intriguing opportunities of the Pennsylvania Campaign.

DO YOU KNOW?

1. This comedy team, in the short "Uncivil Warriors," played the roles of Federal agents Lieutenant Duck, Captain Dodge, and Major Hyde.
2. This Union general was born in Spain in 1815.
3. After Stonewall Jackson's death, this general succeeded to the command of his corps.
4. What is a fascine?
5. This battle is known as the "Gettysburg of the West."
6. This was the last state in which the "insurrection" was declared to be at an end, restoring civil authority through the United States.



TEASER QUESTION

Who was Lieutenant Hiram Clark?

THE ANSWERS to questions 1-6 are below. If you know the answer to the teaser question, send it to NORTH & SOUTH, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667. The author of the correct answer drawn from the *North & South* hat will win a free book prize.

WE HAVE A WINNER!

The teaser question in volume 5, #2, was, "Name four Union generals who had brothers in the Confederate army." We received several correct entries, and drew the name of John Reed, of Cortland, New York, from the *North & South* hat. He receives as his prize a copy of *Grant's Lieutenants*, edited by Steven E. Woodworth. John named Thomas L. Crittenden, John B. McIntosh, Richard W. Johnson, and William R. Terrill. Others correctly named John Gibbon.

(1) The Three Stooges—Moe, Larry, and Curly. (2) George G. Meade. (3) Ambrose P. Hill. (4) A round bundle of sticks tied together and used to reinforce earthworks. (5) Westport, Missouri. (6) Texas, as declared by President Johnson (pictured above) on August 20, 1866.

What was debated and decided at the War Department that 15th of May held the promise of reshaping the very direction of the war. In one sense, the conference revealed how the crisis in Mississippi had passed well beyond Richmond's reach. The drama there seemed likely to play out without any further intervention from the Confederate capital. On the other hand, General Lee was persuasive in his argument that in the Virginia theater the road to opportunity pointed north, and that the way was open. By recapturing the strategic initiative he had surrendered after Sharpsburg, he proposed to take the war right into the Yankee heartland. At the least, a success in Pennsylvania would offset any failure at Vicksburg. At the most, a great victory on enemy soil might put peace within Richmond's reach. James Seddon said it well: such a movement by the Army of Northern Virginia "is indispensable to our safety and independence."¹⁵


STEPHEN W. SEARS' latest books are *Chancellorsville* and *Controversies & Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac*. This article is adapted from his forthcoming book on the Gettysburg campaign. He offers thanks to Kenneth H. Williams for his wisdom on this topic.

NOTES

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2. Pettus to Davis, Apr. 16, cited in Jefferson Davis, *The Papers of Jefferson Davis*, eds. Lynda Lasswell Crist, Mary Seaton Dix, and Kenneth H. Williams (Baton Rouge, 1997), 9:148; Pemberton to Davis, May 12, 13, OR 24.3:859, 870; Seddon to Johnston, May 9, Johnston to Davis, May 13, OR 24.1:215.
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8. Lee to Davis, Apr. 16, OR 25.2:725; Pettus to Davis, May 8, OR 52.2:468; Beauregard to Seddon, May 3, 12, OR 14:924, 938; Lee to Cooper, Apr. 16, Lee to Davis, May 11, Lee to Seddon, May 10, Apr. 9, OR 25.2:725, 791, 790, 713.
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15. Davis to Lee, May 31, Davis, *Papers*, 9:201-2; Seddon to Lee, June 10, OR 27.3:882; Pender to his wife, May 18, William Dorsey Pender, *The General to His Lady: The Civil War Letters of William Dorsey Pender to Fanny Pender*, ed. William W. Hassler (Chapel Hill, 1962), 238.

GRATIOT STREET PRISON

During the Civil War Gratiot Street Military Prison was operated in St. Louis, Missouri by the Union army. Gratiot was unusual in that it was used not only to hold Confederate prisoners of war, but spies, guerillas, civilians suspected of disloyalty, and even Federal soldiers accused of crimes or misbehavior. The prison also was centered in a city of divided loyalties. Escapees could find refuge in homes not even half a block away. Many of the most dangerous people operating in the Trans-Mississippi passed through its doors. Some escaped in dramatically risky ways; others didn't and lost their lives at the end of a Union rope, or before a firing squad.



Gratiot Street Prison, an upcoming book by D.H. Rule, will tell the tales of many of the people who spent time in Gratiot Street Prison. For more information about the prison, and to read excerpts from this book, visit

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A Federal wagon train and its cavalry escort is surprised by a Confederate cavalry charge near Mansfield, Louisiana.

FIGHTING FOR TIME

CURTIS MILOURN

ON APRIL 8, 1864, Confederate forces routed portions of a Union army near Mansfield, Louisiana. It was one of the last major field victories by a Confederate army and signaled the beginning of the end of the Red River Campaign. Yet this significant battle would not have occurred if two very important, but largely forgotten, cavalry actions had not been fought on April 7,

when Confederates blunted the Federals' approach to Mansfield at Wilson's Farm and Carroll's Mill, gaining the time needed to deploy their infantry the following day.

Earlier that year, the Federal high command had decided on a concerted military effort against the Confederacy by striking toward Richmond, Atlanta, Mobile, and Shreveport. The drive on

Shreveport would be led by Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, who had at his disposal various elements of four corps—XIII, XVI, XVII, XIX—totaling twenty-five thousand men. These detachments were to rendezvous at Alexandria, Louisiana, and then move up the Red River to Shreveport. They would be accompanied by a naval fleet of nineteen ironclads and twenty-one transports.

Opposing Banks was Major General Richard Taylor. Initially, Taylor, with only sixty-one hundred men scattered throughout the region, was helpless against Banks' concentrated host. Two undersized divisions of cavalry, led by Major General Thomas "Tom" Green, were en route from Texas, but no one knew when they would arrive.

The campaign commenced on March 12 when the Union fleet, transporting detachments of the XVI and XVII Corps, entered the Red River. The following day the XIII and XIX Corps began an overland march to Alexandria. On March 14 the Federals captured Fort DeRussy, a Confederate stronghold on the Red River, and two days later occupied Alexandria.¹

The Confederates suffered a devastating blow on March 21. During a night attack in a raging thunderstorm, the Federals surprised and routed the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry. This left Taylor with the inexperienced 4th Louisiana Cavalry as the only effective unit between the force he was gathering and the Union army.²

On March 26, with little to impede their progress, the Federals left Alexandria and the open prairie of southern Louisiana and plunged into a region of rolling hills covered by a dense pine forest. "There is something grand and gloomy and peculiar among the Pines," recalled one Federal. "Houses are very scarce. . . . The poorest of the poor people of the South live in the Pine woods." The change of terrain did not bode well for the Federals, as the forest was favorable to defense and ill suited for the mobility and movement needed by a large army. Nonetheless, just five days later, Banks occupied Natchitoches. He was halfway to Shreveport.³

While the Yankees moved at will, the Confederates were unsure of a plan of action. As Taylor continued to consolidate his forces, he bombarded Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith with calls for reinforcements and promised to assume the offensive as soon as he was strong enough. However, by the time the Federals departed Alexandria, two divisions of infantry and Green's cavalry had still not arrived. And, with a Union offensive looming in Arkansas, Smith warned Taylor not to risk his meager force in battle until it could be determined which was the greater

threat. In the meantime, Taylor continued to withdraw before the advancing Federals.

On March 30 the first reinforcements from Texas, two regiments of Colonel Arthur P. Bagby's brigade, finally arrived. Taylor immediately sent them forward to screen the army and keep him informed of Banks' movements. The Texans' arrival changed the tone of the Union advance. "From this time," remembered a trooper of the 2nd Illinois Cavalry, "we had heavy skirmishing and fighting daily."⁴

Taylor received some personal relief the following day when Major General Green arrived in Pleasant Hill. Green, an impetuous combat officer, had learned the art of warfare fighting Indians and Mexicans on the Texas frontier. He was a veteran of the Mexican War and had served the Confederacy in New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. One of the South's best cavalry commanders, Green was Taylor's most trusted subordinate. Recently promoted, Green commanded the Confederate cavalry and would direct forward operations while Taylor formulated a plan of action.

For the next few days, while most of the Union army remained idle in Natchitoches, Brigadier General Albert L. Lee's cavalry division was active scouting the region and skirmishing with the Confederates. Lee, who had joined the 7th Kansas Cavalry as a major in 1861, had been promoted to brigadier general in April 1863. He was wounded during the Vicksburg Campaign and, after his recovery, assumed control of the cavalry in the Department of the Gulf. During the Red River Campaign, Lee's command consisted of four brigades—4,600 troopers—commanded by Colonels N. A. M. Dudley, Thomas J. Lucas, Harai Robinson, and Oliver Gooding.

On April 2 Lee and three of his brigades made a reconnaissance to Crump's Corner, twenty-three miles west of Natchitoches. There they encountered two regiments of Bagby's cavalry and one regiment from Brigadier General Hamilton P. Bee's cavalry division, which had just arrived in Louisiana. A "brisk skirmish" ensued before the Confederates, outnumbered and low on ammunition, withdrew.

Early the following morning, Taylor positioned his recently arrived infantry about five miles from Pleasant Hill on the



Thomas "Tom" Green



Nathaniel P. Banks



Richard Taylor

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Natchitoches road, between Pleasant Hill and Crump's Corner. Disgusted at surrendering so much territory without a fight, he intended to offer battle to the Federals. As Lee's cavalry continued their reconnaissance of the road, they encountered the Confederates, who showed "strong force." Lee withdrew "pursuant to orders."⁵

By April 5, with forage exhausted and the Federals showing "no disposition to advance seriously," Taylor withdrew his infantry twenty miles to the crossroads village of Mansfield. From there an army

could march north to Shreveport, or turn west and cross the Sabine River into Texas, or veer east toward the Red River. And, because Taylor was not certain of Banks' objective, and lacked enough men to adequately cover every possible route, possession of Mansfield was viewed as crucial to the campaign.⁶

Taylor also informed Smith that, unless instructions were received to the contrary, he intended to check Banks' advance. Smith cautioned his subordinate that "the whole fate of this department will be staked upon the issue. . . .

The battle must be decisive. . . . When we fight it must be for victory."⁷

On the same day that Taylor's infantry occupied Mansfield, Brigadier General James P. Major arrived at headquarters. Major, Green's brother-in-law, had graduated from West Point in 1856. In 1863 he had competently commanded a cavalry brigade in Louisiana. Now he commanded Green's old division.

Taylor immediately held a meeting with his high-ranking officers. With the Federals still in Natchitoches, Taylor was uncertain of Banks' next move. For days Union cavalry had been probing toward Pleasant Hill but had not yet attempted to advance in force. Taylor needed accurate information and Major was assigned the task. After receiving personal instructions from Green, Major ordered Colonel Walter P. Lane's brigade, encamped near Mansfield, toward Pleasant Hill. By late afternoon, Lane was in motion.

On April 6, Lane continued his march. While passing Bagby's headquarters, Lane learned that some of Bagby's men were on picket duty below Pleasant Hill but, thus far, no serious Federal advance had been reported.

That same day Smith visited Taylor. Smith doubted that Banks could march "his infantry across the barren country lying between Natchitoches and Mansfield." According to Smith, he ordered Taylor not to bring on a general engagement. At the time of this conference, neither officer was aware that the Federals were already marching toward Mansfield.⁸

On April 6 Banks' army left Natchitoches and marched inland. Lee's cavalry led the Federals deeper into the "howling wilderness" along a narrow, winding road—barely a path. Effective maneuver would be hopeless though it hardly mattered to Banks, who believed that the Confederates would not make a stand south of Shreveport.

At sunrise on April 7 Lee found himself at Crump's Corner, approximately ten miles from Pleasant Hill. Accompanying him were the brigades of Dudley, Lucas, and Robinson. (Gooding had been detailed to guard the army's supply train.) The day dawned overcast and intermittent rain, at times heavy, turned the red clay road into slick mud. Lee had orders to attack the Confederates wherever he found them, but to avoid bringing on a general engagement. He must have

THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN

The Red River Campaign, part of the Union's 1864 grand strategy, was but one of four planned military offensives in this crucial election year. However, unlike the other three campaigns, the Red River expedition was motivated more by politics than by military necessity.

Strongly supported by Abraham Lincoln, the political goals of the campaign were (1) to establish a strong presence in Texas, thereby discouraging a potential alliance between the Confederacy and the pro-French government in Mexico, (2) to open more of Louisiana to political reconstruction, and (3) to confiscate large quantities of cotton for the mills of New England and Great Britain.


There were military advantages to the campaign as well. There was a chance that Confederate armies in Louisiana and Arkansas might be destroyed. At a minimum, by clearing the Rebels from the region, the Mississippi River would be made more secure for Federal traffic. Once the campaign was successfully concluded, it was believed that an operation to capture Mobile, Alabama, would swiftly follow.

The northern pincer of the Red River Campaign was commanded by Major General Frederick Steele. Steele's command was supposed to march through Arkansas and join with Union forces moving through

Louisiana. The southern pincer, by far the larger and more important, was commanded by Major General Nathaniel Banks. Banks, accompanied by a large fleet of ironclads and transports, was to move up the Red River and combine with Steele in capturing Shreveport. To help him accomplish this task, he was loaned 10,000 soldiers from Major General William Sherman's command in Mississippi.

Neither Federal column was successful. Steele was turned back more by logistics than by the Confederates. Banks, however, was soundly defeated at Mansfield, or Sabine Crossroads. Retreating, the Federals were tactically victorious at Pleasant Hill, but Banks, unnerved and unsure of himself, retreated out of the region. The Federal navy barely escaped disaster when water levels on the Red River drastically dropped and threatened to strand the fleet.

Ultimately the expedition failed in both its immediate political and military objectives, and profoundly affected the Atlanta Campaign. Not only did Sherman lose the use of ten thousand veteran troops but, because operations against Mobile never materialized, fifteen thousand Southerners from the Gulf states were able to reinforce Confederate general Joseph Johnston's command in Georgia. These changes in combat strength probably postponed Confederate defeat in Georgia and may have prolonged the war for weeks, or even months.



Union steamers unload cargo at the Grand Ecore depot on the Red River.

doubted that there would be much action this day, as his cavalry had been in constant contact with Confederate cavalry outposts for a number of days but, to this point in the campaign, Southern tactics seemed to be to "fire and fall back." Lee's horsemen, 3,300 strong, confidently rode up the Natchitoches road toward Pleasant Hill.

The Confederates were also busy. Major had received word late the previous night that Federal cavalry was at Crump's Corner. If this was a general advance, he intended to block it somewhere near Pleasant Hill. Lane's brigade was in the saddle at dawn and Colonel Henry C. McNeill's 5th Texas Mounted Volunteers followed in support.

Below Pleasant Hill, gray-clad cavalry guarded the approaches to the village. These advanced units had been sparing constantly with the Federal cavalry since late March, but had orders to fall back slowly before any persistent advance. At dawn a scouting party started down the Natchitoches road toward Crump's Corner, directly at the advancing Federals.

About 7:30 a.m., seven miles from Pleasant Hill, Lee encountered his foe. A running skirmish ensued, with the Confederates contesting the determined advance, grudgingly giving ground but being careful not to be overwhelmed. A message was hurriedly sent back to headquarters, but help could not be expected for hours.

Lee estimated that there were just two hundred Confederates arrayed against him below Pleasant Hill. Yet the enemy, the mud, the narrow road, and the dense forest all worked to retard the blue-clad troopers. However, with odds heavily favoring the Union, there was no real chance to stop the advance. By late morning, Federal cavalry occupied Pleasant Hill.

Lee halted briefly to rest and reorganize before Robinson's Third Brigade, consisting of the 1st Louisiana (Union) Cavalry and the 87th Illinois Mounted Infantry—750 troopers—led the advance out of Pleasant Hill. Lee was unconcerned. The Confederate cavalry had shown no inclination to make a determined stand and, by his own estimates, Robinson's brigade alone outnumbered the Rebels nearly four to one.⁹


To the Confederates it was obvious that Lee was advancing in force. About

three miles above Pleasant Hill was Wilson's Farm, a clearing in the woods by which the road to Mansfield passed. It was here that Lane's brigade prepared to meet Lee.

Lane's men dismounted and took position behind a fence in the woods just beyond an open field with their left flank protected by a nearly impassable ravine. From left to right were the 2nd Regiment (Arizona Brigade), the 3rd Regiment (Arizona Brigade), the 1st Partisan Rangers Regiment, and the 2nd Partisan Rangers Regiment. The 4th Louisiana Cavalry

was held in reserve. Colonel Lane probably had fewer than 1,200 troopers and one Southerner estimated that there were only six hundred Confederates at Wilson's Farm.¹⁰

When the Federals approached the farm about noon, Confederate Colonel George Madison went forward with two hundred men and instructions to fire a "volley, and then fall back in apparent confusion," luring the Yankees into an ambush, a common Texas cavalry tactic. "With more zeal than discretion," Madison "pitched into a regular fight . . . and





James P. Major



Walter P. Lane



Arthur P. Bagby



The Rebecca Jordan house. In 1864, this structure, known locally today as the "Dog Trot House," stood on the western outskirts of Pleasant Hill on the Mansfield-Pleasant Hill Road. During the Red River Campaign it was surrounded by a large open field that was used by Federal cavalry to stage their reinforcements advancing toward Wilson's Farm.



held them in check for half an hour." Finally, Madison fell back through the field, with the Federals in pursuit.¹¹

When the lead elements of Robinson's brigade approached to within fifty yards of the hidden Confederate line, they were met by a hail of bullets. Robinson withdrew about one-quarter mile, to a small slope, and dismounted his entire brigade. He sent part of the 1st Louisiana to the left while the 87th Illinois deployed to the right. The remainder of the 1st Louisiana was placed in reserve. Seeking to surround the Rebels or flank them out of their position, Robinson ordered strong detachments sent out on both flanks. Lane responded by extending his right farther into the woods and sending the 4th Louisiana Cavalry to the left to guard the ravine. The Confederate line was a mile long by this time.

The Federals felt their way through the woods. On the right they discovered the impenetrable ravine and on the left the Confederate line extended deep into the woods. Robinson, still failing to grasp that he was facing a large and determined force, ordered the 87th Illinois into the open field to "feel the enemy severely."

CONFEDERATE ORDER-OF-BATTLE



GREEN'S CAVALRY CORPS
Major General Thomas Green



MAJOR'S CAVALRY DIVISION
Brigadier General James P. Major



LANE'S CAVALRY BRIGADE
Colonel Walter P. Lane

1st Texas Regiment of Partisan Rangers
2nd Texas Regiment of Partisan Rangers
2nd Cavalry Regiment, Arizona Brigade
3rd Cavalry Regiment, Arizona Brigade



BAGBY'S CAVALRY
Colonel Arthur P. Bagby

4th Texas Mounted Volunteers
5th Texas Mounted Volunteers
7th Texas Mounted Volunteers
13th Texas Cavalry Battalion (*Waller's Battalion*)

TEMPORARILY ATTACHED

4th Louisiana Cavalry
Valverde Battery

XXX= corps; XX = division; X = brigade; = cavalry

Left: The open field at Wilson's Farm. The Federals advanced across this field from the left, toward the Confederates waiting in ambush in the treeline to the right. The 87th Illinois Mounted Infantry moved into the field to "severely feel" the Rebels and was roughly handled.

Instead of locating a weakness in the Confederate defense, the unit became heavily engaged.

Meanwhile, fighting erupted along the entire line. The Confederates threatened to turn the left flank of the 1st Louisiana (Union). Suddenly, Robinson recognized the danger he was facing. He ordered his reserve to stabilize the crumbling Union left, brought forward a howitzer section of the 6th Missouri Cavalry for support, and called for reinforcements. Albert Lee sent forward the brigades of Lucas and Dudley and was so distressed by this unexpected resistance that he requested infantry be sent to his support.

During the morning, Brigadier General Major had remained with Bagby's brigade at Carroll's Mill, five miles northwest of Wilson's Farm. Shortly after noon, as the crescendo of gunfire increased, Major ordered Colonel William P. Hardeman's 4th Texas Mounted Volunteers to march to Lane's support, then left for the front to assume command.

A southerly wind brought distinct sounds of firing to Mansfield. Anxious that Major not be overwhelmed, Green ordered Brigadier General Hamilton P. Bee's cavalry division, bivouacked near Mansfield, forward to support Major. Then Taylor and Green, carefully surveying the terrain, made their way toward the front to determine exactly what was occurring. At 2:00 p.m., Taylor halted at Six Mile Bayou, where he remained with Bee's division, while Green continued forward for a more accurate appraisal of the situation. (About 3:30 p.m., Taylor, convinced that things were well in hand, ordered Bee's division forward, and then returned to Mansfield.)

At Wilson's Farm, Federal gunfire slackened as Robinson's men began to run low on ammunition. Sensing an opportunity to sweep the invaders from the field, the entire Confederate line surged forward "with great impetuosity." The 87th Illinois was pushed back and began to disintegrate and the howitzer battery was in danger of being overrun. One Rebel recalled that the Federals were hidden behind buildings and fences and did not break until "we got up to within fifty yards of them." A Northern newspaper reported that "the loss of the day was seriously apprehended."¹²

At this critical moment, Lucas arrived with the fresh First Brigade. As the

Confederates swept forward, they discovered the Union reinforcements on their left flank. The dismounted Yankees halted the Rebels' "fiery attack," and momentum shifted to the Federals as their superior numbers forced the Confederates back. About 2:00 p.m., Major ordered Lane to retire to Carroll's Mill, where the terrain was favorable for defense and an ample water supply would refresh his men. A rearguard was posted below the brow of a hill while the remaining Rebels remounted and melted into the forest.

The rearguard waited for the Federals, who were "advancing at a double quick and firing rapidly." As the Yankees crested the hill, there were just one hundred yards separating the combatants when the Confederates opened fire, forcing the Federals to take cover. Having slowed their pursuers, the rearguard disengaged and joined their comrades in retreat.

As Lane's brigade withdrew, they were greeted by McNeill's regiment, which attempted to slow the Federal

WILSON'S FARM APRIL 7, 1864

As Robinson's Federals march from Pleasant Hill toward Mansfield, Lane has posted his brigade in the woods beyond Wilson's farm field. Madison is sent forward to lure Federals into the ambush.

After about one-half hour, Madison "retreats" across the field, followed by the Federals. Within fifty yards of the woods, the Rebels open fire sending the Yankees scurrying back across the field.

Still believing he is facing only token resistance, Robinson sends detachments to locate the Confederate flanks.

Lane responds by extending his right deep into the woods. He also dispatches the 4th LA to the left to guard the approach from the ravine.

The 87th IL discovers the impenetrable ravine and the 1st LA soon realizes it is outflanked. At this point the Confederate line extends for nearly one mile.

Still believing the Confederate force to his front is not large, Robinson orders the 87th IL to "severely feel" the enemy. Meanwhile, the 1st LA reports that they are nearly flanked on the left.


Robinson begins to comprehend the situation. He sends his reserve to stabilize the left, brings up a howitzer section of the 6th MO and calls for reinforcements. Lee sends the brigades of Lucas and Dudley forward.

As Robinson's brigade runs low on ammunition, the Confederates counterattack. The 87th IL is pushed back and begins to break. For the Union, the loss of the day is "seriously apprehended."

Lucas arrives with a fresh brigade. He threatens to overwhelm the Confederate left.

The Confederates, exhausted and low on ammunition, discover Lucas' fresh brigade on their left. The Rebels immediately withdraw, the 4th LA being the last unit to leave.

The Federals possess the field but have been delayed two hours by this unexpected Confederate resistance.





Albert L. Lee



Thomas J. Lucas



Nathan A.M. Dudley



The deep ravine from the Federal side. This formidable obstacle prevented the 87th Illinois Mounted Infantry from flanking the Confederate left. The author's son is about thirty yards into the ravine, which is overgrown and steep. The telephone poles on the opposite side give an idea of the distance and difficulty involved in crossing this terrain.



pursuit and became involved in a "heavy skirmish." The 5th Texas Mounted Volunteers were soon joined by the 4th Texas Mounted Volunteers. These two units formed a line and an "obstinate and desperate little engagement took place." The 4th and 5th Texas gave ground slowly, buying time for their colleagues to establish a defensive line at Carroll's Mill.

As the afternoon wore on, the fighting in the thick woods frustrated the Federals. Lee admitted that "it was necessary to dismount every cavalryman I put in the fight, and . . . their horses made a long, loose, irregular train to lead and take about." Exasperated, he added, "Cavalrymen are not fit to fight on foot for a great length of time."¹³

Tom Green was organizing a battle line near Carroll's Mill when Lane's brigade streamed in. Understanding the importance of possessing the water, he brought forward the Valverde Battery and posted it on the crest of a hill that dominated the valley below. Bagby's brigade was positioned on the right and Lane's

UNION ORDER-OF-BATTLE

XX
CAVALRY DIVISION
Brigadier General Albert L. Lee

X
FIRST CAVALRY BRIGADE
Colonel Thomas J. Lucas

16th Indiana Mounted Infantry
2nd Louisiana Mounted Infantry
6th Missouri Cavalry; attached howitzer battery
14th New York Cavalry

X
THIRD CAVALRY BRIGADE
Colonel Harai Robinson

87th Illinois Mounted Infantry
1st Louisiana Cavalry

X
FOURTH CAVALRY BRIGADE
Colonel Nathan A.M. Dudley

2nd Illinois Cavalry
3rd Massachusetts Cavalry
6th Massachusetts Cavalry
2nd New Hampshire Cavalry

Battery G, 5th
United States Artillery

XX = division; X = brigade;
I = battery; [diagonal line] = cavalry; [circle] = infantry

Left: Carroll's Mill/house were located, just to the left. The Confederate Valverde Battery was posted near the crest of the hill with dismounted cavalry positioned to the left and the right. Any Federal attempt to dislodge the Rebels would have had to make its way up the slope and into the teeth of this defensive line.

brigade on the left. One of Bee's brigades remained in reserve. Green made it clear to his men that they had run from the Federals long enough and that there would be no further withdrawals. According to one Confederate estimate, three thousand Rebels awaited Lee's horsemen at Carroll's Mill.¹⁴

About 5:00 p.m. the sound of heavy gunfire alerted Green to the Federals' approach. When the Yankees appeared, the four guns of the Valverde Battery brought them to a halt. A Federal battery was brought up and "a fierce cannonade" ensued. Despite facing a force he estimated at five thousand men, Lee wanted to seize the mill stream to gain his tired division the precious water. He organized his command for an assault.

About 6:00 p.m., with night approaching fast, the dismounted Federals launched two desperate attacks on the Confederate right. One company of the 5th Texas, on picket duty, was cut off and nearly surrounded before they escaped. "A furious combat raged till sunset" as Bagby's veterans, assisted by the Valverde Battery, halted the federal assaults. Darkness ended any further federal offensive operations.

Green, however, was not satisfied. He wanted to be certain that Lee's exhausted men were denied access to water. As night fell, Hardeman's regiment sortied across the stream, broke through the Federal picket line, and forced the confused Yankees to withdraw nearly one-quarter of a mile. During the remainder of the night, the Texans remained between the Federals and the stream, with pickets from both sides within three hundred yards of each other.


Lee officially reported eleven killed, forty-two wounded, and nine missing in action at Wilson's Farm. However, he did not report his total losses for the day. Members of the 87th Illinois estimated their losses between twenty and fifty men, while a member of the 3rd Massachusetts Cavalry reported seventy-four casualties during the advance. For the day, Lee's casualties almost certainly exceeded one hundred. No official reports exist regarding Confederate casualties, and opinions vary. A soldier in Lane's brigade estimated that his regiment alone lost forty of two hundred forty men, but estimated the Federal casualties at one hundred fifty men. Walter Lane admitted to one hundred fifty bri-

gade casualties. Another Confederate estimated that "our loss is about a hundred killed, wounded and missing—Yankee loss two hundred." It would be reasonable to believe that Lee, the aggressor most of the day, suffered at least as many casualties as the Confederates.¹⁵

The day's fighting stunned Albert Lee. Despite advancing nearly twenty miles, he sounded like a beaten man. He

when, despite Bee's resistance, the federal vanguard arrived at the Moss Plantation, just three miles southeast of Mansfield, at noon, while Taylor's infantry was still deploying. However, the Confederates had established enough of a presence to cause Lee to pause—providing the time needed to finish moving into position.

Had the Federals not been sufficiently delayed on April 7, Albert Lee's



notified his superiors that "we suffered . . . somewhat. I am simply holding the ground," and requested an infantry brigade be sent to assist in any further advance.¹⁶

Tom Green was invigorated by the day's results. He commented to one of his regiment commanders, "We havent had much show yet but we will give them hell tomorrow." Sensing that Lee was unsupported, Green asked Taylor to send him a division of infantry in order to "see what the [federal] advance was made of." Taylor, however, planned to fight the next day on ground of his own choosing, and ordered Green to fall back. Before dawn, Green withdrew with Major's division, leaving Hamilton Bee to contest the Federal advance.¹⁷

The importance of the engagements at Wilson's Farm and Carroll's Mill were not apparent until the following day

cavalry would have occupied Mansfield well before Taylor could have brought his infantry forward. Once the Federals controlled Mansfield, they would have had a multitude of options, including a choice of three roads to march on Shreveport. And, because Taylor could not adequately guard every route, Banks would have been nearly assured of reaching his objective. That, Taylor predicted, would have resulted in the surrender of Shreveport, the loss of irreplaceable troops, and left eastern Texas and southern Arkansas open to invasion. Wilson's Farm and Carroll's Mill were critical in preventing this Southern disaster which, ultimately, led to the federal failure in the Red River Campaign.¹⁸

CURTIS MILOURN is a lieutenant at the San Angelo Police Department in Texas, and a part time instructor at Angelo State University, where he earned



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his B.A. and M.A. He lives in San Angelo, Tom Green County, and is currently working on a biography of Tom Green.

The author would like to thank Steve Bounds, Scott Dearman, and Gary Joiner for their thoughts on the Red River Campaign and their assistance in locating Louisiana landmarks.

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9. A.L. Lee to Brigadier General Stone, January 15, 1864, OR, 34/2: p. 84; Lee to Drake, April 13, 1864, OR, 34/1: p. 451.
10. Lee to Drake, April 13, 1864, OR, 34/1: p. 450; Geo. Wythe Baylor to Captain Ogden, April 18, 1864, OR, 34/1: p. 616; Letter from unknown Confederate to Dear Father, April 21, 1864, vertical file, Mansfield State Historic Site; According to January 1864 unit returns, Lane's and Bagby's Brigades, combined, had 2,445 men present for duty. It is reasonable to assume that Lane's Brigade made up approximately half of this number. Even with the 4th Louisiana, Major probably had less than 1,200 at Wilson's Farm as illnesses, desertions, and furloughs cannot be accounted for. See Abstract from Return of the District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, January 1864, OR, 34/1: p. 931.
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16. Stanyan, 295; *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*, 59.
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Confederates under generals Jubal Early and John Gordon parade through York, Pennsylvania, June 28, 1863, just prior to the Battle of Gettysburg.

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This tour covers Grant's final attempt to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia in battle before accepting the inevitability of a long drawn out siege. The tour will be led by Gordon Rhea, whose knowledge of the battle is incomparable (see article last issue) and who is—as participants in last year's Wilderness/Spotsylvania tour will testify—among the most pleasant battlefield guides one could hope to meet. The tour includes visits to many normally inaccessible sites on private land, as well as to the well preserved Confederate trench lines. Saturday will be spent touring the North Anna battlefield—including the position of Lee's famous "inverted V," and Sunday will devoted to the ill-fated field at Cold Harbor.

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Tour base: Holiday Inn, Culpeper.

Left: a pontoon bridge spanning the North Anna at Jericho Mill. Below: Alfred R. Waud's drawing of the "bloody angle"—Lee's famous "inverted V."





LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Above: an Edwin Forbes drawing of a Confederate signal station near Beverley Ford.

Right: quartermasters of John Sedgwick's VI Corps at an ambulance camp, near Brandy Station.



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Above: Theodore R. Davis' sketch of Grant and Pemberton meeting under a flag of truce. Top: John C. Pemberton (left) and U.S. Grant.

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VIRGINIA'S RELUCTANT

Twenty-first century Virginians enjoy an unusual variety of geographic settings, from the flat seascape to the rising mountains. Geographic diversity abounded even more dramatically in antebellum times, for West Virginia was then part of the Old Dominion. This diversity deeply influenced the state's 1860-61 trauma over disunion. The resulting tale of a tortuous, reluctant decision to secede forms one of Virginia's richest epics—and one of the richest epics in American history.

TO DESERVE THAT HIGH PRAISE, a tale must exude four qualities. The story must be sweepingly important. It must star vivid actors. It must illuminate rich complexities. And it must convey stunning ironies that highlight erring humans' capacity to achieve the reverse of what they intended.

Of these four requirements—wide importance, vivid stars, rich subtleties, stunning ironies—the importance of Virginia's decision to secede is the most obvious. At 4:00 p.m. on April 17, 1861, the hour of Virginia's decision—an hour haunted by months of paralyzing indecision—the very size of the Southern Confederacy remained uncertain. Eight of fifteen slave states remained in the Union. More than ever at this climactic moment, the differences between southern regions provided the neglected key to the history of the Old South. More than ever in 1860-61, the Slave South resembled a three step ladder, with lower percentages of slaves and less enthusiasm for disunion accompanying each step northward. Farthest South lay the Lower or Deep or Cotton South, with 46.5 percent of its population enslaved. These seven Lower South states all seceded between Abraham Lincoln's election on November 6-7, 1860, and his inauguration as president on March 4, 1861. Above the Lower South sprawled the four Middle

South states (including Virginia), with 31.7 percent of the population enslaved. Still higher lay the four states of the Border South, with only 12.7 percent of the population enslaved.

The Border and Middle Souths together formed the Upper South. No Upper South state had seceded as of April 16, six weeks after Lincoln took the oath of office. The Upper South contained 41 percent of the South's slaves, 61 percent of its population, 67 percent of its whites, and 81 percent of its factories. James McPherson has put it very well: "If all eight states" of the Upper South "had seceded, the South might well have won its independence. If all eight had remained in the Union, the Confederacy surely could not have survived as long as it did."¹

Virginia, the most important of the eight swing Upper South states, contained more people and more slaves than any other southern state. The Old Dominion housed the Tredegar Iron Works, one of the few southern factories capable of crafting heavy ordinance. Virginia also boasted Robert E. Lee, arguably one of the few southern military tacticians capable of stalemating superior Union forces for dozens of months.

Most important of all, Virginia mirrored both tiers of the Upper South. The state's heavily slaveholding eastern side resembled most of the Middle South. In contrast, Virginia's heavily nonslaveholding northwestern extremity, running up north to the Ohio and Pennsylvania border, resembled most of the Border South. If Virginians seceded en masse, the whole Upper South might exit the Union. Then Abraham Lincoln might face an unwinnable war. If all of Virginia instead rejected secession and the Upper South followed suit, Jefferson Davis could not wage war for long.

A final possibility intruded. If Virginia should split its allegiances and the Upper South should concur, Lincoln's share of southern power might leave Davis with too little Confederate power, in a long war of attrition. In an important sense, 1861 came down to 1774-76

all over again. As Virginia went, so might go an historic American revolution.

Great epics need colorful stars as well as sweeping importance. Here again, Virginia's decision to secede met requirements. At the key moment, ex-Governor Henry Wise, arguably the most important Virginia politician between the Washington-Jefferson-Madison era and Woodrow Wilson's, put on his most incredible show.² Wise, an emaciated spell-binding demagogue, had long courted the Virginia commoners shamelessly, securing both their adoration and the aristocracy's contempt. But after President Lincoln called out 75,000 troops to subdue the Confederates on April 15, 1861, and after the Virginia secession convention continued to talk indecisively, Henry Wise, Virginia's best talker, became the man disgusted with too much democratic talk. The ex-governor unconstitutionally seized the sitting governor's prerogatives. He illegally ordered state troops to capture federal army and naval installations. He thus shamed Virginia's procrastinators into deciding which army to join.


Henry Wise could be the epic star of an epic decision only because this drama possessed a third attribute of a great historical saga: immense complication and subtlety. Or to put it another way, if Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 had posed a simple choice—leave the Union or lose your slaves—no ex-governor would have needed to seize forts or naval yards illegally to push indecisive slaveholders off the fence.

But Lincoln's immediate menace remained too debatable for Virginians to storm out of the Union swiftly or easily or unanimously. In Virginia, as throughout the South before the Civil War cannon roared, debate centered on whether Lincoln's immediate threat to slavery demanded the huge gamble of disunion, *before* the new president could do any-

Right: Henry Alexander Wise, ex-governor of Virginia.

SECESSION

William W. Freehling



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thing threatening. Southern Unionists saw insufficient reason for secessionists' risky preemptive strike. These cautious Southerners would wait and see *if* the president menaced slavery. *If* he menaced, *then* they would secede.

Most Unionists doubted that Lincoln and his Republican Party would or could immediately menace. They pointed out that the opposition Democratic Party controlled Congress and the Supreme Court. They noted that the president only pledged to stop slavery's expansion into new U.S. territories, not to abolish slavery in old states. They doubted that the U.S. would acquire any new territories, especially territories in southern latitudes, before the 1864 presidential election. Then the South could exercise the right of all election losers. The vanquished could seek victory in the next election.

Unionists took heart from Lincoln's pledges to enforce the fugitive slave law. They noticed his stunning support, in his Inaugural Address no less, of a new constitutional amendment, already passed by Congress, forever barring the federal government from abolishing slavery in a state. What is the biggest menace to slavery, they inquired, abolitionists stymied by this forbidding constitutional amendment or Yankee armies swarming inside the South? If we're wrong, they repeated—if Lincoln breaks his pledges—we will be rabid secessionists. But let's wait and see.

Wait and see became the motto of most Southerners during the secession winter. If secessionists had had to win a South-wide vote to secure disunion, the Unionists would have deterred them by over 2:1 majorities. Before the war began, after all, secession was a landslide loser in the Border South, a 2:1 loser in the Middle South, and barely a winner in several Lower South states.


But secessionists did not have to win a South-wide referendum. In American theory and practice, not the people of all the states but the people of each state consented, or withdrew consent, to be governed by governments beyond the state. So secessionists claimed that each southern state's citizens must hold their own referendum, to withdraw their consent to be governed under the U.S. Constitution. In each Lower South state before Lincoln could be inaugurated, secessionists man-

aged to win withdrawal of consent to the Union's government.

Even in the Lower South, disunionists had to struggle to achieve secession *before* the alleged menace took office. To secure their hard-won mandate, Lower South secessionists urged that in the long run, Lincoln's ideal, a nation that admitted only new free labor states, would be a dangerous alliance for slave labor states. They added that in the short run, Lincoln could use patronage to develop an immediately dangerous antislavery Republican Party in the less enslaved Upper South. Disunionists warned that slaves would listen to the ensuing debate on slavery inside the Upper South. They also claimed that the Upper South's majority of nonslaveholders would eventually be applauding Lincoln's appointees. Within twenty-five years, they predicted, the Border South, then the Middle South, would become nonslaveholding areas. Thereafter, the progressively swelling majority of nonslaveholding states would force slavery's removal from the Lower South. Disunionists would not passively wait while slavery sank to the bottom of the Union and the Lower South stood shivering alone against the process Lincoln had begun in 1860-61.

recent book, the commissioners from the Lower South to the Upper South, including to Virginia, emphasized little except Lincoln's immediate menace to slavery, when they urged the more northern South to follow the disunionist lead of the more southern South.³ These Lower South commissioners found brilliant compatriots in the Virginia convention, which met in Richmond on and after February 13, 1861, to consider disunion. The secessionist convention delegates, coming largely from heavily slaveholding areas of eastern Virginia, developed a version of the immediate menace argument that rivaled anything their good friends from the Lower South had to say.⁴

Virginia secessionists reiterated that Lincoln needed no new congressional acts or new Supreme Court decisions to begin pushing slavery down the road toward ultimate extinction. Lincoln could appoint custom collectors, post office workers, and other federal officials to positions inside Virginia. Lincoln's appointments, warned Jeremiah Morton in the Virginia convention, would soon place "Black Republicans upon every stump, and organizing in every county, and that is the peace that we shall have from this 'glorious Union.'"⁵



At Morgantown in the summer of 1861, men from western Virginia eagerly line up to enlist in the Union army.

This powerful immediate menace argument was a winner in the Lower South. It was also a loser in Virginia, which is why the state hardly seceded simply to avert Lincoln's alleged abolitionism. As Charles Dew points out in his

A Black Republican Party inside the South, continued the Virginia secessionist delegates, would accelerate an ongoing antislavery process up north in Dixie, including up north in Virginia. "Delaware," noted Professor James Holcombe

of the University of Virginia, “is nominally only, a slave State. Maryland will soon be a free State; and so it is with Missouri and Kentucky.”⁶ And so it is with northwestern Virginia, added Alpheus F. Haymond, “almost entirely depopulated of its slaves, by the influence of Abolitionism.”⁷ After pressing slavery out of northernmost Virginia, warned George W. Richardson, nothing could stop Black Republicans “from pressing” slavery “from the counties which come next in order.” Eventually, Lincoln’s party would sweep slavery down “through Virginia, through the Confederate States, and into the far South.”⁸ As Henry Wise summed up the supposed immediate menace, slavery’s “tenure in Virginia is doubtful”—too doubtful for us to allow Lincoln’s appointees to rally the lukewarm.⁹

William L. Garrison: “I am aware that many object to the severity of my language; but is there not cause for severity? I will be as harsh as truth, and as uncompromising as justice. On this subject I do not wish to think, or speak, or write, with moderation.... I am in earnest—I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I will not retreat a single inch—and I will be heard.”



Waitman T. Willey

For proof of slavery’s doubtful tenure in northern Virginia, Wise pointed to some antagonistic convention orations. Northwestern Virginia’s delegates, representing areas up in the Border South’s geographic zone, kept trying to change the subject. These representatives of heavily nonslaveholding districts did not care to discuss whether Lincoln might menace the slaveholders. They demanded to debate whether slaveholders menaced nonslaveholders. A clause in the Virginia Constitution,

they angrily pointed out, limited the valuation of slaves over twelve years old, for tax purposes, to \$300 and prohibited taxes on slaves under twelve. These constitutional limitations sliced taxes on slave property seventy-five percent, compared to taxes on other property—on nonslaveholders’ property.

Slaveholders called their special tax break a barrier against abolition by ruinous taxation. Western Virginians retorted that bloated squires’ \$600,000 annual tax break riveted “the yoke of inequality and oppression” upon poor men. Waitman T. Willey, leader of the northwestern Virginians, warned of “that deep and burning spirit of indignation reigning in almost every Western mind and heart against the gross, unjust, ... obnoxious distinction against their interests.”¹⁰ Willey’s western Virginia cohort,



William Lloyd Garrison

Cyrus Hall, added that “exceedingly restless and impatient” western Virginia nonslaveholders may conclude “that this slave interest in Virginia” is “an engine of oppression. Such sentiments” will give Yankee fanatics the “right of way for the extension of the underground railroad.” That abolitionist means of transporting runaway slaves to the North will soon attain a “terminus in the valley of Virginia.” Then the liberty line will “commence to tunnel the Blue Ridge” and to move into eastern Virginia.¹¹

In the perspective of that threatened fugitive slave tunnel, eastern Virginians had more reason than even the Lower South disunionists to see Lincoln as an immediate menace to slavery. But too few eastern delegates could discern enough menace. In the first showdown vote on secession, taken on April 9, 1861, a mere three days before Civil War began at South Carolina’s Fort Sumter, the Virginia convention turned down Lewis Harvie’s secession resolution, 90-45.

The convention’s whopping 2:1 antisecession majority wished not to choose between North and South but to attain a reconstructed Union of both. Posterity thinks of the word “reconstruction” as a postwar term. Most Virginians savored the word immediately before the war. They vowed to seek a Great Compromise of 1861. They meant to bring their erring brothers back. Even some of the Virginia secessionists, including Henry Wise, hoped that temporary disunion would supply diplomatic leverage to craft a reconstructed Union. Other convention delegates proposed national or border state conventions, to bring the extreme North and South back together. But as for choosing to join a permanent southern nation, Virginia, the largest slave state, preferred to agitate inside the Union, to make the Southern Confederacy temporary.¹²

Three days after Virginia’s convention declared Lincoln too unmenacing to merit immediate secession, cannons roared in South Carolina. Three days later still, on April 15, 1861, Lincoln called forth 75,000 troops to subdue the rebels. That presidential proclamation heightened old menaces and augured new perils.

The formerly uncertain danger to slavery now seemed graver. Most Virginians had wished to wait and see if Lincoln’s peaceful rule over the old Union of eighteen free labor and fifteen slave labor states would menace slavery. But after a potentially antislavery president declared war against the seven Lower South states, potential perils multiplied for slaveholders in but eight Upper South states, if they remained in an alliance with over two times more free soil states.

A new alleged menace to state rights as well as the greater potential menace to slavery hurried many former Unionists toward disunion. Before the fireworks at

Fort Sumter, when the question had been whether Lincoln would damage slavery inside a peaceable Union, state rights—especially what we think of as state rights—had been almost irrelevant. Posterity thinks of state rights as the right of state governmental power to check federal governmental power, in a two government system. When neo-Confederates now claim that state rights impelled secession, they usually mean that disunionists wished to preclude Lincoln from boosting federal governmental power at the expense of state governmental power inside the Union. According to this interpretation, long popular in southern precincts, secessionists acted not to save slavery but to save state rights from Lincoln's expansive federal legislation, including high protective tariffs, internal improvements, and national banks.

Charles Dew describes his shock, as a native Southerner who relished his southern education, to find in the Lower South commissioners' documents almost nothing about fighting tariffs et al and almost everything about fighting to preserve slavery.¹³ Any Southerner who investigates the prewar Virginia secession documents, expecting to find fury about an expansive federal government's potential economic imperialism, will be equally shocked. Instead, the slavery issue provoked almost all Virginia disunionists' outrage. So too, western Virginians' potentially confiscatory taxes on slaves inspired a dozen times more anxiety than the federal government's potentially prohibitive tariffs on imports.

Indeed, prewar Southerners' master mission, to preserve slavery inside a dual system of federal and state governance, dictated crusades to *expand* federal power and to *limit* state rights.¹⁴ The fugitive slave issue of the 1850s especially shoved Southerners to the supposedly wrong end of the federal power/state rights spectrum. After Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, several northern states passed so-called Personal Liberty Laws. In these laws, a state's legislature empowered the state's courts to stop the federal government's agents from removing alleged black runaways, if the federal intrusion violated the state's right to try the accused and to protect the defendant's rights.¹⁵

Among all the collisions between the South's desire to expand federal power

and the North's desire to expand state rights, the most spectacular confrontation inspired Toni Morrison's fabulous novel, *Beloved*. In January 1856, Margaret Garner, a young Kentucky mother, escaped from slavery with several of her children. Federal officials found Garner in Cincinnati and sought to carry her and her children back to slavery. The enraged mother then seized a butcher knife and killed her two-year-old daughter, nearly decapitating the child. Better the horror of a throat slit from end to end, the act screamed, than to allow a master to dirty a youngster's life back in the South.¹⁶

The Ohio authorities claimed that a state's exclusive right to try murder cases superceded any federal jurisdiction over the murderess. If Ohio secured a state's usually exclusive power to try crimes inside its borders, Margaret Garner's trial for murder would explore whether slavery's dirt had driven a mother to infanticide. According to rumors in Cincinnati, Margaret might claim that her

master had raped her, producing the child that she had saved from his filthy clutches. An outraged northern jury might free the allegedly savaged mother.

Margaret Garner's master wanted no part of the state of Ohio's trial. His lawyers urged that the federal fugitive slave law took precedence over a state's right to try a murderess. The master and national power won. The slave and state rights lost. The federal government conveyed the murderess beyond a northern state's jurisdiction, back to Kentucky. There, she never received a potentially liberating murder trial. Instead, her master shipped her down to Lower South thralldom.

To secure a Union-saving reconstruction in 1860-61, Virginians sought further expansion of the federal government's power to reach inside northern states for fugitive slaves. The reconstructionists also sought to contract any supposed state rights to resist the federal intrusion. But after Lincoln's proc-



Dictator Jeff finding he cannot have the whole of Virginia, concludes to take only a part.

In this contemporary cartoon, an ape sits on his throne and saws the tail off a cat labeled "Virginia."

lamation of April 15, state rights became not a northern weapon to protect slaves fleeing from their masters but a southern tactic to safeguard slaveholders fleeing from the Union. State rights now meant not a limitation of one government at the expense of the other, inside a Union of both, but a prohibition of every speck of federal governmental power, after the people of a state no longer consented to federal governance.

This new relevance of state rights stemmed from the peculiarly American theory of sovereignty.¹⁷ According to that theory, no mere government can be the ultimate sovereign. Rather final sovereignty, the only undeniable and absolute power, must lie in the people's capacity to consent to be governed. The American people have always exerted that ultimate power to consent in a state convention or state popular referendum. The people of individual colonies, the predecessor of states, withdrew their consent to English governance. Later, the people of each state consented to federal governance under the U.S. Constitution.

In the same way, secessionists argued, the people of any state could trans-

fer their consent to be governed from the United States to the Southern Confederacy. If the American Revolution was right, so was the southern revolution. If the people of each colony had the right to resist King George's illegitimate attempt to rule without the peoples' consent, the people of each seceded state had the right to resist Abraham Lincoln's illegitimate attempt to coerce a people who had transferred their consent to another confederacy.

This powerful argument wrapped secession and state rights in the mantles of the American Revolution, the natural right of revolution, and the natural right to consent to be governed. Lincoln replied that a voter, in the act of voting, consents to be governed by whoever wins, unless that winner commits unconstitutional acts.

Secessionists retorted that the people of a state, as absolute sovereigns, had unlimited power to withdraw consent whenever they pleased, whatever the pleasure of their mere elected agent. When the all-mighty sovereign said halt, a mere government must stop. With his April 15 proclamation, Lincoln an-

nounced that he would barrel ahead. His charge would defy not the power of state governments to check the federal government but the supposed power of any state's people to stop government without their consent. Lincoln's 75,000 riflemen thus turned a transformed state rights issue into a fresh source of Virginia secessionism.

In addition to Lincoln's riflemen's new menace to state rights and their heightened menace to slavery, a highly inflammatory new threat, a menace to honorable kin, lent victorious momentum to Virginia's post-April 15 exodus from the Union. Once Virginians at last realized that they lay trapped in unstoppable crossfire between Confederate and Federal riflemen, they only could choose which infantry to join. For most of them, it was no contest. Secessionists were erring brothers. Yankees were despicable insulters. The North's provoking critics, not the South's provoked defenders, most deserved a fist in the mouth or a bayonet in the gut or a bullet through the brain.

This intensely emotional, highly fraternal, and ultimately controlling sense of menace to kin saturates the sources. "If we are to be dragged... either to the North or to the South," John Randolph Chambliss asked fellow Virginia convention delegates, "then in the name of our ancient fame, by whom would we prefer to be dragged? Would you be dragged by the Northern confederacy, your known haters or enemies—or would you prefer to be dragged by your brethren of kindred ties and similar interests?" When "the enemy is at the gates," Virginia would "ruin...her fame" if even "for a moment" she stood "in alliance with the North.... I had rather be under King Cotton than under King Abolition. I had rather be ruled by King Davis than by Autocrat Lincoln."¹⁸

War is the ultimate *We* versus *They*, and Virginians had been schooled that *We* equaled southern defenders, *They* equaled Yankee defamers, throughout thirty years of verbal warfare over slavery. In the major prewar slavery controversies, as in the secession debate over whether Lincoln could immediately menace slavery, an important minority of Southerners had seen a danger to slavery's endurance—whether the supposed menace was antislavery Englishmen in pre-annexation Texas, northern

John Randolph Chambliss: "By whom would we prefer to be dragged?... I had rather be under King Cotton than under King Abolition. I had rather be ruled by King Davis than by Autocrat Lincoln."



Ironically, the Upper South in general and Virginia in particular, having rejected secession in the prewar period, became the primary battleground for the Lower South's war. In April 1865 much of Richmond lay in ruins.

slave stealers in Kansas, the underground railroad in fugitive slave incidents, or Lincoln's patronage during the secession crisis. The supposed menace always allegedly threatened some weak spot on the fringes of the Slave South, akin to slavery's weakened plight in northwestern Virginia.

As most white Southerners usually saw it, southern precipitators of these crises exaggerated the menaces, proposed dubious antidotes, and might even counterproductively increase the dangers to slavery. Thus just as the prewar southern majority thought the secessionists exaggerated Lincoln's menace and that disunion would menace slavery more, so most Southerners thought that southern precipitators of the fugitive slave and Kansas controversies exaggerated the menace of Yankee slave stealers and of a free soil Kansas. The southern majority also worried that new proslavery laws would yield slim chance of enslaving Kansas, return few fugitives to the South, and inspire many more Northerners to fulminate against aggressive southern defenders. But fellow Southerners saw a menace, they proposed a remedy, and Yankees called the proposers barbarians.

Barbarians! Tyrants! Rapists! Proprietors of brothels! That tone pervaded Yankee antislavery blasts. The insult roused Southerners to scream back about honor ravaged and good name savaged, whatever the plausibility of the supposed menace that began the verbal brawl.

To understand why the more moderate Southerners rallied against the insulters, consider how William Lloyd Garrison's tone would offend any self-respecting gentleman. Slaveholders treat slaves, charged Garrison, "as brutal beasts." Slaves enjoy "no protection from licentious and murderous outrages." Their families "are ruthlessly torn asunder—the tender babe from the arms of its frantic mother—the heartbroken wife from her weeping mother."

The "irresponsible tyrants," continued Garrison, have "most fearfully debased and deteriorated... the entire white population of the slave States." Cursed whites display "unrestrained licentiousness, filthy amalgamation, incurable laziness, profligate wastefulness, satanic pride, pitiable ignorance, hardness of heart, atrocious barbarity." Slavery has set

"their passions 'on fire of hell,' blending in their character the conceit of the peacock with the ferocity of the tiger," destroying "in them all sense of justice, all perception of right, all knowledge of virtue, all regard for humanity."¹⁹

Less extreme northern antislavery men than Garrison concurred that "the entire white population of the slave States" combined "the conceit of the peacock with the ferocity of the tiger." Such

caused the Civil War. That casual relationship could easily be understood if most Northerners had elected Lincoln to abolish slavery in the South and most Southerners had seceded to save slavery from Lincoln's abolitionism. But neither occurred. So too, Virginia's decision to secede would be easily explained if most Virginians had thought that Lincoln immediately menaced slavery. They didn't. So *why* did procrastinating Virginians se-



In this northern cartoon, Preston Brooks is condemned for caning Charles Sumner.

Yankee assault on southern character and reputation, especially when it came up close and personal in Congress, with U.S. Senator Charles Sumner screaming the insults, impelled more southern folks than Preston Brooks to wish to bash the insulter's skull.

mainstream Northern Republicans as Abraham Lincoln blamed not just the slaveholders but all Southerners for sustaining a Slave Power that supposedly tyrannized over American republicanism. That Yankee assault on southern character and reputation, especially when it came up close and personal in Congress, with U.S. Senator Charles Sumner screaming the insults, impelled more southern folks than Preston Brooks to wish to bash the insulter's skull. No wonder, then, that Southerners had massed together as maligned brothers, in defense of their equality, their self esteem, their self respect, and their honor, decades before Virginians had to choose between firing rifles at the insulters or the insulted.

Most Virginians' inclination to reenlist in ancient wars for honor and fame against Yankee defamers, whatever their distrust of Lower South scaremongers, particularly well illuminates *how* slavery

ceded anyway—and seceded with sufficient love of comrades and hatred of the enemy to be passionate Confederates throughout four years of brutal war, more brutal in Virginia than anywhere else?

The answers start with the fact that Lincoln's supposed peacetime menace sufficed to provoke the Lower South, but not the Upper South, to secede. The answers end with the fact that Lincoln's armed showdown with the South's seceding fragment destroyed the issue of peacetime menace in the (as yet) unseceding fragment. Virginians now faced only one relevant question: Who would you rather kill? And for most folk who inhabited the middle tier of the South's highly familial civilization, the Southerners farther down were blood cousins, the Yankees way above the despised outsiders.

When one adds together most Virginians' repugnance for shamefully firing on even erring southern brothers, plus

their post-April 15 sense of heightened menace to slavery, plus their new sense of menace to state rights, no wonder that Lincoln's call for Federal riflemen propelled many previous Virginia doubters of disunion to seek the Union's exit doors. The illuminating surprise is that Virginia's epic of indecision had not yet reached its climax. *After* news of Fort Sumter, *after* tidings of Lincoln's April 15 proclamation, *after* a so-called Spontaneous Popular Convention of citizens met in Richmond and demanded immediate secession, *after* citizens paraded angrily in the Richmond streets, chanting for disunion now, the official convention of the state still wished to talk—about delaying the decision for secession. Robert Scott, leader of the delayers, still fought *after* April 15 for a convention resolution that would ask the Virginia people thirty days hence, in mid-May, to choose between two options: either “separate and immediate secession” or “cooperation among the slaveholding States yet remaining in the Union.” To secure his own preference, cooperation with nonseceding states, Scott would go ahead with a border state conference near the end of May.

Scott had previously hoped that a border conference would secure a reconstructed Union. He now hoped that cooperation with the Border South would secure unanimous secession. He now feared that if Virginia seceded without a border conference, the border states would feel ignored, oppressed, unwilling to follow tyrannical secessionists like slaves. He would instead make them masters of their fate, cooperating in an Upper-South-wide rush for disunion.

Scott thus celebrated his proposed delay as “a straight road to secession,” for “I cannot doubt that all the Border States will act together...with the Southern States.”²⁰ But over half his supporters, unreconstructable Unionists, liked his delay because they did not doubt that the border states would act together with the northern states. As the secessionist George Randolph saw Robert Scott, “the gentleman proposes to get out” not by seceding but “by getting the States, that everybody knows will not secede, to join with Virginia in a consultation.”²¹ On April 17, a Virginia convention majority still almost approved Scott's delay. Scott lost by only 79-64. A

swing of eight votes would have given the delayer his triumph.

At this climactic juncture, Henry Wise could abide procrastination no longer. A day earlier, on April 16, the ex-governor, despite lacking his old authority, had ordered state troops to seize the federal government's army facility at Harpers Ferry and the naval installation at the Gosport Yards. Then on April 17, right after Robert Scott's narrow loss and at the very moment the unauthorized seizures were occurring, Wise rose in the convention. He placed his huge horse pistol before him. He snapped open his pocket watch and announced in hushed tones that at this hour, by his command, Virginia was at war with the federal government. If anyone wished to shoot him for treason, they would have to wrestle away his pistol.

Ten feet in front of Wise, ex-President John Tyler turned his chair around, tears streaming down his worn face, to cheer as the spellbinder ripped into the stalling Unionists. To an eyewitness, Wise seemed “supernaturally excited. His features were as sharp and rigid as bronze. His hair stood off from his head, as if charged with electricity.”²² Why can't you realize, he shouted at his foes, now as “white and pale as the wall,” that Lincoln's bloodthirsty proclamation makes waverers into traitors? The tyrant's troops now menace your folks. You must now decide whether to kill your kin. You must

decide whether to return the murder weapons that I have ordered Virginia's patriots to seize. You must now decide whether to secede from the despot or assassinate *me*.

Henry Wise hardly here saved Virginia's secession. Too many reasons compelled Virginians to fight alongside southern cousins, if a fight commenced. The fight had begun. Forces north and south of Virginia had started a war that would not go away. But Henry Wise probably forced many reluctant Virginians to accept the unavoidable fact of war days or weeks before these delayers would have otherwise faced this dreaded music. And the image of Wise screaming there, pocket watch and horse pistol before him, surely epitomized how reluctantly Virginians faced this decision.

Shortly after the convention voted down Robert Scott's delaying resolution and Wise screamed at the delayers, Virginia's convention voted 88-55 to recommend immediate secession to the state's voters. On May 23, the Virginia citizens voted for disunion more decisively, 125,950-20,373.



Virginny, Mother of “Old Dominion” Presidents and other (Wise) things, is asked by Mrs. Davis to try a cup of Secession tea—and finds DEATH in the pot!

Many northern cartoons satirized Virginia's decision to secede.

But a critical Virginia decision remained unmade. Would the western Virginia counties accept the majority's decision? In the Virginia convention, the western delegates had denounced the slaveholders' tax breaks as more menac-

the West Virginia battlefields. As commander of the Virginia army, Robert E. Lee fought first in West Virginia in mid-September 1861. On this largely Unionist terrain, Lee's vaunted tactical genius yielded not his characteristic aggression

president's law enforcers. Meanwhile, most other Virginians found their kinsmen in the great family of insulted Southerners. They also decided that whatever had been true in peaceable Union, coercive war against the Southern Confederacy menaced slavery and state rights too much for slaveholders to be shooting slaveholders.

From most Virginians' priorities, akin to most Middle South voters' attitudes, Jefferson Davis harvested a militarily crucial majority of Upper South warriors, to buttress his majority of Lower South partisans. In contrast, from most northwestern Virginians' priorities, akin to most Border South voters' attitudes, Abraham Lincoln harvested a militarily critical majority of Border South warriors, to buttress his northern majority of Americans.

Davis' Middle South crop enabled him to avoid an abortive Civil War. Lincoln's Border South crop gave him the better chance to win a long war of attrition. Virginia's brilliant epic, culminating in delayed, divided decision, had conditioned the structure of a national epic more brilliant still.

In the perspective of the ensuing Civil War saga, Virginia's secession decision gains the fourth quality of an epic: not only great importance and vivid stars and rich subtlety but also stunning ironies. Ironically, the Upper South in general and Virginia in particular, having rejected secession in the prewar period, became the primary battleground for the Lower South's war. Still more ironically, the prewar eastern Virginians, having trembled at western Virginia nonslaveholders' antislavery threat, made that threat killing by seeking to drag those opponents out of their beloved Union. Most ironically of all, the secessionists, having spied Lincoln's possible menace, made that menace almost instantaneous, just as Unionists had predicted, by trading a slavery-protecting Union for a potentially abolitionizing civil war.

Just how much did disunionists hasten slavery's demise? For those who love to guess about historical might-have-beens, it's great fun to speculate about how long U.S. slavery might have lasted without the disunionists, without secession, and without war. This speculator guesses that without abolition in a civil war, slavery might have lasted in the Up-



Confederate dead near Spotsylvania photographed after being laid out for burial.

Almost all twenty-first century folks find horror in the Civil War killing. Almost all loathe the conception of a severed Union. Almost all wish that abolition could have come at lower cost.

ing than Lincoln's alleged abolitionism. These delegates voted 26-5 against secession on April 17. Their constituents voted down disunion by a 3-1 margin on May 23. These thirty-three Virginia counties contained 24 percent of Virginia's peoples and 33 percent of its whites but only 3.2 percent of its slaves. Wheeling was five times closer to Pittsburgh than to Richmond, and the Wheeling area traded ten times more with the nonslaveholding than with the slaveholding states.

Between June 11 and 20, 1861, the western Virginians met in convention in Wheeling. The convention in effect seceded from Virginia and stayed in the Union as the new state of West Virginia. Virginia lay shattered. The most slaveholding portion, like most of the rest of the Middle South, entered the Confederacy. The most nonslaveholding portion, like most of the Border South, remained in the Union.

The military importance of this split decision immediately became obvious on

but uncharacteristic abject retreats, culminating with his withdrawal from West Virginia in late October 1861. The names "Granny Lee" and "Evacuating Lee" trailed after Virginia's surrendering savior, with of all people George McClellan (despite his usual timidity) seizing the spotlight in the Union's triumph. (William Rosecrans, as usual underrated, more deserved the glory.)

Robert E. Lee's sour beginning in largely nonslaveholding West Virginia showed that all those southern alarmists in all those slavery controversies had been right that slavery might be vulnerable to internal and external menace, especially at the Slave South's borders. Under the inescapable pressure of military combat, when men had to choose whether they should kill Northerners or Southerners, most northwestern Virginians found Ohioans and Pennsylvanians closer kin than South Carolinians. They also decided that they loved the Union too much for Americans to be shooting their

per South until Teddy Roosevelt's time and in the Lower South until FDR's.

If so, a final irony intrudes for those who would understand Virginia's mid-nineteenth century tale of menace to slavery, menace to state rights, and menace to kin. Almost all twenty-first century folks find horror in the Civil War killing. Almost all loathe the conception of a severed Union. Almost all wish that abolition could have come at lower costs. But surely one of the lessons of Virginia's epic—the lesson that Henry Wise at last hammered into Robert Scott's reluctant skull—is that we all sometimes must face unspeakable realities. So a latter-day colorblind republican might well mutter an ironic, final hurrah for the disunionists, who sped up abolition by many years, maybe even by a century. ■

WILLIAM W. FREEHLING is Singletary Professor of the Humanities at the University of Kentucky. In September, the Oxford University Press will publish the paperback edition of his latest book, *The South versus The South: How Anti-Confederates Shaped the Course of the Civil War*.

NOTES


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A SINGLE GRAND VICTORY The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas

By Ethan S. Rafuse (Wilmington, Delaware:
SR Books, 2002, Pp. 232 est., paper, \$17.95,
ISBN: 0-8420-2876-5).

West Point professor Ethan Rafuse's new book *A Single Grand Victory* is volume seven of the American Crisis Series edited by Steven Woodworth. Despite a few quibbles with the book's presentation, *A Single Grand Victory* is a worthy addition to the series. While acknowledging the previous excellent work of William C. Davis and John Hennessy in their respective books *Battle at Bull Run* and *The First Battle of Manassas*, the author seeks to expand our understanding of the first major campaign of the Civil War by also discussing the social, political, economic, and gender-related factors that led to the outbreak of civil strife. Indeed, the author has mined the wealth of current research and scholarship pertaining to cultural influences and summarizes the findings well. Soldier motivation and the factors that led each side to expect a war that would be largely decided in one decisive battle are also examined.

The sections covering the campaign and battle are written in a lively fashion with many first-person accounts woven seamlessly into the text. Though no groundbreaking discoveries are made, the analysis throughout is sound. Unfortunately, the reader's understanding of the Manassas Campaign's operational and tactical movements is hampered by maps that are both too few and lacking in detail. For example, in a battle often characterized by uncoordinated regimental level attacks, the maps are mostly brigade-level and lack important terrain features.

Though not necessarily meriting great criticism, some omissions in the text are curious. For instance, the author mentions the civilian spectators only in passing and chooses not to delve into the Bee/Jackson controversy, limiting the treatment of the subject to a short paragraph. In his analysis of the battle, Rafuse does not criticize McDowell's decision to make Tyler's diversion on the same flank where the main attack was to be made. No order-of-battle or discussion of weapons, tactics, or training is included either.

These criticisms aside, Rafuse has written a solid overview of the First Manassas campaign that places military events in a cultural context. The general reader especially will find the book's comprehensive coverage of the campaign and battle to be in-

BRIEFINGS *Reviews*

teresting and informative. On the other hand, though the discussion of the campaign's operational elements is particularly useful to students of military history, readers interested mainly in the battle's tactical details will still find Hennessy's book to be the best source available. —Andrew J Wagenhoffer, M.D.
Vancouver, WA

C.S.S. VIRGINIA Mistress of Hampton Roads

By John V. Quarstein; G. Richard Hoffeditz
and J. Michael Moore, research assistants
(Appomattox, Va.: H.E. Howard, Inc., 2000.
Pp. 367, \$25.00, ISBN-156190-118-0).

"The swift work done by the Merrimac on this occasion spread consternation throughout the Northern States. The blockade of the Atlantic Coast maintained at that time could not last long before this mighty and invulnerable engine of destruction....The most alarming crisis of the Civil War was at hand." Thus wrote a newspaper correspondent about the naval battle of March 8, 1862, quoted in John V. Quarstein's book, *C.S.S. Virginia: Mistress of Hampton Roads*. The Merrimac referred to was, of course, the C.S.S. *Virginia*, renamed by the Confederacy after the reconstruction of the captured U.S. vessel. *The Mistress of Hampton Roads* traces the odyssey of the vessel through her history in United States' service, her Confederate service as the *Virginia*, and her final destruction at the hands of her creators.

This study is important, not only for its well-documented treatment of the development of the ironclad and the dramatic events of March 8 and 9, 1862, but for placing the *Virginia* in the larger context of the early phases of the Peninsula Campaign. Particularly instructive are Quarstein's selections of dispatches written by land-bound generals on both sides. This is, however, primarily a naval history and the author's treatment of the appearance of the "huge monster" in Hampton Roads and the two days of battle there is both stirring and scholarly.

Some readers will find, however, that the book's chief value lies not in Quarstein's excellent and well written history, but in the inclusion of the service records of the 431 officers and men assigned to the *Virginia* as well as a separate listing of the C.S. Army volunteers who served aboard the ironclad. This is the first complete listing of the *Virginia's* crew to appear in print.

On the last page of the text, Quarstein quotes Major William Norris, a Confederate secret service agent and a crew member of the *Virginia*, "...there was a peculiar fitness in the


name we gave her. In Virginia, of Virginia iron and wood, and by Virginians she was built... and in Virginia's waters..she made a record which shall live forever."

C.S.S. Virginia: Mistress of Hampton Roads is a remarkable story about a remarkable ship and her crew, well told and well documented. This is a first-rate history in every respect.

—Ron Furquerson
Richmond, Virginia

UNCOMMON SOLDIERS Harvey Reid and the 22nd Wisconsin March With Sherman

Edited by Frank L. Byrne (The University of
Tennessee Press, 2001. Pp. 336, 18 photos
and illustrations, 1 map, \$32.00 cloth,
ISBN 1-57233-129-1).



Originally published in 1965 under the title *A View From Headquarters*, the Civil War letters of Harvey Reid won instant acclaim for the delightfully entertaining manner in which the author recounts in vivid detail his service with the 22nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry. Organized in the fall of 1862, the 22nd Wisconsin is conspicuous by its lack of renown. Plagued by an inept commander and hard luck for much of its service, the regiment suffered misfortune when nearly 200 of its men were captured at Thompson's Station, Tennessee, on March 4-5, 1863. Less than three weeks later the remainder of the regiment was surrounded and captured at Brentwood by Nathan Bedford Forrest. Exchanged in May, the regiment spent a year reorganizing and then on garrison duty before its return to active operations during the Atlanta Campaign. From that moment until the close of hostilities the regiment fought with Sherman and participated in the March to the Sea and through the Carolinas.

Reid, a former teacher and headquarters clerk, chronicles his service and that of his regiment in letters to his wife and family that are rich in content and style. Penetrating and insightful, Reid's letters reflect his keen sense of history as they document the prevailing opinions and reactions of the common soldiers to the central issues of the day. His per-

ceptions of the people and events that surrounded him unveil the soul of the army and stir in readers a genuine pathos for the men who experienced war in all its horror as soldiers of the Republic.

The book compares favorably to classics such as John Billings' *Hardtack and Coffee* or Horace Porter's *Campaigning With Grant*. Complementing Reid's letters in this volume are the equally good memoirs of William H. McIntosh, another veteran of the 22nd Wisconsin, that flesh out Reid's account of the March to the Sea and add a greater dimension of critical analysis to the pivotal events of the campaign through the southern heartland. Thus *Uncommon Soldiers* makes a marvelous addition to the University of Tennessee's *Voices of the Civil War* series and will grace any collection.

—Terrence Winschel
Vicksburg Battlefield Park

ALL'S FOR THE BEST

The Civil War Reminiscences and Letters of Daniel W. Sawtelle

By Peter H. Buckingham (ed.) (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2001. Pp. 361, foreword, introduction, illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. \$34.00, ISBN: 1-57233-136-4

Daniel W. Sawtelle was born in 1838 and lived his early life on the frontier of north-eastern Maine. Accustomed from an early age to hunt in the mountainous forests of his native state, Sawtelle was a hard working farmer who waited until February 1862 to join the Union army. His desire to provide for his parents and family accounted for his hesitation. He only joined the 8th Maine when it became apparent that the war would last a long time and demand more men than originally anticipated.

For two years, Sawtelle was busy with occupation duties on the coast of South Carolina. He saw his first man killed in March 1863, when his and several other regiments briefly occupied Jacksonville, Florida. They came under fire from a piece of heavy Confederate artillery mounted on a railroad car. The real war, however, came in May 1864, when the 8th Maine went into action as part of the XVIII Corps of the Army of the James. Sawtelle experienced the grueling challenges of the Cold Harbor, Petersburg, and Appomattox campaigns, serving most of the time as a division sharpshooter.

This is one of the most interesting soldier books I have read in a long while. Sawtelle wrote his reminiscences in 1912, but the long wait did not dull the memory of his wartime experiences. His style lacks sophistication but the vitality of his emotions and the sharpness of his descriptions come through. His memoirs are compelling. No other soldier memoir

so vividly captures the life of occupiers along the coast of South Carolina. Sawtelle described the suffering he endured while lying sick from fever in a hospital bed, the varied qualities of nursing care, and the diet of patients. He provides a very good description of the June 3 attack at Cold Harbor, and offers a lot of insights into the activities of sharpshooters along the Petersburg lines from July to the end of the campaign. Sawtelle was involved in the capture and defense of Fort Harrison during the fifth offensive at Petersburg. He also offers one of the most detailed descriptions of the rules followed by Civil War soldiers when playing baseball. Several accounts by soldiers who served along the Atlantic coast and then wound up in the Army of the James have been published recently, but none are better than this one.

The reminiscences, which cover 196 pages of the book, are far better than the letters, which cover 133 pages and were written from November 1862 to April 1865. The latter tend to deal with matters so mundane as to be hardly worth publishing. But the reminiscences amply justify the publication of the book. One ends them wishing Sawtelle had continued the story of his life as he tried to make a living in Maine, then moved west, eventually to reside in Oregon. He died in 1931 at age 93.

The University of Tennessee Press deserves a hearty round of applause for the success of its *Voices of the Civil War* series. It is the most important collection of recently published soldier accounts of the Civil War. The series editor, Frank L. Byrne, and the editors at the press have maintained an impressive level of quality, both in the value of what the soldiers have to say and in the editorial work that goes into the volumes, even though each book is edited by a different person.

—Earl J. Hess
Lincoln Memorial University

FROM THE FLAME OF BATTLE TO THE FIERY CROSS

The 3rd Tennessee Volunteer Infantry Regiment

By James Van Eldik (Las Cruces, New Mexico: Yucca Free Press, 2001. Pp. vii, 392, illustrations, maps, bibliography, index. \$25.00, ISBN: 1-881325-47-4).

One of the staple genres of Civil War literature has been the regimental history, and like many other genres, regimental histories have often been oriented to the eastern theatre. It is therefore refreshing to see a regimental history of the 3rd Tennessee, a unit that saw service in almost every major battle west of the Alleghenies.

Van Eldik traces the history of the regiment from the start of the war to its baptism of fire at Fort Donelson, its brief period of



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captivity, and then its return to active service. Under the leadership of John C. Brown, the 3rd became a dependable outfit, fighting at Chickasaw Bayou, Raymond, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, several major engagements in the 1864 Atlanta Campaign, John B. Hood's disastrous foray into Tennessee, and the war's final battle at Bentonville. Although original sources on the regiment are somewhat scarce, the author has been able to make good use of what is available—the *Official Records* and, most importantly, the regimental rolls.

Unlike some regimental histories in which every soldier is a hero, Van Eldik notes that the 3rd Tennessee had its share of shirkers. One soldier, a Private J.P. Caldwell, was able to serve out the entire war without seeing a shot fired in anger. Also of interest is Van Eldik's coverage of the postwar activities of the men. These ranged from entering politics to helping found the Ku Klux Klan. Finally, using the regimental rollbook, Van Eldik includes a complete roster of the regiment and details of the service record of every member.

The book does have its flaws. As with so many regimental histories, when it comes to larger issues the author makes a great many generalizations, some of which do not stand up to extended scrutiny. In addition, one sees far too many errors in the text. The name Chickamauga, for example, has three different spellings. Like so many books these days, the hand of a good copy editor is missing.

These matters aside, for anyone interested in the western theatre, this book is well worth the time. It is a good contribution to the literature on a part of the Civil War that is still very much neglected.

—R.L. DiNardo

USMC Command and Staff College
Quantico, Virginia

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR, VOLUME 5

Edited by Peter Cozzens (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002. Pp. xxiii, 705, \$39.95, ISBN 0-5202-404-4).

During the 1880s, *The Century Magazine*, hoping to increase circulation, published a series of articles on the Civil War. Written by famous participants in the conflict, these essays proved so popular that the magazine doubled its circulation. Later, the series editors, Clarence Clough Buell and Robert Underwood Johnson, published a four volume compilation under the same series title: *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. These volumes remain, to this day, a major source on the 1861-1865 conflict.

Little known, however, is the fact that other magazines and newspapers published similar such essay series. These included the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, the *Philadelphia Weekly Press*, *Magazine of American History with Notes and Queries*, *National Tribune*,

Hearst's Magazine, *Ohio Soldier*, *Blue and Gray*, *Scribner's Magazine*, *Atlantic Monthly*, *Galaxy*, *McClure's*, *Overland Monthly*, *United Service*, and *Cosmopolitan*.

Noted Civil War military historian Peter Cozzens has combed these sources, made some hard decisions, and produced what is now volume 5 of *Battles and Leaders*. Most of the articles come from *Century Magazine* and the *Philadelphia Times* and include such writers as U. S. Grant, Joshua Chamberlain, P.G.T. Beauregard, Dabney Maury, William T. Sherman, and Rutherford B. Hayes. The volume begins with two opposite points of view on John Brown's Raid and ends with an intriguing interview of James Longstreet by *newsman* and New South advocate, Henry W. Grady.

Peter Cozzens has done professional historians and amateur buffs alike a real service. I know that, in my case, this volume will take its place on my bookshelf next to the original volumes of *Battles and Leaders*, and I plan to refer to it regularly.

—John F. Marszalek

Mississippi State University

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AT SEA

By Spencer C. Tucker (SR Books: 2001. Pp. 192, maps, illustrations, bibliography, and index. \$17.95, ISBN 0-8420-2868-4).

Spencer Tucker has written an excellent short history of America's Civil War as it was fought on the rivers, coastal harbors, and the sea. Although land battles have always seemed to take center stage—and are favored by Civil War enthusiasts and reenactors—the Union navy's control of the rivers and blockade of major Southern ports was a primary factor in the outcome of the war.

The major naval engagements are expertly described. In addition to the running gun battle between the *Monitor* and *Virginia* at Hampton Roads, Virginia—and the last hurrah of the C.S.S. *Alabama* as she went down before the guns of the U.S.S. *Kearsarge* off the coast of France—other important naval conflicts are recounted. The Union navy's victorious assaults on Port Royal, New Orleans, Charleston, Mobile Bay, and Fort Fisher live once again as told in vivid detail.

The deeds of naval officers and men—both Union and Confederate—become as heroic as any account of soldiers dashing across open fields in the face of enemy fire. The larger than life figures of David G. Farragut, David O. Porter, John A. Winslow, and Raphael Semmes are only a few of the men who would leave their indelible mark on naval history.

Advances in naval technology were remarkable by-products of the conflict. Armor-plated steam-powered warships, submarines and mines, and Dahlgren and Gatling

guns, soon changed the way future wars at sea would be fought.

Tucker's book will give the reader a new appreciation of the naval operations of the Civil War that eventually turned the tide of victory in favor of the Union.

—A. H. "Bud" Feuer
Roanoke, Virginia

STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTLAND The Campaigns from Fort Henry to Corinth

By Stephen D. Engle. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2001. Pp. xxi, 251. \$34.95, ISBN 0-8032-1818-4).

Most Civil War military history studies address one battle or campaign as if it occurred in a vacuum. Several such books have been published on the western battles of Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and the siege of Corinth, Mississippi. Professor Stephen D. Engle of Florida Atlantic University has taken a new look at these three operations and presented them as what they really were—a single three-month-long campaign for control of the Confederate heartland. This book not only covers the military aspects of the campaign, but it also shows how it fit into the overall war strategy, how military politicking affected it, and the significance of its outcome.

Engle's excellent work shows how strategically important Tennessee and northern Mississippi and Alabama were to the Confederacy and how the region was open to invasion by way of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. He also succinctly covers the military operations at Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and Corinth, and shows how the campaign's outcome affected both sides.

What is particularly interesting is the author's coverage of military politics. Both North and South performed poorly in addressing the Heartland's military needs. The Union divided responsibility for the area between rival generals, Henry Halleck and Don Carlos Buell. This rivalry prevented the two from cooperating in an attempt to wrest control of Tennessee from the enemy. The South placed the region under Albert Sidney Johnston, but he became focused on central Kentucky, tended to allow Leonidas Polk virtual autonomy along the Mississippi River, and generally ignored the crucial Tennessee River. Of all the personalities involved in the struggle for the Heartland, Ulysses S. Grant emerged as the most competent and aggressive.

Struggle for the Heartland is a great addition to the University of Nebraska Press' series, *Great Campaigns of the Civil War*. It is a fine example of the growing trend to incorporate economic, political, and social studies into military history.

—Terry L. Jones,
University of Louisiana at Monroe

Crossfire

(continued from page 7) the case of some of them requires that they fear us. War is hell—but it is not the only hell or the worst one.

—Albert Castel, Hillsdale, Michigan

WILLIAM FREEHLING RESPONDS:

Mr. Castel twists some phrases that I wish I had made immune to twisting. For example, instead of announcing that Grant ordered Sherman to the sea, I say that Union troops formed the first landed anaconda by marching to the sea. Instead of anointing Buell the first to occupy Louisville, I say he was easily occupying the city at the time of the Donelson campaign. Instead of proclaiming that 27,000 white East Tennesseans joined Burnside's specific army, I say the 27,000 joined the Union military machine. Instead of saying that Sherman "encircled" Atlanta, I say that Uncle Billy tightened a siege. Mr. Castel retorts that Sherman instead cut railroad lines. But surely Sherman tightened a siege precisely by cutting railroad lines; that is a key point in Mr. Castel's excellent Atlanta book.

Even if I had totally muffed all the above phrasings, and even if someone calls Mr. Castel right in his debatable position on the Donelson breakout, right in his unconditional reading of the Confederate government's highly conditional emancipation, right in his curious certitude about Chickamauga, he would still be indulging in a vice of our field. I mean the zeal to dismiss a large point (in this case, the importance of nonbattlefield causes) on the basis of a handful of allegedly erroneous, largely irrelevant details (in this case, the minutia of battlefield skirmish). Why does this distracting mode of picky criticism engulf our field more than others?

And why should non-opponents pick at each other? His paragraph on my "basic facts" aside, Mr. Castel cheers my basic point: "that too much Civil War military history focuses too narrowly on battles while neglecting the broader context." Mr. Castel would call that broader context "Clausevitzism" or some such, not, heaven forbid, "social history."

I'll use whatever lingo he likes, if he continues to emphasize the only point that relates to socio-military history, in his Nine Point Misreading of a Kentucky Basketball Fan's Minutia. Mr. Castel swishes a three pointer when he points out that I ignore Sherman's distinction between using black soldiers in back line garrisons and in front line combat. I stress that point in *South versus South*; it explains so much about the social drama of black emancipation, about the military drama of Union victory, about northern racism, about Lincoln as well as Sherman. But unaccountably, I left that major point out of my article. Thanks to Mr. Castel for correcting my omission.

If Civil War buffs collaborate in that constructive spirit, we will indeed create a more

sophisticated Socio-Military synthesis (or if you will, a new "Clausevitzism"—Military synthesis); the fine *North & South* is going to be among our best vehicles; and my fellow academics are going to jump aboard rather than being run over.


CAUSES AND EFFECTS

I am enjoying your magazine. Please keep discussing causes and effects, rather than just the battles. It puts the suffering into context. And, it disabuses those who would try to manipulate history for their own purposes.

—Chris Centner, via N&S website

SABOTAGE

Kudos for D.H. Rule's "Sultana: A Case For Sabotage" (N&S, vol. 5, #1, Dec. 2001)! An excellent piece of detective work. I had long suspected Confederate involvement, and specifically the Courtenay coal (or firewood) bomb, but lacked the details you unearthed. The case might not hold up in a court, but it would do for a retaliatory strike. I believe that this was part of a three-step effort: (1) largely self-initiated strikes by "civilians," in the hope of monetary gain as well as damage to the enemy; (2) government-sanctioned military operations under the Act of February 17, 1864; and (3) the steps taken in early 1865 to bring about a central military organization for covert or special operations (see Tidwell's *April '65*). I would be inclined to reserve the word "sabo-



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tage" for the first, for CSA authorities took pains to distinguish participants in the later phases from "amateurs." (This partook of the early attitude toward privateering.) It was in transition from one to two that Courtenay sought authorization from President Davis (December 7, 1863, letter), and it was under the authority of the February 17, 1864, Act that Seddon commissioned Courtenay (letter of March 9, 1864).

Citation of the Thatchers for the photo on page 84 suggests that you have been in touch with the descendants and are perhaps aware of the article on the Courtenay coal bomb in *Military Collector & Historian* (Vol. XI, No. 1, Spring 1959, pp. 7-8), by James A. Shutt and Joseph Thatcher, Courtenay's great-grandson. Courtenay had moved with his family to England in 1864, fearing retaliation. Interestingly, in approaching the British (November 24, 1864, letter to Lord Richard Grosvenor), he claimed exclusive use of his invention by his "independent 'corps'" back in America. So, while he was presumably not personally involved, his devices were still in CSA hands. I've imagined that the horror of *Sultana* (seen as a successful strike compounded by the careless overcrowding), as well as the other distractions you note, caused all who were "in the know" to stay mum, and Courtenay appears not to have returned until the 1870s.... —David W. Gaddy, via email

★ ★ ★

Volume 5, Number 1, of *North & South* featured the article "Sultana: A Case for Sabotage" by D. H. Rule. There are at least five main arguments against Rule's supposition:

1) Robert Loudon, the person who claimed he destroyed the *Sultana*, was a convicted murderer, mail smuggler, and arsonist. He lacked credibility and made his claim while he was drinking heavily.

2) His closest associate, Absalom C. Grimes, did not corroborate Loudon's supposed sabotage in his memoirs, even though his writings were never meant to go public. Although Grimes admitted that Loudon had set fire to the steamboat *Ruth*, he never mentioned the *Sultana*, which would have been the biggest "prize" ever for the boat burners.

3) William C. Streeter, the only witness to Loudon's claim, appears to have suffered from a bit of hero worshiping. Although Streeter was supposedly "a loyal Union man, ...and a respected member of the Grand Army of the Republic" he waited more than twenty years to break a story about the sabotage of the *Sultana*. His statements in the 1888 newspaper article—that Loudon was "a young, vigorous daredevil," "cool and calculating," and "a remarkable man" who "possessed bravery of a certain kind...equal to that of any man who ever lived"—would lead one to suspect that he actually envied Loudon and believed anything that Loudon said.

4) The way Loudon supposedly placed the coal torpedo aboard the *Sultana* is highly suspicious. He would have had to make his way past a handful of guards, an entire boatload of paroled prisoners, the crew of the boat, and the coal stokers in front of the boilers in order to place his torpedo in the coal bins while the *Sultana* was docked at Memphis. After leaving Memphis the *Sultana* took on 1,000 bushels of coal, which would have been dumped directly on top of any "torpedo." If the torpedo had been buried then it would not have been shoveled into the fires of the *Sultana* until most of the new coal was gone, and the explosion would have occurred much farther upriver.

5) The way that Rule claims that the boat was destroyed is inconsistent with the facts and eyewitness reports of the actual destruction. If a torpedo had exploded inside the furnace, which was under the front section of the boilers, the blast would have torn out the bottom of the boilers and the escaping steam would have gone downward and forward. Instead, the explosion came from the rear of the boilers and went upward, tearing apart the upper decks.

And what caused this explosion? A number of steamboat engineers and boiler mechanics testified before the investigating bodies that examined the disaster and determined that a number of factors caused the explosion, including poorly designed boilers, top-heaviness, a lack of ballast, and careening. However, the main cause was determined to be a lack of sufficient water in the boilers. One engineer stated, "In the case of the *Sultana*... I am inclined to believe that the explosion took place from a deficiency of water in the boilers..." while another testified, "In my opinion boilers never explode except from the absence of sufficient water in them."

In the end, the experts seemed to be vindicated by the eyewitness statement of one of the surviving prisoners. Just prior to the explosion, Corporal Robert M. Elza (3rd Tenn. Cav) witnessed second engineer Samuel Clemens tinkering with the water level. Elza wrote, "I heard the engineer complain of his boilers being too full of water to make Chute No. 40, as it took a great deal of steam. He then blew some water out and closed the valve and struck the gauge, the boiler being still full of water. The engineer said, 'D—m, it is not enough,' blowing the water out the second time. He closed the valve and struck the gauge, and a dry steam whistle began to sound. At once I realized the danger, and went to my partner.... I said, 'the engineer had—' and at that juncture she blew up."


When all of the facts and the eyewitness accounts are taken into consideration, Rule's case for sabotage simply falls apart.

—Gene Salecker, via email

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
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